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SUMMARY 
This thesis is comprised of three essays that examine three contemporary themes in UK 
higher education that have emerged, particularly over the past two decades, within an 
expanding higher education sector.  
 
The first essay focuses on the issue of Vice Chancellor (VC) pay, which has risen 
considerably in real terms since the early 1990s. Vice Chancellors are among the 
highest paid public sector CEOs and the level and annual increase in pay generates an 
annual furore in the popular media and from teaching and lecturers’ unions. 
Specifically, we investigate whether VC pay awards are justified, given that VCs now 
require greater managerial skills than in the past due to the complexity and the size of 
the institutions they now manage. We find that VC pay is related to success in 
furthering university expansion and is associated with success in widening participation 
in accordance with current government policy, which suggests that there may be scope 
in introducing some performance element in VC pay determination. There is also 
evidence that internal pay structure and external comparable pay are important in 
determining VC pay.  
 
 
ii 
 
 
The second essay is set against the backdrop of rising student debt and examines student 
debt expectation. We offer a novel contribution to the limited literature that exists on 
this issue. We find that expected debt is related to student demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, future earnings expectations, student time preference and risk 
taking behaviour. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the current system of student 
financial support has little effect on debt expectations and may compromise HE 
participation particularly amongst students in the lower socio-economic groups.  
 
The final essay investigates the upward drift in the percentage share of ‘good’ degree 
classifications in UK higher education, which increased considerably since the mid- 
2000s and coincides with a rise in the maximum limit universities are allowed to charge 
potential students for tuition. We find evidence of grade inflation in UK higher 
education since the mid-2000s which coincides with the sharp increase in fees students 
were obliged to pay. Thus, degree classifications may lose their worth as signals of 
graduate ability and the current system of degree classification may need some revision 
if correct signals of graduate ability and effort are to be sent to interested parties. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
This thesis comprises three essays that examine three contemporary issues relating to 
UK higher education that have surfaced as a result of the changing nature of UK higher 
education over the past half century in terms of its size and funding.  
 
The first essay concerns Vice Chancellor (VC)1 pay which in the UK has increased 
considerably over the past two decades. It has also become an issue of public debate 
receiving attention in the educational press and has also been raised in government. This 
essay attempts to shed light on the question as to whether such increases in pay can be 
justified. The empirical analysis is conducted using a large, national, and 
comprehensive dataset which gives more precise estimates of the factors that determine 
VC pay than those reported to date for the limited research that exists in this area. 
 
The second essay concerns the issue of student debt and in particular the factors that 
influence student debt expectations once students are in higher education. Student 
funding has undergone major reforms over the past two decade in the UK including the 
replacement of the maintenance grant with maintenance loans and the introduction of 
tuition fees to cover some of the resource costs of university tuition. These changes, for 
the majority of students, manifest themselves in increasing student/graduate 
indebtedness. With much debate on the potential negative effect that rising 
student/graduate debt exerts on higher education participation rates particularly amongst 
potential students from less advantaged socio-economic groups there has been very little 
research into the factors that could influence student expected debt. The empirical 
analysis is conducted using a questionnaire administered to students in a single 
educational establishment the responses to which provide a rich and original dataset. 
These data are analysed in a more rigorous statistical manner that has been employed 
                                                 
1 ‘VC’ will be used as a generic term to describe all heads of UK higher educational institutions (unless 
otherwise stated) encompassing: Vice Chancellors; Principals; Rectors; Directors and Provosts. 
2 
 
previously. In so doing we offer a novel contribution to the contemporary literature on 
this topic.   
 
The third essay is concerned with students’ performance in UK higher education in 
terms of their final degree classification and in particular the continual increase in the 
proportion of ‘good’ honour degrees awarded since the early 1990s. This trend has 
brought with it the charge of ‘grade inflation’ that may be a result of falling standards in 
UK higher education. The compression or the ‘bunching’ of degrees in the top end of 
the grading distribution can also send confusing signals to potential employers in regard 
to the ‘quality’ of new graduates. These issues have received attention in the educational 
and national press. Moreover, there has been recent concern in government over the 
worth of the current classification system. Surprisingly, there has been very little 
empirical research using UK data on this issue. This essay uses recent institution level 
data to empirically examine the factors that are associated with the recent rise in the 
proportion of good degrees awarded and is complemented with an analysis of student 
performance using student level administrative data. This essay therefore contributes to 
the relatively thin UK literature that exists in this area and sheds light on whether grade 
inflation has occurred in UK higher education in recent times. 
 
The following two sections provide an overview of the relevant changes in the 
landscape of UK higher education that have influenced the three issues described above. 
This is followed by a more detailed account of the contextual background specific to 
each issue. Collectively, these sections provide the motivation for the empirical analysis 
undertaken in each of the three essays.  
 
1.1 The Size and Structure of UK Higher Education 
 
The first UK University was founded in Oxford in 1169 and about 40 years later the 
University of Cambridge was established. In the middle ages four more universities 
were established in Scotland. During the late 19th and early 20th century the number of 
UK universities increased with the establishment of ‘civic’ and ‘red brick’ universities. 
Prior to 1963 there were 31 UK universities (Taylor, 2003).  
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Over the past 50 years the UK higher education sector has gone through substantial 
reform and growth. One can identify three major policy changes over the period when 
the number of UK universities increased considerably. The first followed the 
publication of the report by the Committee on Higher Education in 1963 (Robbins, 
1963). This resulted in 10 colleges of advanced technology (CATs) being granted 
university status by the Privy Council and a further 10 ‘plateglass’ universities were 
also created.  These universities together with those that were created before the 1960s 
will be collectively referred to as ‘pre-1992 universities’ henceforth. The second major 
expansion followed the publication of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, 
which paved the way for the Privy Council to grant university status to 38 former 
polytechnics and several other higher education institutions shortly after 1992. These 
‘new’ universities will be collectively referred to as ‘post-1992 universities’. In 1997 
there were 115 UK universities including the constituent colleges of the University of 
London and Wales (National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997). The 
third expansion came in the wake of the publication of the Higher Education White 
Paper in 2003 (Department for Education and Skills, 2003a). Several, former university 
colleges and other higher education institutions were granted university status and these 
universities will be referred to as ‘post-2003 universities’ henceforth. By 2010/11 there 
were 129 universities of these 19 were former university colleges or colleges of higher 
education prior to 2003. Moreover, UK universities no longer offer a narrow portfolio 
of ‘traditional’ academic degree programmes but offer a wide range of programmes that 
now include vocational as well as academic pathways. 
 
It should be recognised that the higher education institutions (HEIs) that comprise the 
UK higher education sector differ markedly in terms of their history but they also differ 
in terms of their organisational structure, size and the markets for which they cater 
(Dolton and Makepeace, 1982; Parry, 2006). In addition to universities that have 
independent degree awarding powers, the UK HE sector includes university colleges, 
colleges of higher education, and specialist higher education and postgraduate 
institutions (e.g. arts and music colleges, colleges/schools of medicine and nursing, and 
teacher training colleges). In 1997/98 there were 176 publically funded HEIs in the UK 
and by 2010/11 there were 165 such institutions. This fall in the number of institutions 
is in part due to several mergers and the demise of a small number of institutions. 
Appendix A1  provides a chronology of UK HEIs based on the date of their creation 
4 
 
and the nature of the programmes offered from the medieval period to 2011 and 
appendix A2 documents some of the major mergers in UK higher education between 
1994/95 and 2009/10. 
 
Although the actual number of HEIs fell between 1997/98 and 2010/11 the ‘size’ of 
these institutions, in terms of their student body, increased considerably. Greenaway 
and Haynes (2003) noted that in the early 1960s there were about 400,000 full-time and 
part-time students in UK higher education and between 1980/81 and 1999/00 the 
number of full-time students doubled. Dolton, et al. (1997) reported similar findings 
suggesting that between 1989/90 and 1994/95 there was a 61% increase in higher 
education enrolments.2 Data compiled by the Higher Education Statistical Agency 
(HESA) in 2012, see figure 1.1, suggests that between the academic years 1995/96 and 
2010/11 the number of students (full-time and part-time) in UK higher education 
increased by 45.4%, but there was a slight fall in the rate of increase in participation 
around 2006/07 when tuition fees were raised (see below). By the academic year 
2010/11 HEIs enrolled about 2.5 million students (Higher Education Statistical Agency, 
2012). If we exclude further education students, and students enrolled at the Open 
University and specialist medical colleges/schools then, in terms of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) students, the number students on higher education programmes increased by one-
third since 1995/96 to just under 1.9 million by 2010/11. In particular there was a sharp 
increase in the number of FTE students in UK higher education between 2001/02 to 
2009/10 (Higher Education Statistical Agency (a), various years). 
                                                 
2 Macfarlane (1992)  points out that between 1980/81 and 1988/89 there was a 20% increase in full-time 
new undergraduate enrolment in UK higher education but much of this increase was concentrated in 
Polytechnics and colleges of higher education. 
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Figure 1.1 Students in UK Higher Education 1995/96-2010/11 
 
Note: FTE HE students exclude those enrolled at the Open University and specialist 
colleges (e.g. Royal College of Nursing). 
 
 
Although there has been a significant increase in the number of students in UK higher 
education there are differences in the pattern of student enrolment between institution 
types.  Total FTE enrolments in pre-1992 universities was greater than in other any 
other HEI type between the academic years 1995/96 through 2010/11, see appendix A3. 
For instance, in 2010/11 pre-1992 and post-1992 universities enrolled about 866,000 
FTE and 701,000 FTE students respectively. This represented just-under 1.6 million 
FTE students on higher education programmes in these universities, an increase of 45% 
since 1995/96. In contrast post-2003 universities are much smaller and in 2010/11 they 
enrolled about 163,000 FTE students in total, an increase of 69% since 1995/96. There 
is also a niche of ‘Arts’ colleges, specialising in a range of arts, drama and music 
qualifications (academic as well as vocational) that, in 2010/11 enrolled about 43,200 
total FTEs students (Higher Education Statistical Agency (a), various years). These 
figures indicate that the size of post-2003 universities in terms of FTE enrolments 
increased at a greater rate than their pre-1992 and post-1992 counterparts over the 
sample period.  
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However, between 1995/96 and 2010/11 although larger in terms of total FTE student 
enrolments pre-1992 enrolled fewer FTE students on average than post-1992. It should 
also be noted that pre-1992 universities are more numerous than other types of HEIs 
(see appendix A1). Figure 1.2 shows that in 2010/11 pre-1992 universities enrolled just 
over 14,600 FTE students on average, an increase of about 59% since 1995/96, whereas 
post-1992 universities enrolled about 17,500 on average, an increase of just over 38% 
over the same period.  Average FTE enrolments in post-2003 universities increased to 
7,400 in 2010/11 which represents a 61% increase over the sample period. Arts colleges 
enrolled about 2,100 FTE students on average in 2010/11 (Higher Education Statistical 
Agency (a), various years).3  
 
Figure 1.2 Average FTE HE Students in UK Higher Education 1995/96-2010/11  
(by institution type) 
 
Note: The Open University, postgraduate institutions and other small HEIs are excluded. 
 
                                                 
3 University size can also be measured by the number of academic staff employed or by university 
income. Based on these measures pre-1992 and post-1992 universities remain the largest institutions in 
2010/11 - pre-1992 universities employed 1,815 academic staff on average, and received about £298.9m 
in total income. Post-1992 employed 1,149 academic staff on average, and received about £159.9m in 
total income. In the same year post-2003 universities employed 468 academic staff on average, and 
received about £66.2m. Arts colleges employed about 274 academic staff on average and received about 
£29.6m in total income (Higher Education Statistical Agency (b), Various years). 
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The increase in participation in UK HE and its changing nature, particularly since the 
late 1980s, and early 1990s is seen as a major movement from an ‘elite’ system of 
higher education catering for the needs and abilities of the few to a system of ‘mass’ 
higher education catering for the needs and abilities of the many (Fulton, 1991; Parry, 
2006). A key feature of the post Robbins expansion of UK higher education was to 
increase participation rates amongst young adults. In the early 1970s only 10% of 
school leavers participated in higher education (Dolton, et al., 1997).4 The policy was 
given a major impetus in September 1997 when the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
declared a desire to increase higher education participation of young adults particularly 
amongst those from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds and those from 
families with no previous participation in higher education.5 The government set out to 
widen and increase higher education participation to 50% in the 17-30 year age category 
by 2010 (Department for Education and Skills, 2003a: 57).6  Evidence suggests that this 
policy has been reasonably successful (Crawford, 2012). Lindley and Machin (2012) 
report that initial participation rates amongst full-time undergraduate students under the 
age of 21 and domiciled in Great Britain increased from 13% in 1981 to 35% in 2001. 
This change also impacted on the profile of students in UK higher education. More 
women and mature students entered higher education and the academic background of 
students became more diverse – some entering higher education through ‘non-
traditional’ (non A-level) routes (i.e., through GNVQ and Access qualifications). 
Dolton and Lin (2011) find that the introduction of loans and fees in the 1990s to some 
extent negatively impacted on HE participation. However, recent figures indicate that 
initial participation for all 17-30 year old UK domiciled students in 2010/11 was about 
47% up from about 42% in 2006/07. Moreover, the participation rate for students under 
21 years of age from the lower social classes increased from 30.6% in 2006/07 to 39.8% 
by 2010/11. Participation rates for students from low participation areas also increased 
between these years from 9% to 10.5% (Higher Education Statistical Agency, 2012). 
                                                 
4 It is instructive to note that in the early 1960s the participation rate was 5% for students in the 17-30 
year category and increased to about 35% by 2001 (Finegold, 2006). 
5 This commitment was made in a speech delivered at the Labour Party’s conference in 1997. 
6Widening participation in higher education is also seen as a vehicle to reduce socio-economic inequality 
in educational attainment, and widen labour market opportunities. Evidence suggests that the expansion 
of UK higher education during the 1980s and early 1990s actually benefitted the children from relatively 
rich backgrounds (Machin and Vignoles, 2004; Blanden and Machin, 2004), though there has been some 
narrowing of the inequality gap in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Raffe, et al., 2006).   
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1.2 Funding Students in UK Higher Education 
 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, problems associated with funding a growing 
‘mass’ higher education system emerged (Dolton, et al., 1997; Greenaway and Haynes, 
2003) and quasi-market elements were introduced into UK higher education.7  Public 
funding for research would be determined by the quality (determined by the institution’s 
performance in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)),8 the volume of research 
undertaken (determined by the number of research ‘active’ staff), and the relative cost 
of research in specific areas (i.e., laboratory based or ‘library’ based).  
 
A competitive process for allocating teaching funds was also introduced that required 
universities to bid for funding according to the number of FTE students they anticipate 
to enrol and the cost of the undergraduate programme offered. Institutions were then 
ranked according to their anticipated costs, with those with the lowest cost per FTE 
student the first to be allocated funds in accordance to their subject mix (i.e., laboratory 
based versus classroom based programmes, see appendix A4 for further details). 
Glennerster (1991) commented that such a bidding process based on price would reduce 
the quality of higher education provision. This process was replaced in the late 1990s by 
a more direct formulaic mechanism where different subjects are allocated to one of four 
‘price groups’ which determines the funds that each institution receives according to the 
number of FTE students they expect to attract in specific ‘price groups’ (see appendix 
A4). Recurrent funding (ongoing funding) or the block grant for teaching amounted to 
£4,719m in 2010/11 which represented 64% of total funds allocated to UK HEIs 
(Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2010). 
 
With constraints on public finances, particularly in the 1990s, real public funding per 
student halved between the early 1990s and 2000 (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). The 
Green Paper on The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s emphasised the 
need to justify the cost of higher education and to improve efficiency within the sector 
(Department of Education and Science, 1985). Concern was also raised over the quality 
                                                 
7 See Glennerster (1991) and Rothschild and White (1993) for a theoretical expositions of quasi-markets 
in higher education.  
8 The research assessment exercise (RAE), which is carried out approximately every five years, was 
introduced in 1992 to rank universities in terms of the quality of their research output. It should be noted 
that the universities grants committee (UGC) also conducted surveys of university research output in 
1986 and its successor the university funding councils carried out the research selectivity exercise in 1989 
which was also aimed at assessing the quality of research output. 
9 
 
of the programmes delivered in UK HEIs as student-staff ratios increased (Greenaway 
and Haynes, 2003; Barr, 2004). The issue of student funding led to the adoption of 
student loans and the introduction of tuition fees as an alternative method for funding 
British students in UK higher education. Up front tuition fees of £1,000 were introduced 
in the academic year 1998/99 and provided HEIs with a means by which funding per 
student could be increased. At the same time the maintenance grant was reduced to 
£1,000. In the academic year 2006/07 undergraduate students in England and Northern 
Ireland faced a deferred top-up fee of up to £3,000 as a contribution to the cost of their 
tuition rising to £3,290 in 2008/09. The Browne report (Browne, 2010) recommended 
raising the cap on tuition fees to £9,000 at the start of the academic year 2012/13. 
However, serious questions have been raised in regard to the effect that the recent 
increase in tuition fees would have on ‘widening participation’ (Micklewright, 2012; 
Chowdry, et al., 2012).  
 
Recent evidence, see figure 1.3, suggests that real tuition and teaching funding per UK 
domiciled undergraduate FTE student increased since the introduction of tuition fees in 
1998/99. From 1999/2000 funding per UK FTE student in all universities increased by 
46% from £2,762 in 1999/2000 to £4,034 in 2008/09 (see shaded bars). It is interesting 
to note that although funding remained relatively constant between 2003/04 and 
2006/07 there was a further real increase in student funding thereafter, in particular after 
the introduction of top-up fees. These trends are broadly similar to the trends found by 
Dearden et. al. (2012) who report a rise in the average level of funding per UK 
undergraduates since the introduction of top-up fees in 2006/07. Figure 1.3 also reveals 
a large differential between the average funding per UK undergraduate FTE students in 
pre-1992 universities compared to both post-1992 and post-2003 universities. Pre-1992 
universities achieved about 46% more funding per undergraduate student than post-
1992 over the period and about one and a half as much funding per student as post-2003 
universities. The differences in funding between universities depicted in figure 1.3 is in 
part due to composition effects (i.e. due to subject mix), with pre-1992 offering more 
high cost laboratory based programmes that attract greater income from funding 
councils (see appendix A3). 
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Figure 1.3 Average Tuition and Teaching Funding per UK Domiciled FTE 
Undergraduates 1997/98-2008/09 (£ in 1998 prices)
 
 Note; The Open University, postgraduate institutions and other small HEIs are excluded. 
 
 
It is instructive to note that university performance indicators relating to student non-
continuation rates, graduate employment rates, and the number students enrolled from 
under-represented groups were published by the Higher Education Statistical Agency in 
December 1999.9  Although these indicators did not initially affect the funding HEIs 
received from the Funding Councils, those relating to access or ‘widening participation’ 
do currently influence the allocation of additional funds for teaching provision. At the 
same time new demands were placed on higher education institutions such as more 
engagement with the local and national community through innovation and knowledge 
transfer. 
 
Moreover, there was also a desire for universities to become more self-financing by 
generating alternative income streams to those traditionally available from central 
                                                 
9 UK higher education performance indicators from 2002/03 onwards and details on their construction 
can be found at: http://www.hesa.ac.uk, Performance indicators for the period 1996/97 to 2001/02 are 
available via the Higher Education Founding Council for England’s (HEFCE) website: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/data/pi/.  
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government, for example, by attracting more fee-paying students (largely from 
overseas) and sourcing alternative income streams (e.g. from research contracts). As the 
competition for fee-paying students and scarce research funds increased, universities 
have had to employ highly paid specialist staff, academic and non-academic (e.g. 
finance and marketing specialists), to identify, manage, and compete for these 
alternative streams of income, driving up staff costs.  
 
In 2010/11 total government spending on higher education was £15.7b which 
represented about 2.4% of total government expenditure (HM Treasury, 2012). The 
sector had a total income of £27.5b. A large proportion of total income, 32.2% was is in 
the form of funding council grants, 32.6% in the form of tuition fees and education 
contracts, and 16.1% in research grants and contracts.10 The sector employed just under 
382,000 individuals in 2010/11 of which about 47% were academic staff. Staff costs are 
a high proportion of total sector expenditure comprising about 56% of all expenditure in 
2010/11, a rise of 3% in nominal terms over the previous year (Higher Education 
Statistical Agency, 2012). 
 
1.3  Essay 1: On the Determinants of Vice-Chancellor Pay in UK 
Higher Education 
 
It is against the changing landscape of UK higher education over the past half century, 
as described in the previous section, that the role of the Vice Chancellor (VC) has 
evolved from a relatively comfortable end of career appointment as the head of an 
academic patriarchy to corporate executive. The modern VC now requires the 
leadership and managerial skills to enable them to run large and complex higher 
education institutions, similar to those needed to manage and lead large private sector 
companies (Jarret, 1985; Farnham and Jones, 1998; Smith, et al., 1999; Shattock, 1999; 
Bargh, et al., 2000; Whitchurch, 2006).11 Moreover, it is the VC who is ultimately 
responsible for academic standards, facilitating research, financial probity, and defining 
the institution’s short and long term strategy (Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). In 
many cases they would also be seen as a vehicle for attracting private funds and 
                                                 
10Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) headline statistics available at http://www.hesa.ac.uk/ . 
Accessed 12/10/2010. 
11 This view of VCs has been contested in the literature (Cyert, 1975; Cyert and March, 1992; Ehrenberg, 
2003) 
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securing institutional growth. We would expect VC pay to reflect these demands and 
success in meeting the institution’s mission and goals. Furthermore, if potential 
candidates with the required managerial talent to run a modern UK university are in 
scarce supply then the competition for such scarce and specialised human capital could 
bid up VC pay (Dolton and Ma, 2003).   
 
The pay of UK VCs has been the subject of public scrutiny since 1994 when UK higher 
education institutions (HEIs) were required to publicly disclose the annual pay of the 
head of their institution. It was reported that in 2008/09 12 VCs received annual pay in 
excess of £300,000, up from five in 2007/08, and 30 earned over £250,000, up from 16 
in the previous year (Times Higher Education (THE)).12  More recent evidence suggests 
that this was still the case in 2010/11.13 The rate of increase in VC pay has been of 
particular concern.  The then Business Secretary, Vince Cable, was reported as ‘taken 
aback’ by the 10% rise in VC pay in the academic year 2008/09 and urged ‘restraint’ in 
pay awards granted to top university officers (Daily Telegraph, May 26, 2010).  
 
It is informative to note that general concern has also been raised in the UK regarding 
the pay of senior executives in major public sector organisations. For instance, in July 
2003 the then deputy prime minister, John Prescott, criticised the £200,000 annual 
salary offered by Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council to fill its CEO position, 
pointing out that it exceeded the salary of the Prime Minister. More recently the 
incumbent Communities and Local Government Secretary, Eric Pickles, criticised the 
‘bloated salaries’ paid to senior town hall officials emphasising that some pay packages 
would ‘....make a football manager blush’. He further commented that only a few public 
sector workers should expect to earn over £100,000 (The Telegraph, July 10, 2010).  
Moreover, Hutton (2011) reported that median pay of senior executives in the public 
sector was found to be widely dispersed with VCs amongst the top earners. 
 
Figure 1.4 depicts the national trend in real VC pay between 1997 and 2009, which 
increased by 59% in real terms over this period. In contrast full-time lecturers and 
senior academics in higher education received just under a 16% real pay increase over 
the same period. The evidence suggests that on average VCs received a pay award that 
                                                 
12 ‘It was fun while it lasted’, THE, April 1, 2010. 
13 See accompanying tables to ‘Executive overdrive’, THE, May 10, 2012. 
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was above that of lecturers by a factor close to four over the period and we also note a 
widening of the differential over time. These differences have been the major focus of 
criticism vented in the media and by lecturer unions with assertions that the pay awards 
granted to VCs have been ‘outrageous’, ‘shameless’,  ‘despicable’ and unjust (see 
appendix A5). We also note that between 2002 and 2009 the pay of VCs, on average, 
was about 25% greater than the pay of private sector UK senior managers.  
 
Figure 1.4 Average Annual Real Pay 1997 – 2009 (£ in 1998 prices) 
 
Notes: 
(a) All VCs include: Vice Chancellors; Principals; Rectors; Directors and Provosts of all UK HEIs 
including: universities, university colleges, other higher education institutions, and art, drama, and 
music colleges. 
(b) Lecturers include: full-time university lecturers and senior academics excluding professors. 
(c) CEO/Director: full-time directors and CEOs that head large enterprises and organisations 
employing over 500 people at single or multiple site establishments. 
(d) Senior managers: senior managers and executives of large enterprises and organisations 
employing over 500 people at single or multiple site establishments. 
 
 
In the light of the evidence presented in figure 1.4 VC pay in the UK may not be 
excessive on the basis that their remuneration should be comparable to that received by 
private sector CEOs with similar executive responsibilities. Between 1997 and 2009 
average VC pay was about 74% of the annual pay of full-time CEOs/Directors of large 
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private sector enterprises. Moreover, CEO/Director pay increased by 75% compared to 
the 59% received by VCs. It is also interesting to remark that between 2000 and 2004 
there was a general downward trend in CEO/Directors’ pay, possibly due to the 
disclosure requirement set out by the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations,14 
although there was an increase between 2006 and 2007 and then a subsequent fall in the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2007. The trends in pay reported in figure 1.4 may 
suggest that VCs of HEIs are ‘underpaid’ when compared to their private sector 
counterparts who manage similar ‘large’ and complex organisations (Tarbert, et al., 
2008).  
 
Despite a high level of public interest in VC pay only a few studies on the VC labour 
market, and in particular the pay determining process, have been undertaken. The 
primary motivation of this research is to examine the relationship between VC pay and 
performance and in so doing seek to shed some light on whether or not their headline 
pay awards are justified. Specifically, we investigate if there is scope to introduce 
incentive based pay schemes into the determination of VC pay, by examining the 
association between VC pay and widely published performance indicators, including 
those related to widening participation and other ‘mission’ based measures. In this 
particular respect we offer a novel contribution to the literature.  
 
We also consider whether remuneration committees set VC pay commensurate with the 
earnings of other VCs who run comparable institutions. We examine this issue using an 
external pay ‘benchmark’ that remuneration committees are assumed to use when 
setting VC pay (Committee of University Chairs, 2009:27). 
 
In regard to the changing role of the modern VC, within a changing higher education 
landscape, a secondary motivation for this research is to examine the extent to which 
VC personal characteristics impact on pay. These considerations have been explored 
before but we employ a large and more comprehensive dataset than those used in 
previous research in this area. In so doing we offer, not only an update of the VC pay 
                                                 
14 This is a legal requirement that binds listed UK firms to publish director remuneration reports since the 
financial year ending 31st December 2002. Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/pdfs/uksi_20021986_en.pdf, accessed 21/10/11. 
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determining process, but also more precise and consistent set of estimates than those 
currently reported in the literature.  
 
1.4 Essay 2: Students’ Expectations of Debt in UK Higher Education 
 
Student loans were introduced in 1990/91 to help alleviate the public cost of funding 
students in UK higher education. Advocates of student loans argue that graduates are 
the main beneficiaries of higher education (e.g., in terms of enhanced future earnings)15  
and should contribute to its cost (Barr 1991, 1993). Others see the system of loans, and 
the resultant fear of accumulated debt, as a potential barrier to access into higher 
education. This is particularly evident for potential students from lower socio-economic 
groups, which may compromise the policy objective to ‘widen participation’ (Knowles, 
2000; Callender, 2003; Callender and Jackson, 2005; Micklewright, 2012). Government 
concern over the perception of student debt and participation in higher education was 
highlighted in the lead up to the 2004 Higher Education Act (Department for Education 
and Skills, 2003b). Indeed in 2001, the then Secretary of State for Education, Estelle 
Morris, highlighted the issue of student debt and its negative impact on widening 
participation in higher education by stating:  
 
‘I recognise that for many lower-income families the fear of debt is a 
real worry and could act as a bar to higher education. I want to make 
sure that our future reform tackles this problem.’ 16 
 
However, participation in higher education for young students has increased since the 
introduction of loans (Department for Education and Skills, 2003b). Moreover, there is 
evidence that financial support for students maybe inadequate (Callender and 
Willkinson, 2003), which can contribute to rising student debt. The expectation of a 
higher debt burden whilst in higher education can potentially affect student performance 
by reducing the time students devote to study (e.g., through taking on part-time 
employment by necessity) and/or alter a student’s future opportunity set (e.g., the ability 
to secure a mortgage or the ability to pursue particular labour market choices). 
                                                 
15 Several UK studies have found evidence of substantial returns to higher education qualifications (see, 
for example, Harkness and Machin, 1999; Blundell, et al., 2000; Bratti, et al., 2008) 
16 Estelle Morris' speech: Key challenges of the next decade. London Guildhall University: 22 October, 
2001. 
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This essay contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the sparse 
literature on the factors that influence student indebtedness in UK higher education. 
This is all the more surprising given the reduction in public support for UK students’ 
maintenance and the introduction of tuition fees and their subsequent increase over the 
past two decades. Knowledge of these factors would clearly help policy makers to 
carefully target the limited funds available for student support. 
 
Second, it uses unique survey data to examine the factors expected, a priori, to 
influence student debt expectations from which the factors that have a significant 
association with student debt can be identified. In particular, these data allow several 
issues to be explored that have only minimum exposure in the literature. These include 
the influence that student future wage expectations (taken as a proxy for future financial 
expectations), risk attitudes, time preference, and aversion to debt have on expected 
indebtedness.  The survey data used in this essay were collected via a questionnaire 
administered to undergraduate students in seminars and lectures during the winter of the 
academic year 2008/09. 
 
Third, and on a more general level, the essay contributes to the literature on the 
determinants of individual debt.  
 
1.5 Essay 3: Grade Inflation in UK Higher Education 
 
 
As UK higher education expanded in the 1990s there was a corresponding increase in 
the relative proportion of ‘good’ honour (or bachelor) degrees awarded which has 
become the focus for assessing the extent of ‘grade inflation’ or falling educational 
standards in the UK literature (Johnes, 2004). In the UK a ‘good’ degree is often taken 
as the award of either a first class honours degree (1st, the top classification) or an upper 
second (2:1, the second best ranked classification). In general, there are four UK degree 
classes that are awarded with honours and a further two without. Degree classifications 
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that are currently awarded in UK higher education and the threshold delineating each 
degree class can be found in appendix A6.17  
 
The quality of bachelor degrees is controlled according to nationally established and 
organised procedures. The award indicates that a student has undertaken an agreed level 
and period of study, and achieved an externally verified quality benchmark in terms of 
their assessments. The final degree classification is determined by the number of credits 
a student achieves in a variety of assessments averaged over their undergraduate career; 
usually the credits gained in their second and final year of study, with more weight 
placed on final year credits.18  
 
The increase in the proportion of ‘good’ honours degrees awarded particularly since the 
early 1990s and the consequent compression of degrees in the top end of the degree 
class distribution has led some commentators to question the usefulness of the current 
degree classification system to provide correct signals on graduate quality. It has been a 
particular feature in the educational and national press (see appendix A7), and concern 
over the phenomenon has been expressed by government, and employers’ associations. 
For instance, Alan Smithers from the University of Buckingham remarked that there has 
been ‘extraordinary grade inflation’ as UK higher education expanded from the 1990s 
onwards. He also questioned the worth of final degree classifications to employers, 
suggesting the need to introduce a ‘starred first’ classification to identify ‘exceptional 
talent’ (Mail Online, September 23, 2011).19  
 
It may also be the case that university grading practices such as awarding ‘borderline’ 
students with the higher degree classification, giving higher weightings to final year 
performance, the use of the ‘whole grading distribution’ when awarding marks, giving 
credit to low marks or failure on coursework or in examinations, have all contributed to 
‘grade inflation’ over the past two decades. These actions it is argued favours the award 
                                                 
17 This system of classification has its origins in the 19th century and was first introduced at the University 
of Oxford. The university did not differentiate between its ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ seconds (2:2) until the late 
1970s. 
18 Typically undergraduates take 6 20-credit single modules each academic year accounting for 120 
credits per year. Students can combine ‘double’ modules, worth 40 credits with single modules in any 
year. 
19‘First-class? Top-level degrees up by 34% prompting fresh concerns over grade inflation’. Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2040806/First-class-Top-level-degrees-34-prompting-fresh-
concerns-grade-inflation.html. Accessed 28/07/2013 
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of a ‘good’ degree and is partly due to a ‘demand for success by fee-paying 
undergraduates’ and over time it is expected that ‘everyone will get a first or a 2:1’ (The 
Sunday Times, July 14, 2013).20 It was also reported that staff appraisal should be linked 
to the number of ‘good’ degrees awarded which would increase the proportion of these 
awards.21 The incumbent Universities Minister, David Willets insisted that the ‘whole 
system of degree classification does need reform’ (The Telegraph, January 12, 2012).22  
 
Employers’ associations have raised concern of over the ‘bunching’ of grades in the top 
end of the grade distribution which send confusing signals on graduate quality and 
ability to potential employers when making job offers. The chief executive of the 
Association of Graduate Recruiters stated that:  
 
“Over the past decade, employers have become less confident that the 
degree class in itself tells them what they need to know… to some extent, 
it is an indication that the degree class isn’t regarded now as being the 
most accurate measurement of what somebody has achieved” (Carl 
Gilleard, The Telegraph, January 12, 2012).   
 
In the light of these issues the UK government has recently recommended that a Higher 
Education Achievement Report (HEAR) should be introduced in 2010/11 as ‘the key 
vehicle for measuring and recording student achievement’ and to be available alongside 
information on students’ degree class (Universities UK, 2007:5).23 Indeed in the 
academic year 2013/14 the Higher Education Academy launched a 2-year pilot study 
that involves implementing a grade point average (GPA) system, as used in US 
universities and colleges, to provide a more detailed measure of a student’s academic 
performance than captured by the current classification system. It is also worth noting 
that ‘grade inflation’ is an international phenomenon with recent concern being raised in 
several other western countries.24 
 
                                                 
20 ‘Universities twist their rules to award more firsts’. 
21 ‘Surrey considered grade targets for staff appraisals’ (Times Higher Education, July 18, 2013). 
22 ‘Warning over 'grade inflation' as first-class degrees double’. 
23 See also ‘Degree classification is unfair to many graduates’ (The Guardian, April 18, 2001) 
24 For the US see: ‘A history of college grade inflation’ (New York Times, July 14, 2011); ‘To Stop 
Grade Inflation, Just Stop Inflating Grades’ (The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 25, 2012); ‘Want a 
higher GPA? Go to a private college’ (New York Times, April 19, 2010), ‘An eye for an A: Economics 
focus’ (The Economist, March 9, 2002); and for Germany see: ‘Unis und Prüflinge auf Kuschelkurs: 
Wertlose Traumnoten’ – ‘Universities and examinees cosies: worthless dream scores’ (Das Spiegel, 
December 12, 2002). 
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Figure 1.5 depicts recent trends in honour degrees that were awarded to graduating 
students by all UK HEIs from 1994/95 through 2011/12.  We first note that the 
proportion of ‘good’ honour degrees awarded increased from 47.3% of all new 
graduates in 1994/95 to 61.4% in 2011/12.25 In absolute terms the number of ‘good’ 
degrees awarded increased by 113% over the period from 112,511 to 240,030 (see 
appendix A8).  
 
Figure 1.5 Honour Degree (Bachelors) Classifications (%)  
All UK HEIs 1994/95 - 2011/12 
 
Notes: All institutions include pre-1992, post-1992, and post-2003 universities, the Open 
University, Colleges of the Arts, and small specialist colleges, but exclude Medical Schools.  
 
 
 
This increase was not constant over this period. Between 2001/02 to 2006/07 the 
proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded increased by 0.6 percentage points from 53.8% to 
54.4%. However, there was a substantial rise between 2006/07 (the academic year in 
                                                 
25 Johnes and Taylor (1987) present data that shows the share of ‘good’ honour degrees awarded by UK 
universities (excluding the University of  Oxford as at the time there was no division in the second class 
classification) increased from about 31% in 1976 to about 37.5% in 1984 (see table 1, p. 584). Macfarlane 
(1992) reports that the proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded to male (female) students increased from 
32% (33%) in 1981 to about 44% (47%) by 1988 and for both gender groups the figure was 49% in 1990. 
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which top-up fees were introduced) and 2011/12 with the proportion of good degrees 
increasing by seven percentage points. It also evident that the increase in ‘good’ degrees 
was largely driven by an increasing proportion of 1st class degrees awarded to new 
graduates which more than doubled from just over 7% in 1994/95 to just under 16% in 
2011/12. This increase represents a 269.2% increase in the actual number of 1st 
awarded. In contrast the proportion of 2:1s increased by only 5.2 percentage points from 
40.4% to 45.6%, an 86.2% increase in the actual number of 2:1s awarded over the 
period. We also note that the proportion of third class degrees awarded fell from 8.7% 
in 1996/97 to 6.1% in 2011/12. 
 
The evidence presented above can be used to support the notion of ‘grade inflation’ in 
UK higher education. The phenomenon has been explored in the literature before, but 
very little research has been conducted using UK data. Moreover, previous UK research 
has generally focussed on pre and post-1992 universities. The primary focus of this 
essay is to examine ‘grade inflation’ in the UK using publically available institution 
level data. These data provide information on degree classifications that were awarded 
by pre-1992, post-1992 and post-2003 universities covering a seven year period from 
2006 to 2012 given data limitations. We therefore provide a wider coverage of ‘grade 
inflation’ in UK higher education institutions than provided in previous published UK 
research. We are also able to include variables that may explain grade inflation, a priori, 
that have not featured in previous research. We therefore offer a useful contribution to 
the thin body of literature that exists on this issue.  
 
The primary analysis is complemented by an examination of ‘good’ degrees awarded to 
five cohorts of graduates from 2006 to 2010 in a single UK university using individual 
level administrative data. These data contain rich information that allows us to control 
for a variety of student characteristics that are not generally publically available and are 
expected, a priori, to impact on student performance. The results from this analysis help 
to confirm the robustness of the findings from the primary analysis as well as 
contributing to the literature on undergraduate degree performance. 
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Chapter 2 
 
On the Determination of Vice-Chancellor 
Pay in UK Higher Education 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the UK concern has been raised regarding the pay awards granted to senior 
executives in major public sector organisations. In particular some VCs are amongst the 
highest paid in the public sector (Hutton, 2011). It is therefore not surprising that VC 
pay has often been a focus of public criticism from lecturer unions and students. The 
former may perceive the pay awards as ‘unjust’ in comparison to the pay awarded to 
teaching and research staff and the latter may perceive increasing tuition fees as 
contributing to VC pay awards.  
 
The primary motivation for this essay is to examine the relationship between VC pay 
and performance. We examine VC performance across two dimensions: first, in terms 
of the financial performance of the university and second, in terms of furthering the 
institution’s ‘mission’ or strategic plan. The latter typically includes statements on 
‘widening participation’, teaching and research excellence, and growth. We also 
consider whether the remuneration committee sets their VC’s pay with ‘equity’ 
considerations in mind. The remuneration committee may not want to grant huge pay 
awards that may appear unjustified in order to assuage public outrage. The committee 
may seek to award a ‘legitimate’ pay increase that would be commensurate with the pay 
of other VCs who run comparable institutions in terms of their size, university sub-
sector, or nature of student intake. We explore this issue using a suitably defined 
external pay ‘benchmark’ that remuneration committees are assumed to use when 
setting VC pay (Committee of University Chairmen, 2004:26; Committee of University 
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Chairs, 2009:27).26  Furthermore, we consider whether internal pay structures influence 
the pay determining process and infer from this whether remuneration committees seek 
to preserve pay differentials within the institution.  
 
A secondary motivation is to examine the relationship between VC personal 
characteristics and pay within a changing landscape of UK higher education. We 
employ a large and unique dataset in the empirical analysis, which is more 
comprehensive than the datasets employed in previous studies. The dataset was 
constructed from a variety of sources and covers the academic years 1994 through 2009, 
a period where there has been considerable change in the funding and nature of the UK 
higher education sector as already noted. Previous research on the determination of VC 
pay covered a period up to and including the academic year 2002 (Dolton and Ma, 
2003; Tarbert, et al., 2008). Moreover, since 2003 the UK HE sector has witnessed 
radical change. For instance, over half the institutions classified as University Colleges 
in 2002 have since been granted independent degree awarding powers by the Privy 
Council and subsequently assumed ‘university’ status. We are able to extend the period 
of analysis to examine the pay determining process for these ‘new’ VCs.  
 
Explanations of CEO pay are often couched within the framework of human capital 
theory, agency theory, tournament theory, and the theory of managerial power. A 
further motivation for this research is to identify which of these theories best explains 
the determination of VC pay in UK higher education given data constraints. This 
empirical study as well as providing new evidence on the determination of  VC pay will 
also shed light on which of the theories mentioned above best explain the pay of UK 
VCs and on a more general level it also contributes to the relatively small body of 
research on the determinants of CEO pay in the public sector.  
 
The structure of this essay is now outlined. Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the 
literature on executive compensation and VC remuneration. Section 2.3 provides a 
                                                 
26 According to the guidelines set out in these documents when setting the pay of senior officials the 
remuneration committee ‘must seek comparative information on salaries and other benefits and 
conditions of service in the higher education sector’ (CUC, 2004:26). Two primary sources of 
information are available: the CUC database which is only available to chairs of governing bodies and 
contains information on salaries, benefits and conditions of service for heads of institution; and the 
Universities and Colleges Employers Association (UCEA) that collects data on the salaries of other senior 
staff. 
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description of the evolution of VC pay between 1994/95 through 2008/09. Section 2.4 
provides a description of the data employed to examine the VC pay-performance 
relationship which is followed by a description of the data that are employed to 
investigate the VC pay-personal characteristics relationship in section 2.5. A description 
of the econometric methodologies employed is presented in section 2.6. Empirical 
results are presented in section 2.7 and some concluding remarks are presented in the 
final section. 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
 
The purpose of executive remuneration or compensation is to attract, retain, and 
motivate top managers in the interest of the parties that are most likely to be affected by 
managerial behaviour, principally the shareholders or owners of the firm. The 
relationship between executive pay and the factors that are assumed, a priori, to 
influence such rewards has received substantial attention in the academic literature. In 
particular this body of literature attempts to explain why senior executives are 
compensated above their marginal product and why such a situation may be considered 
efficient. In addition to the well-known human capital theory which suggests that pay is 
determined by years of schooling, age, and labour market experience and training 
(Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1993), three other general approaches to explain the relatively 
high levels of compensation for CEOs can be identified in the literature: agency theory 
or ‘optimal contracting’, tournament theory, and the theory of managerial power. This 
research is predominantly concerned with executive compensation in the private sector. 
However, it should be noted that these theories have been applied to the pay of public 
sector workers at lower grades to that of senior management in the UK (Croxson, et al., 
2001; Burgess, et al., 2001; Croxson and Atkinson, 2001; Ratto, et al., 2001; Burgess, 
et al., 2002; Burgess, et al., 2004), The purpose of this section is to provide a general 
overview of the theories and results from the empirical literature that can potentially 
explain VC pay. 
 
This section is arranged as follows. The following sub-sections provide an overview of 
the theories that have been developed to explain senior managerial pay: agency theory; 
tournament theory; and the theory of managerial power, accompanied with the relevant 
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empirical literature. This is followed by a review of the small body of literature that is 
specifically focussed on UK VC pay. A summary is provided in the final section. 
 
2.2.1 The Determination of Managerial Pay 
 
Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory or ‘optimal contracting’ focuses on the design of efficient compensation 
packages that include base salary and bonus payments, plus stock options and non-
pecuniary perks. Stock-based payments are included to provide top management with 
the necessary incentives that maximises shareholder value where managerial effort is 
unobservable or costly to monitor. This is an important consideration when there is 
some divergence of interest between shareholders (principals) and the CEO (agent) 
(Mirrlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979). The design of optimal contracts can potentially 
limit this conflict of interest. The basic model assumes that shareholders are risk neutral 
and the CEO risk averse. The CEO expends unobservable effort e which produces 
stochastic shareholder value (y): 
 
    y = e + ε where, ε ∼ N(0,σ2).   [2.1] 
 
The CEO receives compensation w(y, z), where z is a vector of observable measures of 
the contract. The CEO is assumed to have an exponential utility function of the form: 
  
         U = -exp[-r(w- C(e)]      [2.2] 
 
where  r ≥ 0 and is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and C(e) is the convex 
disutility of effort, i.e., C′, C′′ > 0. For tractability the disutility of effort is expressed in 
quadratic form: C(e) = ½ce2. Shareholders know what level of effort they want but 
cannot observe it directly. The optimum contract will maximise shareholders wealth y-w 
and will be of the linear form (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1988): 
 
      w(y) = s + βy      [2.3] 
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where s is a fixed salary and β is the pay-performance sensitivity (or sharing rate). The 
optimal contract will be subject to the CEO choosing effort e* to maximise [2.2]: 
 
     
c
βe* =      [2.4] 
 
This last expression is known as the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). The CEO 
will provide effort if [2.4] is satisfied subject to the participation constraint also being 
satisfied (i.e., the CEO’s expected utility exceeds the reservation utility or compensation 
in the next best occupation). The first best level of effort is given by 1/c which will 
occur if β = 1. By optimising over the choice of compensation contracts the firm 
chooses its optimal pay-performance sensitivity which is expressed: 
 
      
)(1
1
2 eCr
β
′′σ+
=     [2.5] 
  
Expression [2.5] states that β =1 when output is certain, i.e. σ2 =0, or when the CEO is 
risk neutral i.e. r = 0. We also note that incentives will be weaker the more risk averse 
the CEO and the greater the variation in the firm’s value. Furthermore, the CEO’s 
expected compensation can be expressed: 
     E(w) = s + β E(y)     [2.6] 
and will increase monotonically with β  to compensate for any increased risk imposed 
and the increased effort induced. Much of the empirical literature has focused on 
estimating the pay-performance sensitivity described by expression [2.3] or in the form 
of a ‘pay-change’ specification: ∆w(y) = s + β∆y. In any case executive compensation 
depends on the likelihood that the desired effort is expended. Holmstrom (1979) 
suggests that compensation should be based on stock-based measures as this provides 
information on the effort expended (the ‘informativeness principle’).There is also a 
possibility for non-stock based measures to enter into the contract (e.g. accounting 
ratios and sales growth) which may also provide information on the actions taken. 
However, Holden (2005) notes that the inclusion of stock options in senior executive 
compensation provides the executive with the incentive to take excessive risk and to 
focus on short-term corporate performance. This behaviour it is argued will be more 
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costly to the firm than to a risk adverse executive. Another negative feature of 
performance based compensation is that it provides senior executives with the 
incentives to misreport or manipulate the firm’s financial performance. Efendi, 
Srivastava and Swanson (2007) find that the likelihood of accounting irregularities and 
misreported financial statements increases the value of CEO stock options. 
 
Agency Theory: Empirical Evidence 
 
 
The early literature examining the relationship between CEO pay and performance 
using the ‘optimal contract’ framework was predominantly conducted in the US, but has 
grown considerably over the last three decades. The main focus of this research agenda 
is to explain the considerable rise in CEO compensation during the 1980s to the 
present.27   This body of research focuses, inter alia, on the relationship between 
executive pay and measures of corporate performance (e.g. changes in shareholder 
wealth, or shareholder returns and/or stock market returns), company size (e.g. sales 
revenue or value of assets) and long term incentive plans. Much of the empirical 
research conducted in the US and UK find evidence of the pay-performance sensitivity 
being higher in the US than in the UK (Main, et al., 1994; Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; 
Conyon and Murphy, 2000).28 US studies have found some evidence of a link between 
executive pay and various measures of corporate performance, corporate size, and long 
term incentive plans (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Murphy, 1985; 1986; 1999; Jensen and 
Zimmerman, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Rosen, 1992; Main, et al., 1994; Hall and 
Lieberman, 1998; Prendergast, 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen, et al., 2004; 
Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Frydman and Jenter, 2010). 
 
Studies conducted using UK data generally find that company size rather than stock-
based measures or accounting ratios has a greater influence on CEO pay (Cosh, 1975; 
Gregg, et al., 1993; Main and Johnston, 1993; Main et al, 1996; Conyon and Leech, 
                                                 
27 For comprehensive reviews of the literature see Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), Jensen et al. 
(2004) and Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a contemporary update of the US literature. 
28 Conyon and Murphy (2000) found that after controlling for firm size and other factors US CEOs earned 
190 per cent more than their UK counterparts. Moreover, the highest paid UK CEO ranked only 97th on 
the list of the most highly pain US CEO. For further international comparisons see Kaplan (1994), Abowd 
and Bognanno (1995), Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Conyon and Schwalbach (1999; 2000), Muslu (2003), 
Becker (2006) and Bruce et al. (2006). 
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1994; Conyon, et al., 1995; McKnight, 1996; Conyon, 1997; Girma, et al., 2007).29 
Buck, et al, (2003) find that the presence of long term incentive plans reduced the pay-
performance sensitivity of senior UK executives. Gregg et al., (2010) find a significant 
difference between the pay-performance sensitivities for executives of firms operating 
in the financial sector of the UK and executives of firms in other industries. They also 
confirm the general finding that company size is the dominating factor in determining 
executive pay. They also note that the pay-performance sensitivity is high when stock 
returns are relatively high, but pay is less sensitive to performance when stock returns 
are low. The recent empirical analysis of Bell and Van Reenen (2011) using a large 
sample of publically listed companies covering just under 90% of the market 
capitalization of the UK stock market between 2001-2010 find a strong relationship 
between senior management pay and various measures of company performance (such 
as shareholder return).  
 
Overall results from the UK empirical research are mixed and where a significant 
relationship between performance and pay is detected the magnitude of the effect is 
often very small suggesting that (excessive) pay awards are not optimal.30 However, 
there is strong evidence that company size has a positive and significant effect on CEO 
pay.31 
 
It is recognised that the pay of senior executives in the public sector is generally lower 
than the pay received by their counterparts in publically listed companies in the UK.  
There is a paucity of UK research on the determination of CEO pay in the public sector 
that uses the efficient contract framework.32 It is often difficult to define and measure 
the performance of public sector organisations, particularly when dealing with public 
sector services, and the degree to which performance can be attributed to CEO effort. 
Moreover, within the public sector agents may have vaguely defined tasks and face 
multiple principals who may have to compete for the agent’s effort. These 
                                                 
29 There is also evidence that a change in shareholder wealth has a significant effect on CEO pay see 
Conyon and Leech (1994) and Conyon (1997).  
30 Conyon, et al. (1995) have criticised the methodology adopted in these studies and argue that much of 
this research uses reduced form regressions and fails to measure the structural parameters of a detailed 
principal-agent model. 
31 Rosen (1992) argues that company size (measured in terms of sales) displays a robust and near 
universal relationship with executive pay. 
32 Burgess and Metcalfe (1999b) cited 133 papers. Only four were empirical studies using public sector 
data and none were on public sector CEOs.  
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characteristics of public sector organisations result in agents facing several incentive 
structures that may offset each other making the overall incentive weak (Tirole, 1994; 
Dixit, 1997; 2002). Of the few UK studies that exist on CEO pay in the public sector 
Besley and Machin (2008) modelled the pay-performance sensitivity of UK secondary 
school headmasters for the period 1994 to 2002. They found evidence of a pay-
performance gradient using publically available school performance indicators after 
controlling for head teacher and school fixed effects. They conclude that these public 
sector CEOs are not paid like public sector ‘bureaucrats’, whose pay and performance 
are not linked, but were remunerated, in part, according to their ability to raise the 
performance of their school. 
 
There is also some evidence that UK public sector workers below the grade of senior 
management respond favourably to incentive schemes where they exist, particularly in 
the education and health care sector, but since the incentives are small so too is the 
response (Burgess, et al., 2007). Whether the use of incentive schemes in public sector 
agencies is optimal is unclear. The empirical analyses of Burgess and Metcalfe (1999a) 
find incentive schemes in the UK are far less prevalent in the public than the private 
sector.33 However, within the NHS performance related pay or ‘merit’ schemes have a 
relatively long history of operation and are used to determine the remuneration of 
consultants and hospital managers (Abel and Esmail, 2008). 
 
In certain respects the pay of VCs in UK higher education can be viewed as a principal-
agent problem, but the design of an ‘optimal’ contract is fraught with difficulty in this 
context. First, unlike publically listed firms HEIs have no shareholders and are not 
quoted on the stock market. Performance, therefore, cannot be measured in terms of 
stock-based measures and incentives cannot be framed in terms of stock options. 
Moreover, it is difficult to define what exactly constitutes ‘performance’ in higher 
education, for example, income generation, research/teaching quality, student 
enrolment, etc. This issue becomes more acute given that universities are multiproduct 
organisations (Johnes, 1993). Cyert (1975) recognises the difficulties involved in 
assessing university performance. He suggested that research output should be judged in 
                                                 
33 See Burgess and Metcalfe (1999b) and Burgess et al. (2007) for a review of the UK literature on the 
pay-performance incentives in the UK public sector. See also Croxson et al. (2001), Ratto et al. (2001) 
for applications in the UK health care sector; and Croxson and Atkinson (2001), Burgess et al. (2001) for 
applications in the UK education sector. 
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terms of the quality of journals that the research appears and teaching quality be 
assessed by responses to student questionnaires. These criteria have some resonance 
with the research assessment exercise (RAE) and the National Student Survey (NSS) 
conducted in the UK that are used to assess HEIs research and teaching quality 
respectively. The results from the empirical literature in this regard are mixed but there 
is some evidence that VCs are rewarded for good financial management (proxied by 
various measures of university income), size (total student enrolment), and research 
performance (see below). However, it may be the case that VCs are appraised on other 
aspects of their performance as reflected in university league tables. For instance, 
meeting enrolment targets for students whose family have no history of HE 
participation or who are drawn from areas where HE participation is historically low. 
VC pay may be linked to success in this regard. 
 
Second, and related to the first point, it is the case that universities are run by a team 
consisting of the VC and Pro-VCs who share the workload involved in running the 
university on a day-to-day basis. This organisational structure makes it particularly 
difficult to identify which element(s) of institution performance is to be attributed to VC 
effort. 
  
Third, it is often not possible to specify precisely who the ‘principal(s)’ is(are). It can be 
argued that either the council, senate or governing body fulfils this role as the VC has to 
report to these ‘committees’ on institutional affairs. Moreover, the VC is also an 
executive member of these committees and is therefore in a position to influence 
executive decisions. In this sense, the VC can be both principal and agent. It is also the 
case that VCs face multiple ‘principals’ (e.g. government, students, staff, governors, and 
the local community). These principals may have conflicting interests and differ 
according to the power they can potentially exert over university policy (and VC pay). 
The VC will therefore face multiple tasks that would differ according to the differing 
interests of the principals. In such a situation the VC may wish to satisfy the desires of 
the most powerful principals first.  
 
The foregoing suggests that measuring VC performance is difficult and as a result the 
design of optimal contracts is a challenging task. This is compounded by the fact that 
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VCs face multiple principals, perform multiple tasks, and work as part of a team 
seeking to meet institutional goals. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that good 
financial management and furthering the institution’s mission should be rewarded. If we 
assume that a VC is mission driven then it may be possible to identify VC performance 
as meeting or furthering the institution’s mission (e.g. securing institution growth and 
widening participation). These issues are addressed in the empirical section of this 
essay. 
 
Tournament Theory 
 
In contrast to the empirical literature on optimum contracting there has been less direct 
testing of predictions from tournament theory in an empirical setting and even fewer 
studies on tournaments in public sector organisations. This lack of empirical analysis is 
partly due to the lack of suitable data particularly in the UK. Tournament theory 
attempts to explain the high level of executive pay by starting with the observation that 
workers in hierarchical organisations are paid according to their grade rather than the 
value of their marginal product (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1986). This 
framework assumes that promotion lotteries provide the necessary incentives for high 
ranking executives where executive effort again is unobservable. Firms and 
organisations are prepared to spend large sums of money on CEO salaries and benefits 
to reward capability because it also serves to motivate workers at all levels in the firm to 
work hard for promotion. Workers are ranked according to their relative performance 
and winners secure the ‘prize’, known in advance, in terms of higher pay and the 
opportunity to participate in subsequent promotional tournaments. As a fixed number of 
competitors are promoted in each round of the competition, the performance of workers 
is based on relative rather than absolute performance. The ultimate prize is promotion to 
the rank of CEO. Employees are assumed to exert effort to increase the likelihood of 
securing the ‘prize’. The effort expended depends on the differential in pay or the ‘pay 
spread’ between a high rank and a lower ranked position, the pay of and the number of 
competitors in the lottery and the likelihood of winning (McLaughlin, 1988).  
 
It should also be noted that if there is a wide dispersion of ability within the group of 
competitors then effort will decrease. Those at the top of the ability distribution will 
reduce effort as they know that they will win with almost certainty whereas those at the 
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bottom of the distribution reduce effort as they have little chance of winning. Thus the 
wider the dispersion in ability the wider is the dispersion in the chance of winning the 
promotion, and the wider the pay difference between grades must be to elicit effort. It 
also should be noted that promotional tournaments may lead to competitors sabotaging 
the output or effort of other contestants and therefore reducing the likelihood of 
opponents winning. To counter these negative effects employers may take steps to limit 
this particularly if worker marginal products are interdependent. One possible solution 
is to make executives work in teams and thereby introduce more cooperation amongst 
group members (Lazear, 1989). 
 
The basic theory as outlined in Lazear and Rosen (1981) assumes two identical workers 
(j,k) who compete in a promotion tournament based on their relative output q. Each 
worker is assumed to be risk neutral and output of the ith worker, which is additive 
across workers, can be expressed: 
 
   qi = ei + εi   where,  εi ∼ iid(0, σ2) and  i = j,k [2.7] 
 
where ei  is worker effort (input) or average output34 and εi is a random component 
(luck). Greater effort is assumed to increase productivity but is unobservable to the 
employer. The employer only observes q and is unable to distinguish between the 
amount of effort expended by the worker and the amount of ‘luck’ involved in 
producing q. The probability of j winning can be expressed: 
 
   Π = prob(qj > qk) = prob(ej - ek > εk - εj)   [2.8] 
 
     = prob(ej - ek > δ) = G(ej - ek) 
 
where δ = εk - εj, δ∼g(0, 2σ2) and G(⋅) is the CDF of δ. 
 
Each worker can increase the probability of winning by investing in skills and thus 
increasing ei. Investing in skills is costly and the individual has to balance increasing the 
probability of winning and securing the prize with the cost of investment.  Suppose that 
                                                 
34  e can also be interpreted as the level of investment in effort. 
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the cost of effort is convex in effort and denoted C(ei) which is strictly increasing i.e. 
C′(ei), C′′(ei) > 0 and utility functions linear. There are two prizes of w1 (awarded to the 
winner) and w2 (awarded to the loser), where w1 > w2.  Each worker chooses a level of 
effort input e* to maximise expected utility:  
 
 
*)e(Cw)}G(1{w(.)G
*)]eC(w[U)}G(1{*)]eC(w[U)G(*)e(EUmax
21
21*e
−×⋅−+×=
−×⋅−+−×⋅=
  [2.9] 
 
The model assumes a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and given identical workers j and k, 
their reaction functions are identical. Given symmetry then in equilibrium each worker 
supplies the same optimum level of effort i.e. e*= ej = ek, and since there is a 50/50 
chance of winning then Π = G(0) = 0.5.35 Under these conditions the equilibrium 
condition can be expressed: 
 
    (w1 – w2) *
)0(
de
dG
 = C′(e*)     [2.10] 
 
This last expression is the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) in this case and 
workers will supply effort if it is satisfied. If we define the pay spread: ∆w* = (w1 – w2), 
and g(0) = 
*
)0(
de
dG
, then we can re-express [2.10] as:  
 
    
g(0)
)(C
Δw*
e′
=       [2.11] 
 
From this last expression we see that workers will supply and invest in more effort the 
greater the spread between the winning and losing ‘prize’. We also note that if the 
probability of winning decreases the spread required between the ‘prizes’ to elicit effort 
is larger. The model can be augmented to include risk-averse individuals who would 
prefer less risk and smaller pay differentials (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
 
                                                 
35 Note that  𝐺(0) ≡ ∫ 𝑔(𝜀𝑘0−∞ − 𝜀𝑗)𝑑𝑑 where 𝑑 is the distribution function for δ and summates all 
instances where εk < εj. 
33 
 
 
 
The model also assumes a risk neutral firm operating in a competitive product and 
labour market. Competition for labour increases the total value of the prize to the point 
where it equals the firm’s expected revenues i.e., P×(ej + ek) = w1 + w2, where P is the 
unit price of output. In equilibrium this implies 
2
 P. 21 wwe +=∗  and substituting this 
expression into [2.9] (recalling that G(0) = ½), the worker’s expected utility at the 
optimum investment strategy can be expressed as:  
 
     Pe* - C(e*).     [2.12] 
 
The firm selects w1 and w2 to maximise [2.12]: 
 
   [P - C′(e*)]×(de*/dwi) = 0,  i = 1,2.    [2.13] 
 
Expression [2.13] implies that P = C′(e*), we can rewrite [2.11] as: 
 
     
g(0)
P
Δw* =      [2.14] 
 
Expression [2.14] shows that a firm’s choice of ∆w is constrained by the equilibrium 
price in both the labour and product market. All firms will offer workers the same level 
of expected utility. Firms offering workers ∆w > ∆w* will lose workers to firms 
offering ∆w = ∆w*, as workers will be supplying less effort in the latter. In contrast 
firms choosing ∆w < ∆w* will be driven out of business since the level of effort 
supplied by workers will be less than e*. Note that expression [2.14] can be generalised 
to include n-contestants and k-promotions by replacing g(0) with the probability of 
finishing kth among n-contestants. 
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Tournament Theory: Empirical Evidence 
 
Tournament theory has been applied to executive pay in private sector firms with 
varying degrees of success.36 For instance, Rosen (1986) examines a sequential 
tournament and finds that a large prize spread at the end of a career game offers the 
necessary incentive to provide effort at all stages of the game. O’Reilly, et al. (1988) 
using a sample of 105 US firms finds no evidence of tournaments but evidence counter 
to that predicted by the theory. They find that as the number of vice-presidents increase, 
the pay spread between senior executives and the president falls, which contradicts the 
implications of tournament theory. They do find some evidence that the pay of vice-
presidents has a minimal influence on the pay spread but they interpret this in terms of 
equity considerations rather than a tournament effect. In addition they find that the pay 
of members of the board of directors has a positive influence on the compensation of the 
president. Main et al. (1993) find that the pay spread between the president and vice-
presidents of US firms increases as we move up the executive hierarchy and it increases 
by 3% for every vice-president that enters a promotional tournament assuming that vice-
presidents compete for the top job in the organisation. They take this result as evidence 
of tournaments in a promotion lottery. Bognanno (2001) confirms these findings and 
Eriksson (1999) finds a significant relationship between the pay differentials of 
managers at different grades in Dutch firms. 
 
Although not strictly related to the pay of senior executives Coupe et al. (2003) find 
little evidence of tournaments in determining remuneration amongst economists in US 
economics departments. They conclude that the pay increase in the hierarchy of US 
economics departments is linked with productivity (standards) rather than tournament 
effects. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) find evidence of tournament in the US broiler 
chicken industry. They find that firms reward farmers on their relative performance: 
larger prizes induce better performance (measured by the weight of the chicken).  
 
                                                 
36 Tournament theory has also been applied in the context of sports tournaments where it is found that 
effort increases as the winning ‘prize’ increases. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) found 
that the performance of contestants in a golf tournament improved with the value of the prize. However, 
Orszag (1994) found evidence contradicting their results. Sunde (2003) found that effort increases the 
more homogeneous the contestants in tennis tournaments. Simmons and Berri (2010) found evidence of 
tournament effects in basketball.  
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Of the few UK studies Conyon et al. (2000a; 2000b) find evidence of tournaments 
determining cash and total CEO compensation in 100 large companies quoted on the 
UK stock exchange. They conclude that the pay spread increases as they move up the 
executive hierarchy and increases with the number of participants in a tournament with 
each additional executive adding about 3.5% to the pay spread.37 It is interesting to note 
that Chen et al. (2011) find no relationship between the number of contestants in the 
tournament and the level of executive pay for a sample listed Chinese firms.  
 
Audas et al. (2004) examining the pay structure of large firms in the UK financial sector 
find that as the pay spread increases, workers expend more effort. They also conclude 
that as the incidence of luck falls in a promotional tournament the greater is the effort 
expended by participants. Devaro (2006) finds that large pay spreads, in a hierarchal 
organisation, increase effort for a cross section of UK firms. The model has been 
extended to cases where there are two or more prizes (Clark and Riis, 1998; Moldovanu 
and Sela, 2001). Clark et al. (2009) finds evidence of tournaments in investigating 
workers’ well-being (job satisfaction) and pay grades.   
 
It should also be recognised that a market for scarce executive talent also exits outside 
the confines of the firm. High executive pay may simply reflect the bidding for 
executive talent in a competitive labour market (Rosen, 1981; 1982; Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008). It is also argued that the rise in US CEO pay is due to a 
rising trend in external appointments. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004; 2007) report that 
during the 1970s to the first half of the 2000s external CEO appointments in the US 
increased from 15 percent to almost one third. They state that this is a reflection of 
increasing demand for CEOs with general managerial skills that are needed to run 
modern corporations rather than firm specific skills that are not transferable between 
firms. Chan (1996)  develops a tournament model that includes both internal and 
external candidates with firm specific and general human capital respectively. The firm 
is assumed to value both firm specific and general human capital. Therefore, in order to 
win the prize (tournament) the external candidate’s general human capital will be 
valued, by the firm, more than the sum of the firm specific and general human capital 
possessed by the internal candidate. Since the firm has to compete for this general 
                                                 
37 They also conclude that the ‘tournament ratio’ is greater in the US than in the UK. 
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human capital in competitive markets there will be bidding up of pay. Thus the external 
candidate will receive a pay greater than the incumbent and the pay spread is assumed 
to widen. It is also argued that the high pay offered to external candidates can 
potentially provide workers at lower grades with the incentive to expend effort in an 
attempt to win the tournament. 
 
It is possible that VC pay is influenced by the pay packages received by those in a lower 
ranked position (e.g., a Pro-VC) or simply by the presence of highly paid academics 
and/or administrative staff (Ehrenberg, et al., 2001; Dolton and Ma, 2003). Whether the 
pay offered to the VC motivates workers employed at lower ranks to strive for the top 
position will in part depend on the pay spread between the VC and a Pro-VC say (i.e., 
Wvc – Wpvc), the extent to which internal promotion is the ‘norm’ and the probability of 
securing the prize. However, it is impossible to know the number and percentage of 
Pro-VCs competing for the office of VC. Moreover, if an institution predominantly 
appoints external candidates then there may be less incentive for incumbent workers to 
invest in effort and strive for the top position. That is, institution specific knowledge 
may be less valued than general managerial capital (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). It is 
the case that most VC appointments are external but tend to be from within the HE 
sector. Moreover, a significant proportion of appointments in pre-1992 universities tend 
to be Pro-VCs from other pre-1992 universities, and post-1992 universities have a 
propensity to appoint candidates from other post-1992 universities. Pro-VCs, or their 
equivalent, in similar institutions may be seen as the ‘heir apparent’ (Breakwell and 
Tytherleigh, 2008).  These ‘recruitment strata’ (Giddens, 1974) were found for pre-1992 
universities between 1991 and 1997, when 78% of VC appointments were from other 
pre-1992 universities (Smith, et al., 1999). For the period 1997 to 2006 the 
corresponding figure was 55% (Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). Given that 
recruitment tends to be from ‘within’ a recruitment stratum and the pay of VCs is higher 
than that of Pro-VCs there may be tournament like ‘effects’ operating in the market for 
VCs.  Pro-VCs may have an incentive to invest in effort if the ‘reward’ is promotion to 
the rank of VC in a similar organisation defined by the HEI’s sub-sector in which the 
Pro-VC is employed.  
 
Tournament theory suggests that the spread of the winning and losing prizes is larger 
the number of competitors and the chance (luck) of winning, which in turn is influenced 
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by the ability distribution of the pool of competitors. Moreover, we may expect a vacant 
VC position in a prestigious institution, noted for its quality in research and teaching to 
attract more candidates for the post than a lower ranked institution on the basis of these 
attributes. The likelihood of winning the ‘tournament’ and securing the post in a highly 
ranked institution would be lower in comparison, and pay will be higher in these 
institutions compared to a similar vacancy in a lower ranked institution. 
   
To apply tournament theory to the pay of VCs requires data on the number of 
candidates competing for the post of VC and the current pay of candidates for the post. 
Such data are simply unavailable. However, it may be the case that the internal pay 
structure in regard to senior university officers and academics may influence the pay of 
the VC, and may be an indication of tournament effects at work. Data on the number of 
highly paid staff within a particular institution are publically available which potentially 
can be used to examine tournament effects. 
 
The Theory Managerial Power 
 
The third approach, the theory of managerial power, focuses on the influence that CEOs 
have over their own pay package which is determined by the governance structure of the 
firm. The strength of this influence will depend on their relationship with the board of 
directors and/or the remuneration committee (Crystal, 1991; Main and Johnston, 1993; 
Conyon, 1997; Newman and Mozes, 1999; Conyon, 2006; Frydman and Jenter, 2010). 
It is suggested that managerial power will be strong and compensation high for a 
number of reasons. First, when the board is weak and ineffective vis-à-vis the CEO for 
instance, when board membership is large (Acharya and Volpin, 2010; Morse, et al., 
2011); second,  when outside directors have been appointed by the CEO or when the 
CEO is chairman of the board (Core, et al., 1999; Hallock, 2002); and third,  when there 
is no large outside shareholder who may subject the CEO to closer monitoring 
(Bebchuck and Fried, 2003; 2006). If such conditions are present it is argued that 
excessive executive pay arrangements can reflect adverse executive rent seeking 
behaviour rather than providing efficient incentives (Blanchard, et al., 1994; Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2001a). There is also some evidence that the composition of the 
board or remuneration committee and the level of pay enjoyed by its constituent 
members can influence awards (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; Forbes and Watson, 1993). 
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It may also be the case that the remuneration committee simply award generous 
remuneration packages to signal good managerial quality to outsiders and to limit 
retention and recruitment problems (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; 2002). However, 
CEOs are constrained from unfavourable rent seeking behaviour by the amount of 
‘outrage’ a proposed compensation package is expected to generate among relevant 
outsiders (Bebchuck and Fried, 2003; Ogden and Watson, 2004; Kuhnen and Niessen, 
2012; Rayton, et al., 2012). Such sentiments are likely to cost CEOs embarrassment and 
loss of reputation and will act to constrain excessive awards (Johnson, et al., 1997). The 
remuneration committee may also be concerned with the legitimacy of CEO pay awards 
and may seek to use external pay benchmarks (e.g., CEO pay in comparable 
corporations) when setting CEO pay (Baker, et al., 1988; Smith and Szymanski, 1995; 
Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; 2002). Such ‘equity’ concerns may be used to justify the 
pay awarded that outsiders may deem excessive. 
 
In UK higher education the governing body38 has ultimate responsibility for the conduct 
of the institution’s affairs (Committee of University Chairmen, 2002). It is chaired by an 
independent chairman and its composition includes other lay members who comprise 
the majority of the board and institution officers typically drawn from the institution’s 
own staff (academic and non-academic) including the VC and student representatives. 
The governing body also appoints a remuneration committee that reviews the pay of all 
professors and other senior (highly paid) staff including the VC. The VC and the 
chairman of the governing body are also members of the remuneration committee that 
also include lay members appointed from the governing body but its membership is 
considerably smaller (Tarbert, et al., 2008). In reviewing salaries the VC is not present 
when his/her salary is under review and this is also true for other institution officers 
who are also members of the remuneration committee. In determining the VC’s pay 
award the remuneration committee will use comparative pay information on salaries and 
benefits of VCs who head comparable institutions, typically in terms of type and size. 
The committee will also consider the VC’s performance in terms of furthering 
‘corporate’ goals when determining pay awards.39 
 
                                                 
38 The governing body in pre-1992 universities is generally known as the ‘university council’ and in post -
1992 universities it is referred to as the ‘board of governors’. 
39 This process was confirmed through interviews with the secretaries of two separate remuneration 
committees. 
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It is possible that the composition of the senate/board of governors or remuneration 
committee and their relationship with the VC could influence the remuneration package 
as suggested by the theory of managerial power. Indeed outside pressure from 
government, the media and labour unions, could act as a constraint on excessive pay 
awards.  
 
2.2.2 The Determination of VC Pay in UK Higher Education  
 
Research into the determination of VC pay in UK higher education is limited in 
comparison to the literature on the determination of CEO pay in the private sector.40 An 
early study by Bainbridge and Simpson (1996) using a cross section of 64 UK VCs and 
Principals of UK universities, for the academic year 1993/94, modelled pay as a 
function of forty-one variables capturing individual specific characteristics (including 
age, gender, educational background, and experience), and institutional factors 
(including the number of undergraduates/postgraduates, staffing levels, and financial 
variables to proxy performance). The model presented was poorly specified and appears 
to be contaminated by multicollinearity given the relatively high R2 with only a few 
estimated coefficients reaching conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Specifically, they found few significant effects from their university size variables, but 
they did find some evidence of university income (income from research grants and 
fees) exerting a positive effect on pay. Furthermore, they found some evidence that the 
public status and the academic discipline of the VC exerting significant effects on pay. 
Moreover, they found that tenure (years in post) exerted a mild but significant negative 
effect, which ran counter to their priors. Their evidence also suggested that regional and 
economic indicators had significant but opposite influence on pay (i.e., average regional 
earnings had a positive influence on pay but regional house prices had a negative 
impact).  
 
                                                 
40 There has been some empirical research in the US on the remuneration of college presidents. For 
example Ehrenburg et al. (2001) found a weak link between remuneration and institution performance 
(i.e. the presidents success in securing private donations). However, they do find some evidence linking 
the president’s tenure and experience with pay and evidence linking institution size, type and income to 
remuneration though these effects are not robust across the specifications reported. Cornell (2004) found 
that elite US universities do not find it difficult to recruit suitable candidates for the position of president 
even though they are paid significantly less and have similar skills and abilities as top corporate CEOs.   
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Dolton and Ma (2003) using a similar formulation of the earnings function to that of 
Bainbridge and Simpson (1996), estimated an earnings relationship for VCs of UK 
HEIs using a data panel covering eight academic years from 1993/94  through 2001/02. 
They reported the estimates for two models: a ‘pooled’ OLS regression for the entire 
period and a random effects model at the institutional level to take account of the 
unobservable institution heterogeneity. Given the panel nature of their dataset up to 
1007 observations and 49 explanatory variables were included in the various models 
reported although their sample size falls to 357 when reporting models that include both 
individual and institutional controls leading perhaps to imprecise estimates. Their 
models were better defined and had greater explanatory power vis-à-vis Bainbridge and 
Simpson (1996). This may be as expected given the larger dataset and the methodology 
employed. They found evidence that certain human capital variables (age, academic 
qualifications and fellowships), had positive and significant effects on pay although the 
magnitudes of these effects were relatively small. It is interesting to note that they found 
that VCs with an Oxbridge educational background received less pay than their 
counterparts without this attribute. They found little evidence that previous experience 
as a VC influenced pay. Moreover, they detected an unexpected negative relationship 
between VC pay and those previously appointed as Pro-VC.  
 
In terms of institution characteristics Dolton and Ma (2003) found some evidence of 
university type, and size (proxied by the number of cost centres, size of the student body 
and staffing levels) influencing pay. However, the significance and impact of these 
variables on pay varied across the econometric specifications reported. They also 
included controls for institution performance. These included financial performance 
indicators and the results from the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). They found 
some evidence that these controls have a positive and significant effect on pay. 
However, the use of the results from the RAE is debateable on the grounds that many of 
the institutions included in their dataset were not part of the RAE. Moreover, it is 
difficult to assess how RAE scores can be attributed to a specific VC since RAE is 
carried out over a period of about 4-5 years and it may be the case that several VCs 
could have held the office during this time period. It is also interesting to note that they 
found a negative relationship between pay and tenure, which was contrary to their 
priors, but confirms the findings of Bainbridge and Simpson (1996). Finally, they found 
that regional economic conditions exerted no influence on pay. The study also 
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investigated ‘tournament effects’ and found some evidence that the presence of highly 
paid staff increases VC pay in UK higher education. 
 
It is also debatable whether a VC fixed/random effects estimator would have been more 
appropriate instead of the university random effects estimator employed in the study. It 
would appear that controlling for unobservable VC fixed/random effects rather than 
university fixed/random effects would be more appropriate and it would seem difficult 
to justify ignoring within-VC correlations across years. However, it is conceded that 
much of the variation in VC characteristics would be absorbed by the fixed effects, and 
it would be difficult if not impossible to estimate the effects of VC characteristics on 
their pay unless these characteristics vary over time. A VC random effects model would 
seem appropriate provided that the unobservable characteristics are not correlated with 
the observable characteristics.  The use of a pooled OLS estimator was clearly not 
appropriate given the panel nature of the dataset employed. In view of these issues there 
must be some concern about the reliability of the findings presented by Dolton and Ma 
(2003).  
 
In a more recent study, Tarbert et al. (2008) used VC salary data for the period 1997-
2002, to model the relationship between VC pay and university performance employing 
dynamic pay change models. They also included controls for internal and external pay 
benchmarks. In contrast to Dolton and Ma (2003) they found no evidence that VC pay 
is influenced by observable performance measures (such as university income and 
student recruitment). This may not be surprising given the poor explanatory power of 
first difference pay change models regardless of the definition of pay used and the 
performance measures employed (Conyon, et al., 1995). However, they did find a 
positive and significant relationship between VC pay and the presence of ‘highly’ paid 
staff in the institution41, and the pay of VCs heading comparable higher educational 
institutions. Moreover, when their sample was split between pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities, they found evidence that changes in VC pay were related to changes in 
research income, changes in the number of postgraduate students for pre-1992 
universities, and changes in the total number of students for post-1992 universities. 
These results were interpreted as being loosely ‘mission’ relevant.  
                                                 
41 ‘Highly paid’ was defined as earning over £50,000. Whether this is indeed ‘high pay’ is debatable; 
mean academic pay over the sample period covered was about £33,000 (ASHE (various years)). 
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2.2.3 Summary 
 
The foregoing review suggests that CEO pay can be explained in terms of human 
capital, agency theory, tournament theory, and the theory of managerial power. This 
literature offers insights into the possible determinants of VC pay. The data required to 
rigorously test these theories in the context of VC pay is seldom available publically. 
However, the data employed in this essay do allow several predictions from these 
theories to be tested. Specifically, the effect that internal pay structures, institution 
performance and remuneration committee pay setting policy has on VC pay. 
 
The limited literature that exists on VC pay suggests that VC human capital, university 
performance and size, and the institution’s internal pay structures and external pay 
benchmarks are relevant considerations in the pay determination process. The difficulty 
in determining how university performance indicators employed in these studies can be 
attributed to the VC has been alluded to above.  
 
Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to expect that VCs are motivated agents and care 
about the ‘mission’ of the institution they run. It may therefore be more appropriate to 
examine the relationship between achieving mission or corporate goals and VC pay, 
such as success in widening participation and securing institutional growth. These 
objectives appear regularly in university mission statements and/or strategic plans and 
their effect on VC pay (to my knowledge) has not been empirically researched. In the 
empirical section of this essay we define a parsimonious model to investigate pay-
performance sensitivity using variables that are directly related to the institution’s 
mission and its corporate goals. 
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2.3  VC Pay in UK Higher Education 1994/95-2008/09 
 
Since 1994/95 HEIs have been formally required to disclose details of the pay of their 
VC42  and other highly paid staff although some universities made this information 
available in the academic year 1993/94. Data on VC annual pay were obtained from the 
Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) and university financial accounts.  From 
the academic year 1993/94 the THES has published annual salary information for VCs 
derived from data published in an institution’s annual accounts (see appendix B1 for 
further details on the data sources used). These annual data cover the salary paid from 
1st August in a particular year to 31st July the following year. It is important to note that 
the salary reported include any performance-related pay, an estimated value of benefits 
in kind (e.g. subsidised accommodation, a university-provided car, medical insurance 
and subsidised loans and any compensation for loss of office) but exclude pension 
contributions made by the institution. It is not possible to distinguish between the 
elements that make up the final pay from the information provided. This should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the results presented in section 2.7. 
 
We have information on the pay of the 325 VCs who headed the 136 UK HEIs, for the 
period 1994/95 through 2008/09 that includes 35 leading 19 colleges of the ‘Arts’ (Art, 
Music and Drama colleges). The overall distribution of pay is first described followed 
by a description of the pay data that are employed in the empirical analysis. The pay 
data employed are transformed into real terms using RPI (1998=100).43 It should be 
noted that for reasons of comparability and data availability VCs that lead post graduate 
institutions, medical and business schools, the Open University and colleges of the 
‘Arts’ and small specialist HE colleges (e.g., the institutes that form London 
University’s school of advanced studies) are excluded from the empirical analysis due 
to their atypical student intake. It should be recalled that there have been several 
significant mergers between HEIs over the sample period (see appendix A2) and as a 
result certain institutions are no longer in existence (e.g., UMIST and the University Of 
Wales College Of Medicine). The pay of VCs that administered these institutions is also 
excluded from the analysis. 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that several arts and drama colleges have merged to form a larger ‘federal’ body (e.g. 
the University of the Arts, London) and information on the pay of the heads of constituent colleges is only 
available up to the academic year 2005/06. 
43 Retail Price Index accessed at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDdownload2.asp 
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2.3.1 The Distribution of VC pay 1994/95-2008/09 
 
The distribution of VC pay (including the pay of the leaders of colleges of the Arts) and 
associated summary statistics for each academic year from 1994/95 through 2008/09 is 
reported in table 2.1. In section (i) of table 2.1 we see that the mean pay of all VCs over 
the sample period is £120,770 in 1998 prices (see last row). On average VC pay 
increased by just over 70.5% in real terms which represents a 3.9% real annual increase. 
However, as is evident from section (ii) of the table the increase in pay is not evenly 
spread across all VCs. It is instructive to note that many of those in the bottom 20th 
percentile are VCs that lead former university colleges and colleges of HE that were 
granted university status post 2003. VCs in this part of the pay distribution received a 
75.4% increase in their real pay over the sample period the largest relative increase of 
any group in the pay distribution and represents a 4.1% real annual increase. In 
comparison those VCs at the top end of the pay distribution, who tend to be the heads of 
large pre-1992 and post-1992 universities, received a real pay increase of about 71%, 
not the largest increase but sizeable. The table also reveals that VC mean and median 
(50th percentile) real annual pay were very similar over the period which suggests the 
absence of any significant outliers. 
 
Over the fifteen year period covered by these data the dispersion in VC pay increased 
by about 15.2%.44  The largest dispersion in pay is found to be in the academic year 
2000/0145 and can be attributed to a small group of VCs, of ‘prestigious’ institutions, 
receiving substantial end of term payments. For instance, in the academic year 2000/01, 
Sir John (Charles) Kingman, the then Vice Chancellor of University of Bristol, received 
a substantial end of term payment of £236,877, an increase in real terms of 95% on his 
previous year’s salary. We also note that the Gini coefficient has increased by two 
points over the sample period which represents a 17% increase in the index. This would 
suggest an increase in inequality of pay across the pay distribution and this effect is 
significant at the 5% level (t = 2.07).46  
                                                 
44 Given that both the mean and standard deviation has increased over the sample period by 70.5% and 
85.7% respectively the coefficient of variation = 15.2%. 
45 Coefficient of variation =24.6%. 
46 Note that the standard error for the Gini in 1994 is 0.007 and the standard error for 2009 is 0.008 
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Table 2.1 Distribution of VC Pay 1994/95 to 2008/09 (£ in 1998 prices) 
 
Notes:  Post graduate institutions, medical and business schools, the Open University and small specialist colleges are excluded. 
 
  (i)   Summary  Statistics (ii)   Percentiles   
Year N Mean St.Dev Min Max q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q 60 q70 q80 q90 Gini 
1994/95 136 94,972 19,183 54,628 141,117 67,028 76,479 85,753 89,590 96,809 99,423 103,793 109,911 120,837 0.116 
1995/96 136 98,290 20,442 58,049 152,145 68,385 80,750 88,544 93,665 99,673 104,546 108,707 116,281 124,389 0.117 
1996/97 136 100,482 20,277 60,402 149,671 71,507 78,602 92,155 97,140 101,360 106,559 113,565 116,874 126,493 0.114 
1997/98 136 100,798 20,349 60,000 147,000 71,294 81,000 91,000 96,800 102,231 107,200 114,000 119,600 127,300 0.115 
1998/99 136 104,576 21,888 49,227 180,469 72,763 86,445 95,632 98,679 104,541 112,277 115,232 125,671 133,944 0.117 
1999/00 136 107,515 21,320 60,262 154,004 77,069 88,270 96,611 103,116 107,310 112,873 118,612 127,153 137,360 0.113 
2000/01 136 113,429 27,869 50,759 236,877 79,420 89,524 97,947 107,911 110,919 119,379 123,985 136,110 147,578 0.133 
2001/02 136 117,709 25,116 68,414 201,545 82,412 94,116 106,343 112,791 117,414 122,717 129,132 137,383 150,984 0.120 
2002/03 136 122,744 28,298 70,982 225,526 86,035 95,960 108,810 117,525 122,160 125,792 131,991 147,356 158,677 0.127 
2003/04 136 127,632 30,140 71,547 227,728 91,013 103,433 111,898 119,536 127,581 130,878 136,114 150,597 169,188 0.131 
2004/05 136 133,309 32,689 63,633 237,563 90,902 104,606 118,056 126,417 133,205 139,164 143,711 160,781 173,930 0.136 
2005/06 136 138,068 32,003 72,363 238,471 94,092 110,676 123,347 131,290 137,261 144,069 152,046 164,962 179,758 0.130 
2006/07 131 143,084 32,116 79,636 243,640 99,111 115,662 126,630 136,726 141,656 149,946 158,606 165,628 181,666 0.134 
2007/08 131 150,770 35,845 79,630 266,716 103,391 122,059 134,074 141,487 146,367 153,956 166,085 176,551 198,544 0.131 
2008/09 129 161,942 35,628 82,289 261,463 115,295 134,162 147,128 155,865 159,698 165,568 178,470 188,249 206,426 0.136 
% 
change N/A 70.5 85.7 50.6 85.3 72.0 75.4 71.6 74.0 65.0 66.5 71.9 71.3 70.8 17.2 
N / 
Mean  2023 120,770 33,886 49,226 266,716 79,926 92,546 101,000 109,038 117,000 125,081 134,682 146,751 165,523 0.125 
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2.3.2 VC Pay by Institution Type 1994/95-2008/09 
 
UK universities differ markedly in terms of their size and structure one would expect 
VC pay to reflect the size, type, and complexity of the organisation for which they have 
ultimate responsibility. The pay data employed in the empirical analysis include the pay 
of VCs that administered pre-1992, post-1992 and post-2003 universities from the 
academic year 1994/95 to 2008/09 (inclusive). We have data on the pay of 141 VCs 
who led 55 pre-1992 universities, 92 who led 39 post-1992 universities and 57 who led 
23 post-2003 universities. This provides information on the pay of 290 VCs who led 
117 universities over the sample period. The pay of those leading institutions classified 
as colleges of the ‘Arts’, which do not enter the empirical analysis, can be found in 
appendix B2 for reasons of comparison. Table 2.2 reports the mean pay of VCs that 
have headed the three university types that enter the empirical analysis. We first note 
that the mean real pay of these VCs is £125,464 and VC pay increased by about 70% 
over the sample period which represents a 3.8% real annual increase similar to that 
noted earlier for all heads of UK HEIs. We also note a wide variation in the mean pay 
across the different university types. The mean pay of VCs of pre-1992 institutions is 
£135,985 and is higher than the pay received by VCs of the other university types. In 
particular their pay was significantly higher than the pay of £126,918 received by their 
counterparts in post-1992 universities (t = 4.12). In general we also see that the median 
pay was near to that of the mean in most years and the difference does not appear large 
enough to suggest problems with outliers. It is also instructive to note that the mean pay 
of those leading colleges of the ‘Arts’ is lower than that received by those leading 
universities, see appendix B2. 
 
Table 2.2 also reveals that VCs of pre-1992 received the highest increase in real pay of 
79% over the period, rising from an average of £102,173 in 1994/95 to £183.209 in 
2008/09. In contrast, VCs in post-1992 universities were awarded the smallest increase 
over the sample period of 58%, rising from £103,685 to £163,792 over the period. It is 
also the case that in almost every year VCs of post-1992 universities received, on 
average, a lower year on year increase in pay, in comparison to their pre-1992 university 
counterparts. Vice chancellors of post-2003 universities received a 67.5% increase in 
pay over this period and between 2003 and 2009 they received an increase in pay in the  
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Table 2.2 VC Pay by University Type 1994/95 to 2008/09 (£ in 1998 prices) 
 
Academic 
Year 
All Universities 
(ex. Arts colleges) 
Pre-1992 
university 
Post-1992 
university 
Post-2003 
university  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
1994/95 98,053 
(17,166) 
98,330 102,173 
(15,144) 
101,607 103,685 
(14,185) 
100,515 78,657 
(12,022) 
76,859 
1995/96 101,834 
(17,796) 
102,412 106,667 
(15,237) 
105,983 106,729 
(14,714) 
102,728 82,225 
(14,320) 
76,957 
1996/97 104,161 
(18,016) 
105,047 110,475 
(15,241) 
111,703 108,092 
(13,249) 
105,497 82,941 
(14,613) 
76,958 
1997/98 104,691 
(17,901) 
105,000 112,034 
(16,115) 
113,000 107,029 
(11,519) 
104,727 83,222 
(13,639) 
82,000 
1998/99 108,387 
(19,915) 
107,352 116,970 
(18,119) 
115,231 110,041 
(11,599) 
107,352 85,164 
(16,805) 
86,634 
1999/00 111,408 
(18,963) 
110,959 119,695 
(17,504) 
118,612 113,370 
(11344) 
111,916 88,038 
(13,284) 
86,567 
2000/01 117,627 
(26,432) 
114,678 127,399 
(27,218) 
123,138 121,240 
(16,272) 
120,318 88,157 
(15,058) 
88,970 
2001/02 122,367 
(22,947) 
120,187 132,079 
(22,638) 
128,508 124,947 
(13,005) 
122,961 94,617 
(13,241) 
94,301 
2002/03 127,728 
(26,203) 
123,994 138,881 
(27,305) 
129,385 130,309 
(13,245) 
128,487 96,472 
(12,292) 
92,547 
2003/04 133,018 
(27,998) 
130,878 145,819 
(28,686) 
140,476 132,768 
(17,532) 
130,006 102,523 
(14,590) 
102,346 
2004/05 139,182 
(30,381) 
137,446 154,516 
(30,748) 
150,173 136,174 
(19,568) 
135,791 107,269 
(15,217) 
108,763 
2005/06 144,497 
(28,730) 
140,845 159,387 
(28,236) 
158,706 142,209 
(16,976) 
139,793 112,327 
(16,561) 
114,428 
2006/07 147,528 
(29,968) 
146,657 160,451 
(28,062) 
160,850 147,956 
(24,587) 
143,021 115,903 
(17,169) 
115,906 
2007/08 154,854 
(33,338) 
151,884 170,031 
(33,149) 
169,877 155,433 
(21,830) 
146,804 117,583 
(17,648) 
119,065 
2008/09 166,618 
(32,964) 
162,604 183,209 
(30,920) 
181,423 163,792 
(22,300) 
158,559 131,736 
(23,447) 
129,588 
% Change 69.9  79.3  57.9  67.5  
Mean pay 
1994-2009 
125,464 
(32,550) 120525 
135,985 
(34,429) 129,925 
126,918 
(24,829) 124,000 
97,837 
(21,949) 95,654 
Universities 
VCs 
Observations 
117 
290 
1755 
 
55 
141 
825 
 
39 
92 
585 
 
23 
57 
345 
 
 Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
 
order of 36.5% compared to an increase of 20.2% in the earlier period 1994-2002. This 
may reflect a need to attract or retain experienced VCs with the talent needed to run 
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these ‘new’ universities and with knowledge of the modern environment in which 
universities compete. It is also worth noting that the heads of institutions classified as a 
college of the ‘Arts’ received a similar percentage increase in pay compared to their 
counterparts in post-1992 universities (58.1%) with their actual pay increasing from 
£75,841 to £119,858 over the period, see appendix B2.  
 
Although not reported in table 2.2 the mean real pay of male VCs was £121,454 which 
is significantly higher than the £115,564 received by female VCs over the sample 
period (t = 2.51, [p-value = 0.012]), see appendix B3. However, although the gender 
pay differential is just under £5,890 the table reveals that the mean and median pay of 
male VCs has been above that of their female counterparts over the entire sample period 
and in relative terms male pay increased at a greater rate (73%) than female pay (65%). 
These figures translate to an annual increase of 3.9% for males, and 3.6% for females. 
The dispersion of pay has been far greater for male than for female VCs.  
 
2.4 VC Pay-Performance Data 
 
The primary focus of this essay is to examine the relationship between VC pay and 
university performance. We use several measures of performance that include variables 
that capture success in meeting the institution’s mission and variables that capture 
success in attracting funds for teaching and research, together with other institution 
specific contextual data (see appendix B4 for the definitions of university contextual 
variables and appendix B1 for data sources). It should be recalled that mission-based 
performance data are only available from 1997/98 onwards. These data are only 
available for the whole period under review for the pre-1992 and post-1992 universities 
included in the sample. Thus, the analysis focuses on the pay-performance relationship 
for VCs of these two university types. For this reason we exclude post-2003 universities 
from the analysis. Moreover, focusing the analysis on the pay-performance relationship 
for VCs of pre-1992 and post-1992 universities provides a more homogeneous group of 
institutions, and furthermore, it is the pay of these VCs that attract most public criticism. 
We estimate a parsimonious model so that the relationship between VC pay and 
performance is made precise, and multicollinearity is minimised. For instance, we 
detected a high degree of correlation between university size variables and income 
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variables (see below). This sub-sample includes the pay 193 VCs who led 95 pre-1992 
and post-1992 UK universities over the period 1998/99 to 2009/09 (inclusive). Once 
allowance is made for missing values these data represent an unbalanced panel 
consisting of 1045 observations. The associated summary statistics are detailed below in 
table 2.3.  
 
The mean pay over the sample period in original monetary units (the natural log of real 
pay is employed in the empirical analysis) is £141,567 in 1998 prices and on average 
VCs of pre-1992 universities are paid more (£146,674) than their counterparts in post-
1992 universities (£134,234). We also employ a variable that captures the pay awarded 
to VCs of comparable universities (i.e., an external pay benchmark). This variable is 
constructed for each year in the dataset according to the type of university and the size 
of the institution determined by the total number of FTE students (undergraduate and 
postgraduate). By university type, each university is arranged in ascending order 
according to the total number of FTE students.  The universities are then grouped into 
fives starting from the smallest institution. Within each group and for each VC the 
average group pay is calculated excluding the pay of the VC under focus. This variable 
is calculated for all VCs and its natural log is used to define the external benchmark pay 
which we assume remuneration committees potentially use to inform equitable and fair 
pay awards.47 We argue that it is unlikely that remuneration committees will know the 
current pay awarded to VCs in comparable institutions. However, we assume that they 
will have information on the previous year’s pay awards.  To capture this effect, our 
measure of the external pay benchmark is lagged by one year. We expect VC pay to be 
positively related to this variable indicating that as the comparable pay of relevant VCs 
increase, so too will the pay of the VC under consideration. We note that the mean 
benchmark pay is £135,955 and is highest for VCs of pre-1992 universities at £146,674.  
 
  
                                                 
47 This was confirmed by interviews with the VC’s personal assistants (PAs) in two universities. It would 
appear that in setting VC pay one important source of information available to remuneration committees 
is the pay of VCs (assumed to be the previous year’s pay) in ‘comparable’ institutions. We have no access 
to this information but in the interviews PAs hinted that university type and size of institution by number 
of students were important considerations when setting pay. 
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics: Pay-Performance Measures 
1998/99-2008/09 
 
 All Universities Pre-1992 Universities Post-1992 
Universities 
z-score/t-stat a 
VC Pay 
 
    
Real pay (£ in 1998 prices) 141,567  (30,658) 146,674  (33,702) 134,234  (23,858)  6.58 
(ln) Real pay   11.838    (0.209) 
 
11.870    (0.227) 11.792    (0.171) 5.99 
Real external benchmark pay  
(£ in 1998 prices)  
135,955  (22,351) 140,352  (23,752) 129,642  (18,444) 7.83 
(ln) Real external benchmark pay 
 
 11.8079  (0.159) 11.838    (0.167) 11.763    (0.136) 7.63 
VC Characteristics 
 
    
Mean age (years) 58.10       (4.21) 58.29      (4.28) 57.82     (4.11) 1.76 
 
Age (years)  <=55 0.254 0.234 0.282 -1.76 
Age  (years)  56 -60 0.446 0.438 0.457 -0.59 
Age  (years)  > 60 0.300 0.328 0.261 2.32 
  𝜒(2)2  = 6.281b  [p = 0.000] 
 
    
Tenure expired (years)  7.968     (4.270) 7.354       (3.755) 9.021     (4.901) -2.13 
Tenure (years) 
 
5.504      (4.024) 4.942       (3.523) 6.312     (4.533) -5.49 
University Characteristics 
 
    
Pre-1992 University 0.589 Not Applicable Not Applicable  
Proportion of staff earning more 
than £70,000 
0.025 0.035 
 
0.011 2.67 
Number of cost centres 20.07       (5.17) 20.02      (5.88) 20.14      (5.64) -0.36 
Real house price (£ in 1998 
prices) 
129,286   (55,428) 
 
131,822  (55,323) 125,645  (55,441) 1.77 
(ln) house price 11.678     (0.431) 
 
11.699 (0.432) 11.648 (0.430) 1.86 
Mission Based Performance Variables 
 
   
 Merger c 17  (0.016) 14 (0.023) 3 (0.007) 
 
1.98 
Hit benchmark for comprehensive 
schooled students 
0.692 0.539 0.911 -12.83 
Hit benchmark for students from 
low participation areas 
 
0.427 0.331 0.564 -7.49 
Financial Based Performance Variables  
 
   
Real Funding Council Grants 
(£000s in 1998 prices) 
47,818   (27,346) 52,739   (33,093) 40,752   (12,867) 7.13 
(ln) Real Funding Council Grants  10.626   (0.556) 10.671   (0.662) 10.561   (0.344) 3.18 
Real Tuition Fees (£000s in 1998 
prices) 
30,146   (15,903) 
 
32,505   (18,394) 26,757   (10,545) 5.84 
(ln) Real Tuition Fees  10.171    (0.572) 10.219   (0.632) 10.102   (0.464) 3.27 
Real Research Council Grants 
(£000s in 1998 prices) 
22,143    (33,692) 35,481   (38,599) 2,990     (2,107) 17.41 
(ln) Real Research Council Grants 
(£000s) 
9.009   (1.519) 9.906    (1.189) 7.721     (0.879) 32.40 
Number of Universities 95 56 39  
Number of VCs 193 119 74  
Number of observations 1045 616 429  
Notes to table:  
(a) z-scores are used to test differences in proportions between old and new universities, and t-stats are 
used to test differences in means. The appropriate critical value at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed test is 
± 1.96.  
(b) Chi-squared statistic with two degrees of freedom is used to test the assumption of independence of 
age categories across university type.  
(c) Actual number.  
(d) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables. 
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It was noted in the introductory chapter that the UK higher education sector grew 
considerably over the past half century and a major policy focus was on widening 
participation. Many universities now have missions to ‘widen participation’ through 
attracting students from socially disadvantaged groups and from areas where university 
participation is low. We use two measures to identify if institutions achieve such aims: 
the percentage of students they enrol from areas where there has been traditionally low 
participation in higher education (i.e., areas where participation rates are less than two-
thirds of the national figure) and the percentage of young students enrolled from state 
comprehensive schools. Each university is given a ‘benchmark’ which is expressed as a 
percentage of their first year student enrolment from state comprehensive schools and 
underrepresented areas. The ‘benchmark’ used is calculated as a sector average which is 
adjusted for the university’s subject mix, and students’ qualifications and age on entry.48 
We construct two dummy variables based on this information which equals one if the 
university meets its relevant benchmark figure or zero otherwise. The data reveal that 
just over 69% of all universities achieve their benchmark figure in attracting students 
from comprehensive schools but do less well in attracting students from low 
participation areas with just under 43% of universities achieving their benchmark figure. 
Moreover, it appears that post-1992 universities have been more successful in widening 
participation for these groups of students. We would expect there to be a positive 
relationship between VC pay and success in this regard. 
 
Over the eleven year period covered by these data institutions have invested heavily in 
developing and expanding their teaching and learning environment. Such expansion can 
be brought about by investment in new facilities both in the UK and abroad or by 
merging with other institutions. These developments can also be seen as part of the 
university’s mission and successful expansion through a merger or acquisition may be 
attributed to successful leadership and good strategic management. We would expect 
VC pay to reflect such success. In these data we note that there have been 17 instances 
of major mergers over the period. It is clear that pre-1992 universities were more active 
in this regard. 
 
                                                 
48 See HESA: www.hesa.ac.uk – ‘performance indicators’ tables T1a, T1aii, T1b, Tbii, and Tc, for further 
information on the calculation of these measures.  
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It is expected that VC pay is positively related to university income, as a reward for 
sound financial management and leadership. We employ three income variables to test 
this proposition.  These are income from: funding council grants; tuition fees and 
educational grants; and research grants and contracts and are transformed to natural 
logarithms in the empirical analysis. The actual sample mean income from these sources 
is about £47.8m, £30.1m and £22.1m respectively. It is clear that pre-1992 universities 
receive significantly more income from these sources than post-1992 universities 
particularly in the form of research grants and contracts. 
 
Other observable measures of institution performance are the results from the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA). The former 
is a measure of university research performance and the RAE scores are used to allocate 
government research funds. The RAE was initially conducted over a four/five year 
cycle commencing in 1994. However, there has been a gap of seven years since the 
publication of the results from the most recent exercise in 2008 and the previous one in 
2001. There have also been major changes in the methods used to calculate the RAE 
scores that make the published figures difficult to compare over time.49  We 
transformed the three sets of RAE scores in the data to percentiles, based on research 
performance, to try to overcome this problem but this did not yield a robust or intuitive 
set of results. Also in many cases, we are unable to attribute RAE scores to the effort of 
a single VC. For instance, due to the length of time between the 2001 and 2008 RAE 
there have been instances where two or more VCs have occupied the relevant office. 
Finally, the TQA is an assessment of teaching quality in a selection of subjects. The 
review is not repeated for most subjects and for many institutions these results are not 
available. It is for the above reasons that these variables do not feature in our empirical 
analysis. 
 
We noted in section 2.2 that research finds that the size of the firm is an important 
determinant of executive pay. To capture university size and complexity we use the 
number of cost centres and expect it to impact positively on VC pay. We do not include 
FTE students in this specification due to its high correlation with the three income 
                                                 
49 See Higher Education Funding Council for England for a description of the methods used to calculate 
the RAE score available at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/research/ref/reform/ 
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variables.50 The inclusion of FTE students and the three income sources resulted in 
these variables becoming less significant and reversals of signs on the estimated 
coefficients and the R2 was necessarily high. This pointed to the possibility of 
multicollinearity between these variables. As we focus on exploring the separate 
relationship between the income variables and VC pay, as done in previous research 
FTE students were dropped from subsequent analysis (see, Tarbert, et al., (2008)). The 
correlation between the number of cost centres and the income variables was less 
pronounced and it was felt that the use of the number of cost centres as the size variable 
would give more precise estimates than using FTE students.51 The average number of 
cost centres in these data is around 20 and there is no significant difference between the 
number of cost centres in pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. 
 
We noted earlier that tournament theory suggests that the presence of highly paid staff 
in an institution will drive up the pay of CEOs or directors. In the context of a 
university, highly paid staff generally comprise of senior executives and professors. The 
pay of senior executives and professors is not publically available but we do have 
information on the number and proportion of staff earning in excess of £70,000 for all 
years.52  About 2.5% of university staff earn over £70,000, but we note that there are 
significantly more staff earning in excess of this amount in the pre-1992 than in the 
post-1992 universities. 
 
Human capital variables such as age, tenure, educational background, and experience 
are expected to enhance the pay of the VCs. The methodology that is adopted to 
examine the pay-performance relationship does not allow for the inclusion of variables 
that are time invariant such as gender and previous educational qualifications. However, 
we examine the relationship between VC pay and their personal characteristics in the 
secondary analysis. We include age and tenure of the VC in the analysis, which vary 
                                                 
50 The correlation between the number of FTE students and tuition fee income was found to be 0.70 [p-
value=0.00] and between FTE students and funding council grants it was 0.89 [p-value=0.00]. 
51 The correlation between: cost centres and FTE students was found to be 0.46 [p-value=0.00]; cost 
centres and funding council grants was 0.41 [p-value=0.00]; cost centres and tuition fee income was 0.41 
[p-value=0.00]. 
52 Although universities reported the number of staff earning over £100,000 over the sample period, many 
did not or reported a zero figure in their annual financial statements. This was generally the case with 
many post-1992 universities. The numbers/proportions of staff earning over £100,000 were very small, in 
many cases less than 1% except for a few large civic universities. The variable proved insignificant in the 
regressions undertaken and was omitted from further analysis. Most universities registered some staff 
earning over £70,000 over the period and this variable was used in the regressions reported.  
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over time. It is possible that VC pay is positively associated with age (Dolton and Ma, 
2003) we investigate if this is still the case. The age of VCs in the data employed is 
defined as the age in the academic year under study minus the year of birth. The average 
age is just over 58 years and there is no significant difference in mean age between VCs 
heading these two types of university, but we note that pre-1992 universities appoint 
proportionally more VCs that are over sixty years of age. Their average length of tenure 
is just under eight years for those VCs who have completed their term in office and 
five-and-a-half years over the entire sample. We note that for VCs that have completed 
their term in office those in post-1992 universities on average stay in post just over a 
year and a half longer than their counterparts in pre-1992 universities.  
 
Local economic conditions may also impact on VC pay and we also include county-
level house prices to account for this possibility. The log of average county-level house 
prices is used to capture local economic conditions that may impact on pay. 
 
2.5 VC Pay-Personal Characteristics Data 
 
 
The secondary motivation for this research is to empirically examine the relationship 
between VC personal characteristics. The pay of the 290 VCs who led the 117 
universities over the sample period from 1994/95 through to 2008/09 (inclusive) 
described in section 2.3.2 is used to examine the pay-characteristics relationship. Thus 
the data employed spans fifteen years.  
 
First, we recall that the real mean VC pay over the period, in original units, is £125,464 
in 1998 prices and VCs of pre-1992 universities are paid more, on average, than VCs in 
other university types (see table 2.2). We also include an external pay ‘benchmark’ the 
reason for its inclusion and its construction was described in the previous section and 
note that the mean benchmark pay is £121,222 which again is highest for VCs 
administering pre-1992 universities.   
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The personal characteristics of 35 individuals who led colleges of the ‘Arts’ are also 
reported for comparative reasons.53 Specifically, we use information on VCs’ age, 
gender, educational background (i.e., the type of university attended as an 
undergraduate, and the academic discipline studied), tenure, work experience and 
academic/public esteem (e.g., the award of a honorary degree or the bestowment of a 
Knighthood). The definitions of these variables can be found in appendix B5. This 
information was compiled from various sources (see, appendix B1 for details), 
including Who’s Who – An Annual Biography (various years), and Who’s Who of VC’s 
Presidents and Rectors of Commonwealth Universities (ACU’s Who’s Who, various 
years). Information on VCs that were not in these publications was obtained from 
alternative bibliographical sources (e.g., Who’s Who in British Art), official institution 
documents, press releases or through personal contacts. From these sources it was 
possible to construct a dataset that provides rich information on individual specific 
characteristics. It should be noted that the characteristics of the heads of postgraduate 
institutions, medical schools, the Open University and small specialist colleges are 
excluded due to data availability and the atypical nature of their student intake. We 
focus the discussion that follows on the summary statistics for pre-1992, post-1992 and 
post-2003 universities which are reported in table 2.4 below. 
 
Gender and Age 
 
Farnham and Jones (1998) reported that between 1990-1997 male VCs accounted for 
96% of all university heads. Breakwell and Tytheleigh (2008) for the period 1997-2006 
reported a figure of 85%. The data collected in the present study is in broad agreement 
with these observations. Moreover, previous research suggests that male VCs earn more 
than their female counterparts (Dolton and Ma, 2003). We note that just under 88% of 
all VCs (excluding those leading ‘Arts’ colleges) are male. Although these data reveal a 
distinct male dominance of the profession, male VCs are relatively more represented in 
pre-1992 universities and females in post-2003 universities. We also note that over the 
sample period the proportion of male VCs leading pre-1992 universities fell from 98% 
to 87%, those leading post 1992 universities fell from 90% to 82% and those leading 
post-2003 universities fell from 91% to 70% (see, appendix B6). 
                                                 
53 This represents about 83% of all HEIs in the UK higher education sector in 2008/09. 
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Table 2.4 VCs’ Personal Characteristics by Institution Type 1994/95-2008/09 
 
Variable 
All Universities 
(ex. Arts) (i) 
Pre 1992  
(ii) 
Post 1992 
(iii) 
Post 2003 
(iv) 
Colleges of  
Arts (v) 
Z score 
t-stat a (vi) 
Gender and Age       
Male 0.877 0.941 0.856 0.762 0.925 5.67 
Age (years)  57.283 
(4.581) 
58.075 
(4.361) 
57.117 
(4.372) 
55.669 
(4.982) 
55.970 
(5.253) 
4.88 
   Age <= 55 0.329 0.254 0.349 0.472 0.437 -4.28 
   Age 56 to 60       0.421 0.441 0.426 0.368 0.384 0.53 
   Age >=61       0.250 0.305 0.225 0.160 0.179 3.85 
𝜒(4)2  = 62.07 [ p= 0.000] b       
Age at appointment 51.739 
(4.717) 
53.233 
(4.102) 
50.725 
(4.877) 
49.889 
(4.720) 
49.306 
(5.021) 
11.27 
University Attended (UG) c       
Ancient/civic 0.447 0.399 0.458 0.482 0.163 -1.29 
London 0.139 0.136 0.121 0.203 0.180 -0.22 
1960s 0.067 0.058 0.065 0.046 0.031 -1.00 
Polytechnic 0.042 0.008 0.118 0.000 0.028 -9.04 
Overseas Educated  0.051 0.086 0.030 0.017 0.094 5.18 
Other 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.292 0.00 
Oxford/Cambridge 0.241 0.313 0.208 0.182 0.212 5.01 
𝜒(10)2  = 155.29 [p= 0.000] b        
University Attended (PG) d       
Ancient/civic 0.402 0.401 0.369 0.453 0.191 1.43 
London 0.173 0.122 0.164 0.310 0.272 -2.58 
1960s 0.127 0.115 0.168 0.087 0.004 -3.32 
Polytechnic 0.035 0.000 0.089 0.026 0.000 -8.89 
Overseas Educated  0.043 0.065 0.036 0.017 0.112 2.39 
Other 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.00 
Oxford/Cambridge 0.220 0.297 0.174 0.107 0.138 5.68 
𝜒(8)2  = 106.65 [p= 0.000]b       
Academic Specialism       
Engineer 0.118 0.179 0.082 0.036 0.000 5.26 
Social Scientist       0.497 0.401 0.538 0.658 0.220 -6.58 
Arts 0.056 0.046 0.049 0.089 0.780 -0.70 
Natural Scientist 0.329 0.374 0.331 0.217 0.000 2.71 
𝜒(6)2  = 115.65 [p= 0.000]       
PhD 0.742 0.828 0.694 0.620 0.332 6.40 
Academic and Public Esteem       
Professor 0.870 0.935 0.844 0.762 0.858 7.25 
FRS 0.077 0.160 0.007 0.000 0.022 9.91 
Honorary degree 0.455 0.633 0.396 0.130 0.272 9.57 
Knighthood 0.118 0.196 0.063 0.017 0.112 7.67 
Work Experience e       
Civil Service     0.080 0.132 0.053 0.000 0.059 4.99 
Education 0.015 0.007 0.000 0.061 0.041 2.39 
Academic 0.864 0.808 0.897 0.939 0.721 -5.07 
Industry 0.041 0.053 0.050 0.000 0.179 0.84 
𝜒(6)2  = 43.72 [p= 0.000]       
Overseas Appointment 0.041 0.070 0.014 0.017 0.004 5.23 
Externally appointed 0.723 0.837 0.648 0.580 0.783 9.83 
Ex VC 0.094 0.137 0.073 0.029 0.075 1.56 
Pro-VC    0.520 0.446 0.742 0.371 0.201 -7.66 
Tenure expired (%) 0.114 0.125 0.107 0.101 0.097 1.31 
Tenure - term expired (years) 
 
8.303 
(4.572) 
7.540 
(3.816) 
9.153 
(4.842) 
9.143 
(5.821) 
10.192 
(5.492) 
-6.66 
Tenure - all VCs (years) 
 
5.558 
(4.046) 
4.842 
(3.431) 
6.415 
(4.445) 
5.817 
(4.378) 
6.779 
(4.688) 
-7.14 
Number of  institutions 117 55 39 23 19  
Number of VCs 290 141 92 57 35  
Number of Observations 1755 825 585 345 268  
Notes to table:  
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(a) Z-score are used to test differences in proportions and t-statistics are used to test differences in means of VC characteristics 
reported in columns (ii) and (iii). The appropriate critical value at the 0.05 level of significance using a two-tailed test is ±1.96.  
(b) Chi-squared values are used to test the assumption of independence in the sets of categorical variables across the three university 
types (excluding colleges of the Arts). Probability values are reported in parenthesis beneath the relevant test statistic. 
(c) Due to zero and low cell counts other university types, overseas universities and polytechnics were combined in the computation 
of the chi-squared statistic. 
(d) Due to zero cell counts other university types were dropped and due to low cell counts polytechnics and overseas universities 
were combined in the computation of the chi-squared statistic  
(e) Due to zero cell counts VCs with a career history in the civil service, private sector or with dept. education were combined in the 
computation of the chi-squared statistic. 
As in the primary analysis we expect VC age to be positively associated with VC pay 
and note that the average age of VCs in this sample is just over 57 years. There is also 
some variation across HE sub-sectors. For instance, VCs of pre-1992 are about one year 
older than their counterparts in post-1992 universities (t=4.88) and about two to two and 
a half years older than those that lead post-2003. We again note that the largest relative 
proportion of VCs who are over 60 is found in pre-1992 universities (30%), perhaps 
suggests that for these VCs the post of VC seems to be more of an end of a career 
appointment. This is not reflected in post-2003 universities where a large proportion of 
VCs (47%) are aged 55 or under. We also note an upward trend in the average age of 
VCs rising from about 56 years four months in 1994/95 to about 58 years seven months 
in 2008/09 (see, appendix B6). 
 
Bargh at al., (2000) note a shift towards appointing VCs who have more managerial 
and/or leadership expertise and skills than simply appointing someone to be a mere 
‘substitute’ for the Chancellor in a prestigious end-of-career post. They argue that over 
the two decades preceding the mid-1990s UK HEIs have had to become more business-
like in line with changes in government higher education policy. They hypothesise that 
this changing landscape would lead UK universities to seek the appointment of VCs 
with proven managerial/leadership skills who may be younger than their earlier 
counterparts. They find no discernible trend in VC age at appointment.54 The average 
age at appointment in the current sample is just under 52 years. There is also variation 
across university types. In particular pre-1992 universities appoint VCs who are older 
(just over 53) than their counterparts in other UK universities. For instance, VCs 
appointed in post-1992 universities are about two and a half years younger than those 
appointed in pre-1992 universities. These data also reveal that the average age at 
appointment has risen from just under 51 in 1994/95 to just under 53 by 2008/09, (see 
appendix B6). This may reflect a preference to appoint VCs with greater experience and 
                                                 
54 Although they note that for ‘old’ universities the age at appointment was higher in the 1970s 1980s and 
1990s than in the 1950s and 1960s, and for ex-polytechnics the age at appointment increased in the 1990s. 
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knowledge of UK higher education as the sector expands and the complexity of running 
a modern university increases. It may also reflect that the pool of suitable candidates for 
the office of VC is rather small as candidates with more experience and knowledge of 
UK higher education management are more highly sought and in scarce supply. The 
upward trend in appointing older VCs may impact positively on VC pay and may help 
to explain the upward trend in pay already noted in the introduction. 
 
Although not reported in table 2.4 it is interesting to note that the average age of male 
VCs is just over 57 years which is similar to the overall average for all VCs. For females 
the average age is just over 56 years. As noted above there is evidence of an upward 
trend in the average age of VCs over the sample period and this trend is particularly 
striking amongst females, whose average age was just under 51 in 1994/95 rising to just 
under 59 by 2008/09. The comparable figures for their male counterparts are 56 and 59 
respectively. The gender age profiles seem to have converged over time. Both groups 
have also witnessed a distinct upward trend in their age at appointment. For females the 
average age at appointment has increased from just over 49 in 1994/95 to just under 53 
by 2008/09. For male VCs the average age at appointment was just over 50 in 1994/95 
and just under 53 years by 2008/09.  
 
Educational Background  
 
It is hypothesised that VC pay will be positively related to certain academic 
qualifications and schooling as predicted by human capital theory. There are two 
general reasons. First, from a supply-side perspective potential VCs may expect to be 
compensated for the loss of earnings whilst in education and for many VCs they would 
have spent at least six years in higher education. Second, from a demand-side 
perspective the acquisition of higher education raises individual productivity and hence 
enhances pay. It is therefore possible that the appointing committee may take the view 
that VC quality is to some extent influenced by an individual’s educational background 
and qualifications (Bargh, et al., 2000). These sentiments may lead to a preference for 
candidates who have a certain type of schooling (e.g., a graduate from a certain 
university type) and/or with a certain academic discipline (e.g., engineering) and/or with 
a certain type qualification (e.g., a PhD). Such candidates may be perceived by the 
appointing committee to be of high academic calibre vis-à-vis those who have attended 
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less prestigious colleges, or universities. In the minds of the appointing committee it 
may also be a signal of high quality ‘traditional’ education which may be more familiar 
to those on such committees. It is difficult to determine the precise effect that these 
factors will have on pay, a priori, and it is possible that these factors would influence 
appointment rather than pay directly.  However, it is still possible that a VC’s 
educational background can have a significant influence on pay. For instance, a VC who 
received a doctoral degree from an institution that is highly regarded both nationally and 
internationally may be expected to bring with her important academic and public 
contacts, and an institution may offer higher pay and attractive increases in pay to retain 
such individuals. 
 
In terms of a VC’s undergraduate education just under one-quarter (24.1%) of VCs were 
Oxbridge educated (educated at either Oxford or Cambridge), just under 45% were 
educated in an ancient or civic university, about 14% in a London university college, 
6.7% in a 1960s university, and just over 4% in a former polytechnic. However, the 
proportion of VCs who were Oxbridge undergraduates or undergraduates at an ancient 
or civic university, or a London University college, has fallen over the sample period 
whereas the proportion of VCs who were undergraduate at a 1960s or former 
polytechnic has increased (see appendix B7). We also note that the universities 
represented in columns (ii) – (iv) in table 2.4 appear to have a preference for appointing 
VCs with an undergraduate career in an ancient or a civic university. There is some 
variation in the type of university the VC attended as an undergraduate across these 
universities. For instance, pre-1992 universities appoint the largest proportion of VCs 
(31.3%) who were Oxbridge undergraduates whereas post-1992 universities tend to 
appoint the largest relative proportion of VCs who studied at a 1960s university (6.5%) 
or former polytechnic (11.8%). We also note that ‘Arts’ colleges appoint a large 
proportion of VCs (29.2%) educated in other HE institutions.  
 
In terms of postgraduate qualifications just over two-fifths of VCs have a postgraduate 
qualification from an Ancient/Civic university and 22% received their qualification(s) 
from either Oxford or Cambridge. We also note that post-1992 universities appoint 
proportionally more VCs with a postgraduate qualification from a 1960s university and 
pre-1992 universities tend to appoint proportionally more VCs with an Oxbridge 
background (about 30%).  Interestingly we note that a relatively large proportion of VCs 
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(11.2%) with postgraduate qualifications from an overseas institution are appointed in 
‘Arts’ colleges. This may reflect a national shortage of suitable candidates for this 
particular role. 
 
The trends highlighted above are similar to those identified by Bargh et al. (2000) and 
Breakwell and Tytherleigh (2008) who noted a decline in the proportion of VCs with an 
Oxbridge educational background since the 1970s. The later study noted a preference for 
pre-1992 universities to appoint VCs with either undergraduate or postgraduate 
experience from similar institutions. Interestingly the authors also noted that no VC 
appointed since 1997 in pre-1992 universities studied at a former polytechnic this is also 
generally true for the data used in this study the exception being Bob Boucher 
(appointed VC of Sheffield University in 2001) who studied as an undergraduate at 
Borough Polytechnic.  
 
Information on a VC’s academic specialism is captured by four broad categories, see 
appendix B5 for definitions. This is done so that the evidence presented can be 
compared with previous studies (see, Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008; Dolton and Ma, 
2003; Bargh et al., 2000; Farnham and Jones, 1998). Specifically these are: Science; 
Engineering; Social Science and the Arts. The overall summary statistics, reported in 
table 2.3, reveal that just under one-half of VCs have an academic specialism in the 
Social Sciences and about 33% in the Natural Sciences and fewer have specialised in 
Engineering (11.8%) and the Arts (5.6%). We also note that pre-1992 universities 
employ the largest relative proportion of VCs with an Engineering (18%) or a Science 
(37%) background and VCs of post-1992 universities and post-2003 universities 
predominantly have an educational background in the Social Sciences, about 54% and 
66% respectively. This is in broad agreement with the recent evidence presented by 
Breakwell and Tytherleigh (2008). We also note a general upward trend in appointing 
Social Scientists and a downward trend in the appointment of Natural Scientists (see 
appendix B7). It is also interesting to note that the proportion of VCs with an academic 
specialism in Engineering has fallen over the sample period.  
 
The amount of education acquired is captured by the award of a PhD or equivalent (e.g. 
DSc or MD). It is argued that this variable will capture variation in the data pertaining to 
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academic attainment.55 Just under three-quarters of VCs have a PhD or equivalent 
qualification. We also note a wide variation across university types. The largest relative 
proportion of VCs with a PhD or equivalent qualification is found in pre-1992 
universities (83%) followed by their counterparts in post-1992 universities (69%) and 
post-2003 universities (62%).  
 
Academic Esteem and Public Honours 
 
One would expect that academic esteem to be positively related to VC pay and we 
capture this particular feature of a VC’s background in terms of: a professorship; a 
honorary degree; or a fellowship of the Royal Society. Such individuals may be 
expected to enhance the university’s reputation, increase the potential of private sector 
funding opportunities, and bring with them a set of network contacts.  
 
A high proportion of VCs (87%) have reached the grade of professor and also note that 
relatively more professors are found in pre-1992 (93%), compared to their counterparts 
in post-1992 universities (84%), post-2003 universities (76%). Over the sample period 
the proportion of VCs with a professorship increased from about 83% in 1994/95 to just 
under 89% in 2008/09 (see, appendix B8). This trend possibly reflects the changing 
nature of the UK higher education sector with its particular emphasis on research and 
the increase in the number of universities awarded university status. It should also be 
noted that a professorship often carries responsibilities that can be best described as 
managerial (e.g. Dean of School, head of a research centre/institute/department), and 
can also include senior administrative tasks, see Bargh et al., (2000).  
 
Just under 8% of VCs are fellows of the Royal Society. However, VCs with a Royal 
Society fellowship (22) are exclusively confined to those leading pre-1992 universities, 
64% (14) of whom lead Russell Group universities, but it may be the case that world 
class research intensive universities are best led by internationally renowned researchers 
(Goodall, 2006).  We also note that just over 45% have been awarded at least one 
honorary degree (from either UK or overseas university), although the proportion of 
VCs with this particular honour has fallen over the sample period (see, appendix B8).   
                                                 
55 All VCs in the sample have an undergraduate and postgraduate degree. 
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It is also hypothesised that a VC with a public honour(s) outside academia, such as a 
Knighthood has the potential to bring future benefits to the institution, in terms of 
private sources of income or by exploiting their public standing and contacts. Such 
honours may capture the VC’s ‘social capital’ (Dolton and Ma, 2003). It is possible that 
a VC who has been knighted may attract higher pay than one without such public 
recognition. We note that 11.8% of VCs have been awarded knighthoods, but the 
number of VCs with this honour has fallen over the period (see, appendix B8). The 
largest proportion of VCs with this honour is found in pre-1992 universities and 
interestingly leaders of ‘Arts’ colleges (mainly the Heads of the Royal colleges). 
 
Previous Work Experience and Training 
 
Following the publication of the Jarrett Report (1985) universities were required to 
become more ‘efficient’ and their VCs more business-like having direct responsibility 
for the institution’s financial position and executive decisions rather than delegating 
these roles to bursars and administrators. Universities were assumed to look to the 
private sector for potential candidates with the necessary business/managerial skills and 
experience. This however never really took hold and VC appointments from the private 
sector are still a rarity in UK Higher Education (Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). We 
expect those VCs drawn from the private sector to command more pay than career 
academics. 
 
Previous work experience is defined by four categories describing the ‘sector’ from 
which the incumbent was drawn, ten years prior to being appointed VC. Specifically 
these four categories are: civil service; education (or related service); academia and 
‘industry’ (private sector employment), see appendix B5 for definitions of these 
categories. Column (i) of table 2.4 shows that the majority of VCs (86.4%) have had a 
recent career history firmly established in academia, followed by those who were 
formerly employed in the civil service (8%), and then by those who were employed in 
industry (about 4%). A small proportion (1.5%) have been employed in education or 
related services. These figures reveal only marginal changes to those reported in earlier 
studies (Farnham and Jones, 1998; Bargh, et al., 2000; Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 
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2008). We also note that the proportion of VCs drawn from academia or from industry 
has remained fairly constant over the sample period (see, appendix B8). 
 
However, there is variation across institutions. The largest relative proportion of VCs 
with experience in the civil service (13%) is found in pre-1992 universities and the 
largest proportion of VCs with an ‘education’ background (6%) is found in post-2003 
universities. Somewhat surprisingly, the largest proportion of VCs with industrial 
experience (18%) are found leading Arts colleges and very few VCs with this 
characteristic are found leading pre-1992 and post-1992 universities, about 5% 
respectively. No VC leading a post-2003 university has this experience. The proportion 
of VCs appointed from outside academia is relatively small. This is all the more 
surprising considering the way in which the role of the VC has changed over time with 
a greater emphasis on business accruement. Whether or not industrial experience 
equates with managerial competence in HE is not clear, but in the case of  ‘Arts’ 
colleges many VCs have had considerable experience of managing theatres and/or 
directing or coordinating shows or musical events which could be more valued in terms 
of managing such institutions.   
 
Relevant training for the post of VC is captured by two attributes. The first is whether or 
not the incumbent was previously appointed as a VC in another university. The second 
is whether or not the incumbent was previously a Pro-VC or equivalent. Table 2.4 
reveals that 9.4% were appointed to a similar office in another university and the 
proportion of VCs who were former VCs more than doubled over the sample period 
(see, appendix B8). We also note that 52% of the sample was previously appointed as 
Pro-VCs and the proportion of VCs with this attribute has increased by just over three-
quarters over the sample period. These proportions are suggestive of a preference for 
appointing VCs with HE managerial experience rather than industrial experience. These 
data also reveal that the largest relative proportion of VCs who were former VCs 
(13.7%) is found in pre-1992 universities and post-1992 universities have the largest 
proportion of VCs who were former Pro-VCs or equivalent (74%).  
 
It is interesting to note that there were 237 instances where a VC’s term in office 
expired of these 170 were retirements. If we exclude appointments in post-2003 
universities, and appointments from overseas we find that there were 19 instances where 
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VCs were reappointed VC in another university: 15 were reappointments in the same 
sub-sector.56 One VC moved from a pre-1992 to a post-1992 university and 3 VCs 
moved from a post-1992 to pre-1992. This may suggest a preference of VCs to appoint 
from within a particular HE subsector. This may not be surprising if the appointing 
committee favours candidates for the post of VC who have familiarity with managing 
similar institutions in terms of size, mission and goals. It should also be highlighted that 
in all instances with the exception of two, there was an increase in the real pay.57 
 
In regard to the appointment of former Pro-VCs and excluding appointments made in 
post-2003 universities, then there were 128 VCs who were former Pro-VCs (or 
equivalent). Of these, 26 (20%) were internal appointments; 15 of which were internal 
appointments in pre-1992 and 11 (24%) were internal appointments in post-1992.  
Moreover, 101 (89%) former Pro-VCs were appointed VC within the same HE sub-
sector, 43 (34%) moved between pre-1992 universities and 58 (45%) moved between 
post-1992 universities. In regard to movement across sub-sectors 21 (16%) former Pro-
VCs move from a pre-1992 to lead a post-1992 university and only 5 (4%) former Pro-
VCs moved in the opposite direction. One former Pro-VC moved from a post-2003 
university to lead a post-1992 university. These data may provide further evidence of a 
preference for appointing VCs from within the same HE sub-sector (Bargh, et al., 2000; 
Breakwell and Tytherleigh, 2008). 
 
External Appointments and Tenure 
 
Table 2.4 reveals that that just over 72% of the sample of VCs were appointed to their 
post externally and the proportion of external appointees has increased by 17.5% over 
the sample period (see, appendix B8). We also note that pre-1992 universities have the 
largest proportion of VCs appointed externally (83.7%). It is difficult to be precise 
about the nature of the relationship between an external appointment and pay. However, 
one may speculate that the relationship is positive if the supply of suitable candidates is 
indeed ‘globally limited’.  Therefore, salaries would be driven up in accordance with the 
                                                 
56  9 VCs moved from a pre-1992 to a pre-1992 and 6 moved from a post-1992 to a post-1992. 
57 George Bain was the principal of the London Business School from 1989-1997 and then was appointed 
VC of Queen’s Belfast from 1998-2004.  Alfred Morris was VC of the University of West of England 
until 2008 and was appointed VC of Lampeter University in 2009. In both these case there was a fall in 
their real pay. 
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shortage in supply. Chan (1996) suggests that those externally appointed to senior 
positions are generally of superior quality in contrast to potential internal candidates. 
This feature will tend to be drive up the pay of externally appointed CEOs, above those 
of their internal competitors.  
 
The average term in office is just under eight and a half years for those VCs who 
completed their term in office, see table 2.3.58 This is slightly longer than 7.65 years 
cited by Dolton and Ma (2003) but similar to the 8.9 years reported by Breakwell and 
Tytheleigh (2008) for appointments made between 1991 and 1996. In the latter study it 
is also pointed out that VC tenure has fallen over time. However, their analysis also 
included VCs still in office. The data used here does not reveal any discernible trend in 
VC tenure over the sample period.  However, we do observe some variation across 
institution type. For instance on average, VCs of post-1992 and post-2003 universities, 
and who have completed their term in office, are in post for about one and a half years 
longer than their counterparts in pre-1992 and Heads of Art colleges are the longest 
serving with tenure of just over 10 years on average. 
 
As in the primary analysis we expect university type and size as well as hierarchical 
structure to influence VC pay and include variables to capture these effects in the 
empirical analysis (see appendix B4 for definitions of variables). Local economic 
conditions may also impact on VC pay and we again include county-level house prices 
to account for this possibility. It should be noted that we do not include ‘performance’ 
variables that relate to the university’s mission (i.e., those related to ‘widening 
participation’) and as already noted these data were only available from 1998/99 
onwards. However, we do include a variable capturing success in securing university 
expansion through a merger or acquisition. In these data we note that there have been 25 
instances of major mergers over the period and we expect a positive association 
between VC pay and university expansion. It is clear that pre-1992 universities were 
more active in this regard compared to the other two university types. As noted earlier 
other performance measures such as the results from the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) are not available for all institutions over the sample period and are therefore not 
included in the analysis (see section 2.4.5). All financial data used, including VC pay, 
                                                 
58 If we include VC still in office then the average term is 5.5 years. 
66 
 
 
 
are measured in 1998 prices and transformed to natural logarithms for use in the 
empirical analysis. The relevant summary statistics are presented in table 2.5 below.  
 
We also note that pre-1992 universities account for 47% of the sample, post-1992 
universities represent one-third of the sample and post-2003 universities account for 
about one-fifth (see, table 2.5 below).  In this analysis we include two variables that can 
potentially capture university size and complexity. These are the natural logarithm of all 
FTE students and the number of cost centres which reflects the nature and the diversity 
of the work undertaken by each institution. We note that the average number of cost 
centres is about 18, but it is clear from table 2.5 that, based on this measure, pre and 
post-1992 are more ‘complex’ and diverse than the newer post-2003 universities. 
Similarly, these institutions are larger than post-2003 universities in terms of FTE 
students. We would expect VC pay to be positively related to these variables. It is 
conceded that university size can be measured in terms of the number of FTE staff and 
university income. However,  we detect a high degree of correlation between these 
measures for instance, the correlation between FTE students and funding council grants 
is 0.91 [p-value = 0.00]; between FTE students and tuition fees is 0.89 [p-value = 0.00]; 
and between FTE students and research grants and contracts is 0.62 [p-value = 0.00]. 
These financial variables are therefore not included in the specifications reported in 
section 2.7. 
 
We noted that tournament theory suggests that the presence of highly paid staff in an 
institution will drive up the pay of CEOs or directors. The pay of senior executives and 
professors is not publically available but we do have information on the number and 
proportion of staff earning in excess of £70,000 for all years.59  We note that this 
proportion is highest in pre-1992 universities. The promotion to professor also brings 
with it an increase in remuneration. We see from table 2.5 that the proportion of 
professors in pre-1992 universities (11.8%) is higher than the proportion of these 
academics found in the other two university types. We also include the proportion of 
senior academic staff (senior lecturers and above) and find that this proportion is highest 
                                                 
59 Although universities reported the number of staff earning over £100,000 over the sample period, many 
did not or reported a zero figure in their annual financial statements. This was generally the case with 
many post-1992 universities. The numbers/proportions of staff earning over £100,000 were very small, in 
many cases less than 1% except for a few large civic universities. The variable proved insignificant in the 
regressions undertaken and was omitted from further analysis. Most universities registered some staff 
earning over £70,000 over the period and this variable was used in the regressions reported.  
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in post-1992 universities. These variables are also expected to exert a positive influence 
on VC pay as predicted by tournament theory.  
 
Table 2.5 Summary Statistics: VC Pay and University Characteristics  
1994/95 – 2008/09  
 
Variable All Universities Pre-1992 Post-1992 Post-2003 
VC Pay     
Real Pay (£ in 1998 prices) 
 
(ln) Real pay 
 
Real external pay benchmark (£ in 
1998 prices) 
(ln) Real external pay benchmark 
 
125,464 
(32,550) 
11.707 
(0.254) 
121,222 
(26,426) 
11.681 
(0.219) 
135,985 
(34,429) 
11.772 
(0.250) 
131,308 
(25,888) 
11.767 
(0.192) 
126,918 
(24,829) 
11.720 
(0.192) 
123,025 
(19,665) 
11.708 
(0.153) 
97,837 
(21,949) 
11.466 
(0.223) 
93,964 
(17,470) 
11.432 
(0.187) 
University Characteristics     
University type n/a 0.470 0.333 0.197 
University Size     
#Cost centres 18.495 
(5.925) 
20.044 
(5.629) 
19.641 
(4.333) 
12.849 
(5.594) 
FTE (Number) 
 
11,440 
(5,817) 
11,829 
(5,425) 
14,616 
(4,679) 
5,123 
(2,705) 
(ln) FTE students 9.177 
(0.645) 
9.264 
(0.506) 
9.531 
(0.360) 
8.372 
(0.635) 
Mergera 25 15 6 4 
 Hierarchical Structure     
Proportion of Senior Academic 
Staff 
0.167 
(0.133) 
0.156 
(0.074) 
0.188 
(0.173) 
0.157 
(0.159) 
Proportion of Professors 0.074 
(0.063) 
0.118 
(0.058) 
0.041 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.038) 
Proportion of Staff 
Remuneration >70k 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.029 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
Regional  Variation      
Real county-level House Price (£ in 
1998 prices)) 
116,106 
(54,955) 
116,973 
(54,589) 
112,107 
(53,700) 
120,813 
(57,569) 
(ln) Real county-level  
House Prices 
11.560 
(0.447) 
11.567 
(0.451) 
11.526 
(0.442) 
11.602  
(0.440) 
 
Number of Universities 
 
117 
 
55 
 
39 
 
23 
Number of VCs 290 141 92 57 
Number of observations 1755 825 585 345 
Notes:  (a) Actual numbers. 
 
 
2.6 Methodology 
 
 
The primary theme of this essay is to examine the relationship between VC pay and 
observable performance indicators. The data described in section 2.4 are employed in 
analysing the pay-performance relationship. Given the panel nature of these data the use 
of individual VC fixed effects is favoured over institution fixed effects (and random 
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effects)60 in modelling the pay-performance relationship, which allows for within-VC 
correlations across years,  for the VCs of pre and post-1992 universities that feature in 
these data. This is because we believe that the remuneration package offered is more 
strongly influenced by the attributes the individual brings to the job rather than the 
characteristics of the institution. In addition, we argue the assumption of time-invariant 
individual attributes are more persuasive in the current context than time-invariant 
institutional characteristics given the rapidly changing nature of the university landscape 
in the UK over the time period covered by the analysis presented. The robustness of the 
results is also investigated using an alternative model containing institutional fixed 
effects. We also experimented with a number of pay-change specifications but these had 
very poor explanatory power, similar to what was found in previous research (see, 
Tarbert et al, 2008).61 We therefore do not report the results for pay change models and 
instead we estimate the relationship by employing a VC fixed effects methodology, 
where the omitted unobservable VC effects are assumed fixed and allowed to be 
correlated with the included variables. 
 
The secondary theme of this essay is to examine the relationship between VC pay and 
their personal characteristics using the data described in section 2.5. To model this 
relationship we would like to use a model that is flexible enough to allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals and institutions over time. Employing the 
fixed effects estimator would mean that VC (or institution) characteristics that are time 
invariant would be ‘swept’ out in the estimation procedure. Thus valuable information 
on VC personal characteristics would be lost such as gender, career and schooling 
histories. It would therefore be more informative to use the random effects estimator in 
this regard. 
 
                                                 
60 A Hausman test was performed to test if the random effects estimator was preferable to a fixed effects 
estimator using expression [2.15] in the text. The resultant χ2 statistic with 23 d.f = 75.85 [p-value = 
0.000] favours the fixed effects estimator being efficient and more consistent than the random effects 
estimator. A likelihood ratio test was also performed to test if a pooled regression fits the data better than 
two separate institution equations. The resultant χ2 statistic with 214 d.f = 51.877 and we accept that a 
pooled equation fits the data better than two separate institution equations.   
61 The annual difference in the log of VC pay was used as the dependent variable and the annual 
difference in the performance measures were used as regressors. The specifications were very poorly 
determined and no inference could be drawn from the estimated parameters. Conyon et al, (1995) 
discusses the problems associated with models of this kind.  The fixed effect estimator in this case is 
similar in spirit to pay change models and allows for within-VC correlation across years. 
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2.6.1 Modelling VC Pay and Performance 
 
 
The basic model can be expressed as:  
 wijt = αi + β′Xijt +  ∑ϕ
=
T
2t
ttD  +  uijt      i = 1, 2,...,N,     [2.15] 
       j = 1, 2,…,J,     
       t = 1, 2,…,T  
  
where: wijt is the natural log of real annual pay for the ith VC in institution j at time t;  
Xijt is a k×1 vector of VC and institution specific pay determining variables excluding 
those that are mission and financial performance relevant. Specifically, these include the 
set of mutually exclusive age specific dummies capturing the age of the VC at time t; 
tenure (years in current post), a university size variable (number of cost centres), the 
proportion of staff (excluding the VC) earning more than £70,000, a university type 
dummy variable to capture the distinction between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities, 
and the log of average county-level house prices for the jth institution. It is important to 
note that the vector Xijt also includes an external pay benchmark as described in section 
2.4 and for reasons already outlined the natural logarithm of this variable, lagged by one 
year, is used in estimation.  A set of time specific dummies (Dt) are introduced to 
capture exogenous events that affect all VCs over time and uijt is an error term assumed 
to conform to standard assumptions as per uijt ~ iid(0,σ2). The unknown parameters αi  
(the intercepts) are the VC their fixed effect that are estimated and assumed to capture 
differences across VCs in terms of unobservable characteristics. 
 
Three variants of the basic model are also estimated. The first augments the basic model 
to include variables that capture mission-based performance indicators lagged by one-
year. This is done to take account of the fact that such information is only available after 
the event usually in the following academic year. This model can be expressed as: 
 
  wijt = αi + β′Xijt + γ′ Zijt-1 + ∑ϕ
=
T
2t
tt D  +  uijt        [2.16] 
Where Zijt-1 is a h×1 vector of mission based performance indicators that capture 
institution growth through merger and widening participation. The other vectors are as 
defined in expression [2.15].  
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The second variation uses financial based performance indicators lagged by one-year 
(i.e., grants from UK funding councils, tuition fees and research grants and contracts) in 
lieu of mission-based performance indicators and is expressed as: 
 
  wijt = αi +  β′Xijt +  δ′Vijt-1  +  ∑ϕ
=
T
2t
tt D  +  uijt    [2.17] 
 
where Vijt-1  is a h×1 vector of  financial performance variables. The final model 
augments the basic model to include both mission and financial based performance 
indicators and is expressed as: 
 
 wijt = αi +  β′Xijt +  γ′ Zijt-1  + δ′Vijt-1 +  ∑ϕ
=
T
2t
tt D  +  uijt   [2.18] 
 
All vectors are as defined above and β, γ, δ and φ are unknown parameters and are 
estimated according to the relevant specification. The dataset employed in this analysis 
consists of 1045 observations on 193 VCs and represents an unbalanced panel. 
 
2.6.2  Modelling VC Pay and Personal Characteristics 
 
As noted above employing a fixed effects methodology to model the VC pay-
characteristics relationship would mean time-invariant VC characteristics would be lost 
in the estimation process. A general estimation (random effects) model with separate 
heterogeneity terms for individuals and institutions can be expressed: 
 
           wijt = β1 
' Hi+ β2 
' Hit + γ1
' Ij + γ2
' Ijt + ∑ϕ
=
T
2t
ttD  + vijt     [2.19] 
where wijt, and Dt are defined in expression [2.15]. Hi is a m×1 vector of VC personal 
attributes that are time invariant. Specifically these include information on VC gender; 
educational background characterises (i.e., university attended as an undergraduate, the 
academic discipline studied and the achievement of a doctorate); previous work 
experience; and whether the VC was a professor or pro-VC at appointment. We also 
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include an indicator for the termination of the VC contract to examine the effects of 
severance pay.  Hit is a n×1 vector of VC personal attributes that vary with time 
including VC age and tenure (as defined in specification [2.15]). Variables relating to 
academic esteem (the award of a fellowship to the Royal Society or honorary degrees) 
and public honours (the award of a knighthood) that vary over time are also included. 
As there has been some movement of VCs between universities we also include a 
variable capturing whether the VC had been previously appointed VC in another 
institution in this vector.  
 
Ij is a q×1 vector of time invariant university characteristic (i.e., university type 
dummies). Ijt is a r×1 vector of time varying university characteristics including those 
relating to university size lagged by one-year (i.e., the number of cost centres and FTE 
students); the institution’s hierarchical structure (the proportion of professors and senior 
academic staff); and a location specific pay determining condition for the jth institution 
to capture local economic conditions as defined in expression [2.15].  We do not include 
financial variables in this specification due to the high degree of correlation between 
these variables and the size of the student body as outlined in the previous section, but 
we do include an external pay benchmark (lagged one-year), the proportion of staff paid 
above £70,000 in the year of observation, and an indicator of a successful merger.  
 
The stochastic error term in expression [2.19] is defined as: vijt = ψi + λj + εijt, where, 
ψi captures unobserved heterogeneity across individuals,, λj captures unobserved 
heterogeneity across universities and εijt, captures unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals and time. A GLS procedure is used to estimate the unknown parameters β1, 
β2, γ1 γ2. We are therefore able to model unobserved heterogeneity across both 
universities and individuals. We model the relationship using a random effects estimator 
at both the level of VC and institution. 
 
The dataset used for the VC random effects estimation consists of 1755 observations on 
286 VCs and represents an unbalanced panel. In contrast when employing the institution 
random effects estimator the sample consists of 1755 observations on 117 institutions 
and represents a balanced panel over the fifteen years covered by the data employed.   
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2.7 Empirical Results 
 
2.7.1 VC Pay and Performance 
 
The estimates for the four models described by expressions [2.15] to [2.18] in section 
2.6.1 are reported in table 2.6 below. Before we discuss the results in detail we first note 
that on the basis of the goodness of fit measure reported at the bottom of the table, the 
specifications fit the data well by the standards of broadly comparable fixed effects 
applications on the determination of CEO pay (e.g., see Besley and Machin, 2008; 
Gregg et al., 2010). Second, we note that that estimated coefficients on the academic 
year dummies are well determined and are jointly significant at a conventional level in 
all specifications, suggesting a steady ceteris paribus monotonic increase in VC pay 
over time. In general, the point estimates suggest substantial pay inflation since the 
academic year 1998/99 once we control for individual fixed effects and other pay 
determining characteristics.  
 
It should be noted that the econometric methodology adopted does not necessarily 
suggest that causal relationships exist between VC pay and all the explanatory variables 
included on the right-hand side of expression [2.18]. Although the application of fixed 
effects to these data helps to mitigate the bias that may be inherent in the estimated 
coefficients, due to time invariant unobservable variables that may be potentially 
correlated with the included variables, there is the possibility that bias may be 
introduced due to time-varying omitted variables. If these omitted variables are 
correlated with an included variable(s) then, dependent on the nature of this correlation 
(positive/negative), the relevant coefficients on these potentially endogenous variables 
may be either over or under estimated.  For instance, the pay of highly paid university 
officers (e.g. pro-VCs) may exert a direct positive effect on VC pay in the light of 
tournament theory, but such information is not publically available. Further, this time-
varying omitted variable may also be highly correlated with the proportion of staff 
earning above £70,000 per annum. If we assume a positive correlation then the 
estimated coefficient for this variable may be an over estimate. To address this issue 
would require the introduction of proxy variables that are highly correlated with the 
time varying omitted variables but uncorrelated with the error term (the exclusion 
criteria). Finding such ‘proxy’ variables is not an easy task. Therefore, caution should 
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be exercised when interpreting the impact that these potential endogenous variables 
have on VC pay.   
 
Furthermore, there is still a possibility that certain key variables may be endogenous 
due to ‘reverse’ causality which causes the estimated coefficients to be biased and 
inconsistent. For instance, it is possible that the proportion of staff earning in excess of 
£70,000 may be affected by the current VC pay award, since it is possible that 
remuneration committees may have decided on the pay increment to be awarded to the 
VC before deciding on the pay awards to be given to senior or highly paid staff, while at 
the same time it is possible that the proportion of highly paid staff influences VC pay on 
the basis of tournament effects. To separate the causal impact that the proportion of staff 
earning more than £70,000 per annum has on VC pay from a mere correlation, we need 
an exogenous source(s) of variation (instrument(s)) that is highly correlated with the 
proportion of staff earning more than £70,000, which have no direct impact on VC pay 
(i.e. the covariance between VC pay and instruments is zero) but affects VC pay 
indirectly only through the relevant endogenous variable, conditional on the other 
explanatory variables in the model. It is difficult to suggest such an exogenous source(s) 
of variation that meets these requirements, and the dataset employed offers no suitable 
variable(s) to act as an instrument(s). A further problem with such instrumentation is 
that no suitable method is available to test the assumption that the instrument(s) have no 
direct impact on the VC pay. This then raises the possibility that the estimated 
coefficient relating to the proportion of staff earning in excess of £70,000 may be an 
under or overestimate of the true causal effect, and caution should be exercised in 
interpreting the estimated coefficient. It may be argued that a similar concern may be 
attributed to the external benchmark pay. For instance, and conditional on the other 
explanatory variables in the model, we may expect that the previous year’s external pay 
benchmark to have a positive correlation with the current year’s pay benchmark and 
does not affect current year’s VC pay. If these assumptions are true, then it is possible 
that the estimated coefficient on the external pay benchmark is an overestimate of the 
true causal effect, but finding suitable instruments would again be a challenging 
exercise. 
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Table 2.6 Vice-Chancellor Pay and Performance 
VC Fixed Effects Estimates 
 
Variable Names [1]  Non mission or 
performance relevant 
[2] Mission relevant [3] Financial 
performance 
relevant 
[4] Mission and financial 
performance relevant 
VC and University Characteristics 
Age  <=55 -0.002  (0.017)   -0.003  (0.018) -0.001  (0.017) -0.002   (0.018) 
Age  56 -60 -0.018  (0.010)*       -0.018  (0.010)*     -0.016  (0.009)*    -0.016   (0.009)*      
Age > 60   f     f    f   f  
Tenure (years)  0.001  (0.004)   0.001  (0.004) -0.001  (0.004)  0.0004 (0.0043) 
(ln) external pay 
benchmark (lagged by 
one year) 
  
0.168  (0.071)**     
   
0.175  (0.069)**     
  
0.148  (0.071)**    
 
 0.151  (0.068)**    
#Cost centres  0.004  (0.002)**       0.005  (0.002)**      0.003  (0.0016)*       0.003  (0.002) 
Proportion of staff 
earning > £70k 
 0.599  (0.232)***     0.576  (0.230)***    0.479  (0.229)**     0.419  (0.224)*     
Pre 1992 university -0.017  (0.062) -0.019  (0.073)  0.007  (0.045)  0.009  (0.053) 
(ln) Real Average house 
price 
-0.087  (0.025)***   -0.075  (0.023)***  -0.064  (0.027)**   - 0.047  (0.025)*     
Mission Based Performance Measures (lagged one year) 
Merger/expansion †   0.038  (0.023)*        †  0.056  (0.023)**  
Hit benchmark for 
comprehensive schooled 
students 
 
† 
   
0.017  (0.015) 
 
† 
  
0.024  (0.013)*    
Hit benchmark for 
students from low 
participation areas  
 
† 
  
 0.022  (0.010)**      
 
† 
  
0.021  (0.010)**  
Financial Based Performance Measures (lagged one year) 
(ln) Real Funding 
Council Grants 
†  †   0.071  (0.035)**     0.092  (0.035)***  
(ln) Real Tuition Fees †  †   0.017   (0.040)  0.017  (0.041) 
(ln) Real Research 
Council Grants 
 
† 
  
† 
  
-0.009  (0.011) 
 
-0.010  (0.012) 
Year Dummies 
1999 f f  f  f  
2000 0.016  (0.008)**     0.024  (0.010)**     0.022  (0.011)*       0.018  (0.011)*       
2001 0.074  (0.017)***   0.068  (0.016)***   0.074  (0.016)***   0.068  (0.015)***   
2002 0.123  (0.022)***   0.116  (0.022)***   0.120  (0.021)***   0.110  (0.020)***   
2003 0.180  (0.030)***   0.171  (0.029)***   0.173  (0.029)***   0.161  (0.027)***   
2004 0.226  (0.037)***   0.215  (0.036)***   0.216  (0.036)***   0.200  (0.034)***   
2005 0.271  (0.046)***   0.257  (0.044)***   0.257  (0.043)***   0.237  (0.041)***   
2006 0.312  (0.051)***   0.298  (0.048)***   0.296  (0.048)***   0.275  (0.046)***   
2007 0.332  (0.057)***   0.317  (0.055)***   0.313  (0.055)***   0.291  (0.053)***   
2008 0.401  (0.062)***   0.385  (0.059)***   0.379  (0.060)***   0.354  (0.057)***   
2009 0.464  (0.067)***   0.445 (0.064)***   0.441  (0.066)***   0.413  (0.063)***   
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 
Number of VCs 193 193 193 193 
σi  0.143 0.148 0.133 0.135 
σe 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 
rhoi 0.761 0.773 0.734 0.740 
R2 - within 0.691 0.6909 0.6947 0.6974 
χ2  statistic (df=10) for 
year dummies 
213.07 [0.000] 178.77 [0.000] 169.27 [0.000] 150.01 [0.000] 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on VC in parentheses.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c) f  denotes base category in estimation.  
(d) † denotes not applicable in estimation. 
(e) σi and σe are the estimated standard deviations for the fixed effects and the error term respectively, and rhoi is the fraction of the 
variation in the dependent variable accounted for by the fixed effects.  
(f) See appendices B2 and B4 for definitions of the variables.  
 
75 
 
 
 
In all specifications age is entered as a categorical variable indicting the age group to 
which the VC belongs at time t. Age is expected to have a positive influence on pay, a 
priori. The non-mission/non-financial performance related specification reported in 
column [1] [expression 2.15], suggests that VC pay increases to some extent with age in 
a linear fashion.62 Those VCs who are in the 56 to 60 age group are paid less than those 
aged over 60 years. The point estimate suggests that a VC in this age group is paid, on 
average and ceteris paribus, just under two percent less. This effect remains robust 
across the specifications reported. There also appears to be no significant differences in 
VC pay between those who are 55 years or under and those aged over 60 years. 
However, this particular result may be picking up a quality effect where the bidding for 
talent, through the award of higher pay, is not dependent on age. These effects remain 
relatively robust across all specifications reported.  
 
Human capital theory predicts a positive relationship between pay and tenure though the 
relationship may be nonlinear. Whether such non-linearities exist in this particular 
market is difficult to assess, a priori, since the post of VC is often an end of career 
choice and the period in office is likely to be relatively short. Quadratic tenure terms 
were entered into the analysis but these were found to be insignificant and dropped from 
further analysis. In any case tenure was found not to have a significant influence on pay 
in this investigation.63  
 
We find evidence that university size and complexity, as proxied by the number of cost 
centres, increases VC pay as expected. Using specification [2.15] (column [1]), a unit 
increase in size increases VC pay by about 0.4% on average and ceteris paribus. 
However, although this effect remains robust in specifications [2.16] and [2.17] 
                                                 
62 Human capital theory suggests that the age–earnings profile is concave and reaches a peak in the latter 
period of an individual’s working life. Quadratic age terms were used in previous estimations but were 
found to be insignificant and dropped in subsequent estimations. This may be due to the fact that the 
position of VC is not an initial career choice and such appointments are generally only available to 
suitable candidates towards the end of their academic career and the actual period in office is likely to be 
relatively short in comparison to an individual’s overall career history. 
63 We also experimented with a VC previous experience dummy variable capturing whether or not the 
incumbent had previously been appointed a VC at another university (including non-UK universities) and 
included this as a regressor. The estimated coefficient was statistically insignificant (|t|=1.02 [p-
value=0.31]). In addition, the exclusion of this variable made no material difference to the empirical 
results for the key performance variables reported in table 2.6. It was, therefore, dropped from further 
analysis. 
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(columns [2] and [3]) it fails to reach statistical significance in specification [2.18] 
(column [4]) when controls for both mission and financial performance are included. 
 
Typically the remuneration committee sets pay awards for professors and other senior 
staff prior to determining the pay of their VC (Tarbert, et al., 2008).  It is assumed that 
such committees will have information regarding the pay awards granted to senior or 
highly paid staff in any one year at the time of setting their VC pay. The results in this 
regard confirm some of the findings from previous work. There is evidence that VC pay 
is contemporaneously and positively influenced by the presence of highly paid staff 
(i.e., staff earning in excess of £70,000). The point estimate suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in the proportion of staff earning in excess of £70,000, on 
average and ceteris paribus, raises VC pay by about 0.6% per annum. The significance 
and direction of this effect is robust across specifications but its magnitude falls by 
about one-fifth in the financial performance specification, column [3] and by three-
tenths in the mission and financial relevant specification, column [4].  
 
We assume remuneration committees use an external pay benchmark in determining the 
pay of their VC in any particular year.  The estimated coefficient for this variable is well 
determined and the point estimate in the non-mission/non-financial performance 
specification column [1], suggests that a ten percent increase in relative VC pay in 
comparable institutions, in the previous year increases current VC pay, on average and 
ceteris paribus, by just under 1.7%. Again this effect remains robust across 
specifications but the impact of this variable is attenuated slightly as we move to the 
specifications reported in columns [3] and [4]. This suggests that external benchmarking 
exerts an important influence in the framing of VC pay even after controlling for the 
performance of the institution.64 We find no evidence that VC pay is influenced by the 
type of the university that the VC leads suggesting no ceteris paribus differential in pay 
across pre-1992 and post-1992 universities.  It is acknowledged that the poorly 
determined nature of this institutional pay gap effect is explained by the fact that the VC 
fixed effects absorb most of its variation and the estimated effect is identified through 
the small number of VCs who switch between these two types of universities.  
                                                 
64 We also experimented with a wider external benchmark measure comparing incumbent VC pay in 
groups of six (rather than five) comparable institutions. The estimated coefficient remained significant but 
reduced in magnitude. 
77 
 
 
 
  
The average county level house price is entered into the regressions in logged form to 
control for regional economic conditions that impact on local living costs and the 
possibility that they impact on VC pay. A significant but negative effect is detected in 
all specifications. This seems counterintuitive, but it could reflect the receipt of some 
form of payment in ‘kind’, such as housing subsidy or transport costs afforded to VCs 
living in areas where the cost of living is high. This may be true for VCs heading 
universities in major cities or the heads of prestigious universities that provide 
accommodation in kind.  
 
We now turn our attention to the relationship between VC pay and mission and 
financial related performance indicators. The mission based indicators are lagged by one 
year to allow for the possibility that pay awards are made in commensurate with VC 
success in meeting the institutional goals set in the previous year. The results are 
reported in column [2]. The specification includes variables that are assumed to capture 
elements of the university mission: growth and widening participation. One way in 
which an institution may grow is through an acquisition or merger. We find a significant 
effect on VC pay from managing a successful merger. The point estimate suggests that a 
successful merger increases VC pay by just under 4%, on average and ceteris paribus. 
This effect increases when we control for mission and financial based covariates, 
column [4]. There is also a significant effect for reaching the benchmark level for 
admitting students from areas where university participation has been traditionally low. 
The point estimate suggests that VCs in charge of such a university will receive, on 
average and ceteris paribus, a 2% increase in pay. Again we find this effect remaining 
in the specification reported in column [4]. 
 
The results for the specification that excludes mission relevant performance indicators 
but includes variables to proxy financial performance are reported in column [3]. These 
comprise, as noted above, funding council grants, tuition fees, and grants from research 
councils received in the previous year. Only the estimated coefficient on the funding 
council grant achieves statistical significance at a conventional level. The point estimate 
suggests that a ten percent increase in funding council grants increases VC pay by just 
under 0.7%,  on average and ceteris paribus. The negative point estimate for research 
income has been reported in previous work (Dolton and Ma, 2003; Tarbert, et al., 
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2008), though it is emphasized that the effect reported here is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  The other variables in this model yield similar effects to 
those reported in column [1]. 
 
The results for the specification that includes both mission and financial performance 
variables are reported in column [4]. We note that all the ‘mission’ relevant 
performance measures, achieve statistical significance in this specification. VC pay is 
positively related to successful growth of the institution through a merger as well as 
meeting the ‘benchmark’ figure for admitting students from comprehensive schools and 
from traditionally low participation areas. In addition, VC pay remains significant and 
positively related to the size of the funding council grants received in the previous year. 
The magnitude of the effect is marginally larger than that reported in column [2].  
 
As a check of the robustness of the results, we re-estimate the specification in column 
[4] using university rather than VC fixed effects. The results using university fixed 
effects are reported in table 2.7 below along with the results for the VC fixed effects 
specification to facilitate easy comparison.65 First, we note that the signs of the 
estimated coefficients in both models are broadly similar and some of the estimated 
effects remain stable across the two specifications. The effect of internal pay structure 
and the external pay benchmark remain significant across specifications although the 
external pay benchmark now yields twice the estimated effect. The coefficient on the 
merger variable remains significant though with an impact that is now numerically 
larger than when VC fixed effects are used. In terms of financial performance, the effect 
of attracting funding council grants remains robust across specifications but its impact 
falls slightly when university fixed effects are used. However, pay is not affected by 
success in ‘widening participation’ when institution fixed effects are used in the 
estimation. This may be reflective of different missions between the two types of 
universities. The impacts reported for the year dummies, though still significant and 
exhibiting a monotonic increase, are attenuated by just over one-half in most cases. 
Overall, these results taken together generally provide some confidence in the 
robustness of the results reported in table 2.6.  
  
                                                 
65 The correlation coefficient between the 95 current VC fixed effects and the comparable university fixed 
effects is 0.75 suggesting a high inter-correlation between the unobservables in this application.  
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Table 2.7 Vice-Chancellor Pay and Performance 
VC Fixed Effects versus University Fixed Effects Estimates 
 
Variable Name VC fixed effects University fixed effects 
VC and University Characteristics 
Age  <=55 -0.002      0  (0.018) -0.035** (0.017) 
Age  56 -60 -0.016*       (0.009) -0.030*** (0.011) 
Age > 60 f  f  
Tenure (years) 0.0004        (0.0043) 0.004** (0.002) 
(ln) external pay benchmark (lagged 
by one year) 
0.151**      (0.068) 0.321*** (0.070) 
#Cost centres 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Proportion of staff earning more 
than £70k 
0.419*      (0.224) 0.578*** (0.212) 
Pre 1992 university 0.009          (0.053) n/a n/a 
(ln) Average house price -0.047*       (0.025) 0.002 (0.037) 
Merger/expansion 0.056**      (0.023) 0.082*** (0.029) 
Mission Based Performance Measures (lagged one year) 
Hit benchmark for comprehensive 
schooled students 
0.024*       (0.013) 0.003 (0.017) 
Hit benchmark for students from 
low participation areas 
0.021**     (0.010) 0.003 (0.011) 
Financial Based Performance Measures (lagged one year) 
(ln) Funding Council Grants 0.092***   (0.035) 0.073* (0.042) 
(ln) Tuition Fees 0.017        (0.041) 0.028 (0.038) 
(ln) Research Council Grants -0.010       (0.012) -0.016 (0.012) 
Year Dummy 
 1999 f  f  
 2000 0.018*       (0.011) 0.008 (0.011) 
 2001 0.068***   (0.015) 0.054*** (0.014) 
 2002 0.110***   (0.020) 0.072*** (0.018) 
 2003 0.161***   (0.027) 0.099*** (0.023) 
 2004 0.200***   (0.034) 0.111*** (0.030) 
 2005 0.237***   (0.041) 0.133*** (0.036) 
 2006 0.275***   (0.046) 0.153*** (0.037) 
 2007 0.291***   (0.053) 0.151*** (0.041) 
 2008 0.354***   (0.057) 0.193*** (0.043) 
 2009 0.413***   (0.063) 0.249*** (0.043) 
Observations 1045 1045 
Number of VCs/Universities 193 95 
σi  0.135 0.103 
σe 0.080 0.092 
rhoi 0.740 0.554 
R2 - within 0.6974 0.6985 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on either VC or institution depending on fixed effects 
specification in parentheses.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c) f denotes base category in estimation.  
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2.7.2 VC Pay and Personal Characteristics 
The relationship between VC pay and individual characteristics is estimated using a 
random effects estimator at both the level of the VC and institution. The results are 
presented in table 2.8. Before we discuss these results it is instructive to highlight some 
of the specification tests that were undertaken. First, non-nested J-Tests were conducted 
on alternative specifications the first based on VC personal characteristics and the 
second on institution characteristics. These tests reject the null of no influence of the 
predicted values from the alternative specification in both cases suggesting that an 
optimal approach is to combine both sets of variables when modelling the relationship 
between VC pay and VC/Institution characteristics.66 Second, a Hausman test favoured 
the institution random effects estimator over the institution fixed effects estimator (χ2 
(47) = 49.72 [p-value = 0.365]).67 A further test favoured the VC fixed effects over VC 
random effects (χ2 (30) = 53.11 [p-value = 0.005]). However, as already noted the use 
of the VC fixed effects estimator does not allow the use of time invariant covariates and 
as the focus here is on the VC pay-characteristics much of the valuable information on 
VC characteristics would be lost. This must be borne in mind when interpreting the 
regression results. For the reasons previously discussed it is possible that the modelling 
strategy adopted may not establish causation but associations. In particular, variables 
relating to the proportion of senior academic staff and professors as well as the 
proportion of staff earning above £70,000 may be endogenous leading to the possibility 
of ‘reverse causality’ causing the  coefficient estimates to be biased and inefficient. 
Caution should therefore also be exercised when interpreting these coefficients 
 
The estimation results are presented in table 2.8, and we focus the discussion on the 
estimated coefficients for the institution random effects specification presented in 
column [1]. The results for the VC random effects, presented in column [2], are used for 
comparative purposes and as a check on the robustness of the coefficients presented in 
column [1]. We first note that the goodness of fit measures reported at the bottom of the 
table suggests a good fitting model in both cases, and in general the categorical 
variables are appropriately entered in each model. We also note that the estimated 
coefficient on the academic year dummies in both specifications show a general ceteris 
                                                 
66 The t-statistic for the coefficient on the institution predicted values was 12.6 [p-value=0.00] and on the 
VC characteristics predicted values was t = 12.89 [p-value = 0.00].  
67 A Breusch-Pagan test was conducted to test for random effects in the latter specification which 
decisively rejected the null of no random effects χ2 (1)  = 1305.33 [p-value = 0.000]. 
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paribus monotonic increase in VC pay from 1998/99 through 2008/09. This effect was 
also found for the pay-performance relationship investigated in the previous section. 
 
The estimated coefficient for the external pay benchmark is well determined in both 
models and this variable exerts a positive influence on VC pay, although the magnitude 
of this effect is greater in the institution random effects specification. The point estimate 
in column [1] suggests that a one percent increase in the external pay benchmark, on 
average, and ceteris paribus increases VC pay by about 0.38%. These results confirm 
the earlier findings that external benchmarking plays an important role in the 
determination of VC pay even after controlling for VC characteristics. 
 
In the institution random effects specification we find some evidence that VC personal 
attributes impact on VC pay.  We first note a significant gender effect with male VCs 
earning about 5%, on average and ceteris paribus, more than their female counterparts. 
This may be due to the fact that proportionally more females VCs are found leading 
post-2003 universities and these VCs are paid less than VCs of pre and post-1992 
universities. Whether this provides evidence of gender pay discrimination in this 
particular labour market is difficult to determine as the data does not allow a robust 
decomposition to be undertaken due to the small number of female VCs. However, it 
does suggest that universities may treat the pay of male and female VCs differently. We 
also find that older VCs are paid more than their younger counterparts confirming the 
findings from the pay-performance analysis.   
 
In terms of educational background VCs with an academic specialism in the arts are 
found to be paid less than their counterparts with a specialism in the natural sciences. 
There appears to be no significant difference in the pay received by those VCs with 
either a social science/engineering background and those with an academic specialism 
in one of the pure sciences. There is however a pay dividend associated with receiving a 
first degree from an ancient/civic university or the University of London 2.6% and 4.5% 
respectively compared to receiving a first degree from Oxford or Cambridge.68 
Furthermore, an honorary degree increases VC pay, on average and ceteris paribus, by 
                                                 
68 We also experimented with the institution at which VCs studied for postgraduate awards but the 
estimated coefficients proved to be individually insignificant and dropped from further analysis. 
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about 2% but there appears to be no significant role for other public/academic esteem 
measures to influence VC pay.  
 
Table 2.8 VC Pay-characteristics Equations 1994/95-2008/09 
Variable Institution Random Effects  [1] VC  Random Effects [2] 
Constant   6.157 (0.725)***  7.425 (0.687)***    
General Characteristics   
Male   0.049 (0.016)***  0.018 (0.022) 
Age <=55  -0.017 (0.013)  0.002 (0.012)   
Age 55 - 60  -0.018 (0.009)** -0.005 (0.008) 
Age >= 61 f f 
(ln) External pay benchmark 
(lagged one year) 
 0.377 (0.062)*** 0.267 (0.053)*** 
Education Background   
Doctoral Degree   0.001 (0.012)  0.009 (0.015) 
 Academic Discipline:   
Engineering  0.023 (0.021)  0.031 (0.026) 
Social Science -0.002 (0.015) -0.016 (0.014)    
Arts  -0.040 (0.024)* -0.052 (0.023)**   
Science f f 
University Attended   
Ancient/Civic 0.026 (0.012)**  0.011 (0.016) 
London 0.045 (0.020)** 0.026 (0.021) 
1960s/CAT 0.031 (0.036)  0.003 (0.026) 
Ex Polytechnic 0.019 (0.023) -0.005 (0.027) 
Overseas 0.045 (0.031)  0.046 (0.038) 
Other 0.056 (0.049)  0.001 (0.038) 
Oxford/Cambridge f f 
Esteem and Public Honours   
Professor 0.013 (0.019)  0.023 (0.018)   
FRS 0.015 (0.024)  0.052 (0.029)*   
Knighthood 0.017 (0.020)  0.030 (0.020) 
Honorary Degree  0.021 (0.011)*  0.005 (0.013) 
Career History and Training   
Previous work experience   
Civil Service  0.010 (0.025)  0.051 (0.024)** 
Education  0.039 (0.051)  0.012 (0.036) 
Industry   0.046 (0.031)  0.061 (0.041) 
Academia f f 
Training   
Ex VC 0.056 (0.026)**  0.060 (0.025)** 
Ex pro VC -0.013 (0.014)  0.007 (0.015) 
Current Employment   
External Appointment 0.001 (0.015)  -0.004 (0.017) 
Tenure (years)  0.006 (0.002)***   0.006 (0.002)*** 
Contract Terminated -0.006 (0.009)  -0.002 (0.009) 
Institution Characteristics   
Pre-1992 0.002 (0.022)  0.008 (0.017) 
Post-2003 -0.046 (0.028)* -0.048 (0.032) 
Post-1992 f f 
Institution Size Variables (lagged one year)  
#Cost centres 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)* 
(ln) FTE students 0.082 (0.017)*** 0.093 (0.016)*** 
Merger 0.061 (0.017)*** 0.042 (0.014)*** 
 Institution Hierarchical Structure    
Proportion of Senior Academic Staff 0.020 (0.030) 0 .037 (0.032) 
Proportion of Professors 0.234 (0.121)* 0 .164 (0.103) 
Proportion of Staff Remuneration >70k 0.922 (0.221)*** 0 .714 (0.176)*** 
Regional  Variation  (lagged one year)   
(ln) Real county-level house price 0.013 (0.020) -0 .001 (0.017) 
Year Dummy   
1995   
1996 0.023 (0.007)*** 0.024 (0.007)*** 
1997 0.017 (0.011) 0.021 (0.011)* 
1998 0.011 (0.014) 0.017 (0.013) 
1999 0.035 (0.016)** 0.045 (0.015)*** 
2000 0.045 (0.016)*** 0.057 (0.016)*** 
2001 0.071 (0.020)*** 0.089 (0.020)*** 
2002 0.092 (0.021)*** 0.119 (0.021)*** 
2003 0.110 (0.024)*** 0.146 (0.024)*** 
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Variable Institution Random Effects  [1] VC  Random Effects [2] 
2004 0.118 (0.028)*** 0.169 (0.029)*** 
2005 0.140 (0.031)*** 0.195 (0.032)*** 
2006 0.157 (0.036)*** 0.220 (0.034)*** 
2007 0.161 (0.037)*** 0.229 (0.037)*** 
2008 0.197 (0.038)*** 0.271 (0.039)*** 
2009 0.266 (0.039)*** 0.342 (0.041)*** 
Number of observations 1755 1755 
Number of groups 117 284 
R2:   Overall 
   Within 
   Between 
  Wald 𝜒492   
0.797 
0.795 
0.780 
5220.96 [0.000] 
0.798 
0.771 
0.840 
3872.69 [0.000] 
Model Diagnostics 
        σi 
        σe 
        rhoi 
 
0.069 
0.089 
0.374 
 
0.093 
0.073 
0.613 
 χ2  tests for categorical Variables (df)   
Age Dummies (2) 8.16 [0.017] 2.55 [0.280] 
Academic Discipline(3) 16.11 [0.001] 7.78 [0.050] 
University Attended (6) 33.85 [0.000] 3.94 [0.685] 
Work Experience (3) 12.12 [0.007] 7.46 [0.058] 
University Sub-sector (2) 5.39 [0.068] 8.77 [0.012] 
Year Dummies (14) 168.83 [0.000] 234.86 [0.000] 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses corrected for clustering on VC or institution depending on 
specification. 
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1% 
(c)  f denotes base category in estimation 
(d) † denote not applicable in estimation 
(e) rhoi is an estimate of proportion of the variance in the unobservable random effects in the total variation in the 
error structure.   
(f) p-values are reported in squared brackets.   
 
In terms of VC training ex VCs are paid about 5.6% more, on average and ceteris 
paribus, than incumbents without this attribute, suggesting that previous experience of 
running a university is highly valued by potential employers. It is worth also pointing 
out that there is little role for other measures of a VC’s previous work experience in 
influencing pay in this specification. We do find evidence that an extra year in post 
increases VC pay, on average and ceteris paribus, by about 0.6%. This effect is also 
evident in the VC random effects specification.69 
 
We now turn our attention to the effect that university characteristics have on VC pay 
focussing our attention on the estimated coefficients for the institution random effects 
specification. We find evidence of a differential in pay between those VCs who head 
post-1992 and those leading post-2003 universities. The point estimate suggests that the 
latter group of VCs are paid, on average and ceteris paribus, about 4.6% less than their 
counterparts in the base category.  
 
                                                 
69 Quadratic tenure terms were also employed but found to be insignificant at conventional levels of 
significance and dropped from subsequent analysis. 
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We also note that the estimated coefficients for the variables used to capture university 
size: the number of FTE students and the estimates for the number of cost centres are 
both well determined and suggest that university size exert a positive influence on VC 
pay. For instance, a 1% increase in the number of FTE students increases VC pay by 
about 0.08%. However, the number of cost centres only achieves statistical significance 
in the VC random effects specification.  
 
We also note that VCs are awarded for the completion of a successful merger. The 
estimated coefficient for this variable is well defined and suggests that a successful 
merger increases VC pay, on average and ceteris paribus, by about 6%. The magnitude 
of this effect is similar to that reported in column [4] of table 2.6. Again this effect is 
robust across specifications. This particular result is similar in magnitude to the result 
reported in the pay-performance relationship, and provides further evidence that VC 
performance through the management of a successful merger impacts positively on VC 
pay. 
 
The results also suggest that the presence of highly paid staff, proxied by the proportion 
of staff earning over £70,000, exerts a positive influence on VC pay. The point estimate 
suggests that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of staff earning in excess 
of £70,000 increases VC pay by 0.92%. This particular finding confirms the earlier 
finding for the pay-performance relationship although the effect was smaller. This may 
be taken as further evidence of ‘tournaments’ influencing VC pay. Similarly, a one 
percentage point increase in the proportion of professors in the institution, who also 
represent high earners, increases VC pay, on average and ceteris paribus, by about 
0.2%. This provides further supporting evidence that ‘tournaments’ may indeed impact 
on VC pay.   
 
In general several of the significant effects reported for the institution random effects 
remain robust in the VC random effects specification. However, on balance only few 
VC personal characteristics are found to influence VC pay. The main effects tend to be 
determined by the institution’s characteristics. This has also been confirmed in previous 
research (Dolton and Ma, 2003). 
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2.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
There has been recent public interest in the determination of CEO pay in the public 
sector. The primary analysis undertaken empirically examined the relationship between 
VC pay and mission-based and financial performance indicators. In addition, a 
complementary analysis examined the relationship between VC pay and VC personal 
characteristics after controlling for university specific characteristics.  
 
From the primary analysis we find new evidence of a relationship between VC pay and 
mission and financial based performance measures. There is evidence that success in 
‘widening participation’ which is now a key feature of the mission statements and 
strategic plans of many universities, impacts VC pay although the responsiveness in pay 
is low (inelastic), and indeed many VCs may be mission driven. However, when 
university rather than VC fixed effects are used in the analysis, neither of the social 
inclusion measures used achieve statistical significance at a conventional level. This 
may be attributable to the fact that the institutional fixed effects absorb most of the 
variation associated with these two measures. This is perhaps to be anticipated since 
these social inclusion measures can be reflective of different university policy or 
‘missions’ between pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. We also find that VCs are 
rewarded financially for securing steady financial flows through funding council grants 
as a possible reward for sound financial management although the responsiveness of 
VC pay to this variables is again fairly inelastic. We also found that VCs were awarded 
for success in securing institution growth through merger. These results provide 
evidence that VCs are not entirely paid like public sector bureaucrats but good 
management and furthering the institution’s mission is rewarded. However, in both the 
analyses undertaken there was evidence of substantial VC pay inflation particularly 
since the academic year 1998/99 onwards. 
 
The complementary analysis examined the relationship between VC pay and VC 
personal characteristics. The results from the institution random effects specification 
suggest only marginal evidence that a VCs’ human capital impacts on VC pay after 
controlling for university characteristics (similar conclusion can be drawn from the VC 
random effects specification). However, there is evidence that certain aspects of VC 
training (i.e., whether the incumbent was a former VC), and current employment 
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(tenure) impacted positively on VC pay. There was little evidence that a VC’s previous 
work experience influencing pay. This is all the more surprising given the drive to 
appoint a VC with commercial experience. In addition we found evidence that VCs with 
an educational background in the arts are paid less than their counterparts with a science 
background. This perhaps reflects the commercial worth of such degrees.  
 
There was also evidence of a gender dimension to VC pay with male VCs being paid 
about 5% more than their female counterparts. Whether this reflects gender 
discrimination in this labour market is difficult to discern and the small sample of 
female VCs means that a gender decomposition was not possible. But the evidence does 
suggest that universities do, to some extent, pay female VCs less than their male 
counterparts. We also found that to a certain extent universities pay older VCs more 
than their younger counterparts. In general however, there was little evidence of VC 
characteristics impacting on pay, and we conjecture that the characteristics examined 
may be more important in determining employment than pay. 
 
In both the primary and secondary analysis undertaken the data employed allowed the 
examination of the influence that external pay benchmarks and internal pay structures 
exert on the pay determination process. In particular the results confirm some of the 
findings from the limited previous research that exists in this area. These variables, it is 
argued, capture some of the information that the remuneration committees utilise when 
determining their VC pay. The remuneration committee may seek to set VC pay 
commensurate with the pay awards of VCs at comparable institutions in regard to the 
guidelines set by the Committee of Universities Chairs (2009:27). We find robust 
evidence that this is indeed the case. Such pay awards may also represent a signal of 
comparable quality and assist retention thus reducing the costly process of recruitment. 
Moreover, comparative pay awards may also be used by the remuneration committee to 
justify the increase in pay to relevant stakeholders (e.g., lecturer unions, academic staff 
and students). However, the results reveal that that the effect is fairly inelastic 
suggesting that the responsiveness of the remuneration committee to VC pay in other 
comparable universities is relatively low.  
 
We find evidence that VCs are paid according to internal pay structures as predicted by 
tournament theory. This may not be that surprising given UK universities employ highly 
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paid financial and marketing staff to manage and identify changing income streams 
(e.g., income from research/consultancy contracts and new markets for overseas 
students). Moreover, universities with business and/or medical schools now have to 
compete for high quality academics who command high salaries. The evidence suggests 
that the presence of highly paid staff impacts positively on VC pay and is in comport 
with previous findings (Dolton and Ma, 2003; Tarbert, et al., 2008). Whether these 
results provide evidence of ‘tournaments’ in determining VC pay is difficult to confirm 
as most VCs are appointed externally. However, it is interesting to note that just over 
one-fifth of the VCs in the primary analysis reach their position through internal 
promotion. Of these, 55% VCs were promoted internally in ‘new’ and 45% in ‘old’ 
universities. This may further suggest that ‘tournaments’ impact positively on VC pay if 
internal promotion reflects success in a promotional contest. 
 
Evidence from the secondary analysis also found that the proportion of professors, who 
also command high pay impacted positively on VC pay providing further support for 
internal pay structures influencing VC pay. The results from the secondary analysis also 
suggest that VCs are compensated for the size of the institution as measured by the size 
of the student body. However the evidence presented suggests that the responsiveness in 
VC pay to changes in the size of the student body is highly inelastic. There was no 
evidence of a ‘size’ effect in the pay change models reported by Tarbert et al (2008) 
possibly due to the poor explanatory power of the pay-change models presented. There 
is also evidence that VCs of post-2003 universities were paid about 5% less than their 
counterparts in pre and post-1992 universities suggesting some differential in VC pay 
across the sector.  
 
There was only marginal evidence that VC human capital impacted on pay although 
experience as a former VC had a positive influence. We were unable to test the theory 
of managerial power in this labour market due to the limited availability of relevant 
data. In order to do so would require more detailed data on the composition and pay of 
the members of the remuneration committee and other stakeholders.  Such data are not 
readily accessible, but is another area that provides a potential for future research on VC 
pay.  Finally, it will prove of interest in time to determine how the pay/performance 
gradient is affected by the levy of higher tuition fees as recently introduced by the UK 
coalition government in the academic year 2012/13.  
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Chapter 3 
Students’ Expectation of Debt in UK Higher 
Education 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Student loans were introduced in 1990/91 following the publication of the 1990 
Education (student loans) Act. These loans were initially introduced to reduce public 
subsidy towards student living costs. In 1991 the maximum loan was set at £420 for 
full-time students living away from home and outside London. This represented about 
one-sixth of the maximum amount of public support towards student living expenses, 
the rest being made up by a combination of educational grants, bursaries, and parental 
contributions. Over time these loans gradually replaced the existing maintenance grant 
and by 1996/97 the maximum loan accounted for 50% of the grant.70 For students 
entering higher education in the academic year 1998/99 the maximum maintenance 
grant was set at £1,000.  
 
Moreover, at the same time students were also expected to contribute to the cost of 
tuition up to a maximum of £1,000.  The 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act 
abolished mandatory grants which were replaced by income assessed loans; it also 
introduced means-tested tuition fees. In 1999 all new entrants to UK Higher Education 
and those that started a year earlier, received all their maintenance allowance in the 
form of an income assessed loan.71  Student loans also accounted for 50% of student 
income in 2002/03, the rest being largely made up in the main by commercial 
borrowing and/or by paid employment (Callender and Willkinson, 2003).  
                                                 
70 These were ‘mortgage-type’ income-contingent loans repayment of which commenced following 
graduation and when the graduate’s gross income exceeded 85% of national average earnings. If gross 
income remained above the 85% threshold then repayment was made over a five year period in 60 equal 
monthly repayments at a zero real rate of interest. For a discussion of the merits of income-contingent 
loans and a graduate tax as replacements for mandatory grants on equity and efficiency grounds, see Barr 
(1991;1993), Barr and Crawford, 1998 and for an international perspective, see Barr (2004), Johnson 
(2000) and Woodhall (2002). 
71 Repayments were income-contingent and set at 9% of gross annual income above £10,000. This 
threshold was raised in 2005 to £15,000. 
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The 2004 Higher Education Act saw student loans as a means by which students, after 
graduation, could repay their tuition fees. In the academic year 2006/07 new students 
attending Higher Education institutions in England and Northern Ireland were charged a 
variable fee of up to £3,000 as a contribution to the cost of tuition. Students were given 
the option to take out a tuition fee loan to cover these extra costs.72 Tuition fees were 
raised incrementally to £3,290 in 2008/09. The maintenance loan was raised to £4,625 
in 2008/09 and to £4,950 in the academic year 2010/11. In October 2010 the Browne 
report (Browne, 2010) recommended that students should start to repay their loans once 
their income reached the new threshold of £21,000. It was suggested that the cap on 
tuition fees should be raised from its then £3,290 to £6,000 per annum. In addition 
under certain circumstances universities are now able to set a fee of up to £9,000 per 
annum if they could prove that students from low income backgrounds are not 
disadvantaged from gaining access to the institution.  The proposals came into effect in 
the academic year 2012/13. These changes in student financial support meant that 
graduate indebtedness was expected to increase particularly from 2006/07 and in the 
near future. Appendix C1 at the end of this chapter provides a summary of the major 
changes in student finance from 1962 to the present.  
 
The primary focus of this essay is to examine the factors that are correlated with the 
level of debt students expect to accumulate once their undergraduate studies are 
completed, in the context of the changes in student finance following the 2004 Higher 
Education Act. In particular, we use a unique dataset that is derived from information 
gathered from a survey of undergraduate students. In addition to demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics and student attitudes to debt we also include information 
on student time preference, risk taking behaviour, and expected future earnings. 
Information on these latter variables is often absent from research on student debt 
particularly in UK studies. This essay makes a novel contribution to the literature on the 
student indebtedness, by examining the possible associations that may exist between the 
variables highlighted above and student expected debt and to the author’s knowledge 
there is very little research on this issue using UK data.  
 
                                                 
72 Some students were also eligible for a new income assessed maintenance grant of up to £2,700. 
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This chapter is arranged as follows. The next section provides a brief background to the 
current state of graduate debt in UK higher education. This is followed by a review of 
the relevant literature in section 3.3. The data used in the empirical analysis are 
discussed and described in section 3.4 which is followed by a description of the 
methodology employed in the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 presents the empirical 
results and the final section provides some concluding remarks.   
 
3.2 Student Debt in the UK 
 
3.2.1  Student debt 1990/91- 2005/06 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the average loan taken out by eligible students, domiciled in 
England and Wales, increased considerably over the period 1990/91 to 2005/06. We 
note that in the academic year 1990/91, following the introduction of the Education Act 
1990, the average student maintenance loan was £390 in 1991 prices, and over the 
decade to 1998/99 increased in real terms to £1,509 as loans replaced maintenance 
grants.  
 
Figure 3.1 Average Student Maintenance Loan 1990/91-2005/06 (£ in 1991 prices) 
English and Welsh Domiciled Students 
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Between 1998/99 and 1999/2000, subsequent to the Teaching and Higher Education Act 
1998, the maintenance allowance was replaced by a means tested loan and the real 
average value of the loan increased by just over 33%. By the academic year 2005/06, 
the average student loan stood at £2,338 for student who took out a loan.  
 
This increase in the size of the average loan was also accompanied by an increase in the 
number of students taking out loans. In the academic year 1990/91, 180,200 students 
took out a loan, which represented a 28% take up rate across all eligible students. By 
1999/2000, 699,700 students took out a loan, representing a 72% take-up rate which 
rose to 80% representing 880,700 students by 2005/06 (Students Loans Company). 
These trends were anticipated given the changes in student funding arrangements in 
England and Wales.  
 
Surprisingly, given the growing public concern over student debt, there is a dearth of 
official statistics on the level of actual student debt after graduation. Barclays Bank 
Graduate Debt survey (Barclays Bank, 2005), covering the period 1994 to 2004, 
reported that student debt for new graduates increased in real terms by a factor of 3.7 
from £2,047 in 1994 to £9,653 by 2004. A similar survey carried out by NatWest 
(Natwest Bank, 2007), covering the period 2000 to 2006, suggested that in real terms 
student debt more than doubled over the period. In particular in 2005 real student debt 
was £8,789 and in 2006 it was £8,929. These surveys illustrate a clear increase in 
student debt between 1994 and 2006, see figure 3.2 below.  
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Figure 3.2 Average Student Debt 1994-2006 (£ in 1991 prices) 
English Domiciled Students 
 
 
Notes: The figures reported above do not apply to students who were liable for 
variable tuition fees. The data for both series were derived from surveys of 
graduates carried out 6-18 months after graduation. 
 
 
Evidence from national surveys broadly supports these trends. Callender and Wilkinson 
(2003) report that average student debt for full-time students amounted to £8,666 in the 
academic year 2002/03 – 2.5 times higher, in real terms, than average student debt in 
1998/99 (£3,462) and 3.5 times higher than average student debt  in 1996/97 (Callender 
and Kemp, 2000). It is worth noting that the Push survey (Push, 2007) showed average 
student debt remaining static or even falling in 2004 and 2005, and the UNITE survey 
revealed a small decline in average debt among students in 2005 (UNITE, 2007).The 
proportion of students expecting to be in debt after completing their undergraduate 
studies also increased from 81% in 1998/99 to 92% in 2002/03 (Callender and 
Willkinson, 2003). Metcalf (2005) found that 89% of 3rd year students who started 
university in 1998 expected to be £8,739 in debt by the time they graduated. In contrast 
84% of students who started a year earlier (before the introduction of means tested 
tuition-fees) expected to be £5,371 in debt at graduation.  
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3.2.2 Student debt post 2005/06 
 
In the academic year 2006/07 students enrolling in English universities were charged a 
variable fee of up to £3,000 as a contribution to their tuition costs. Students were given 
the option to take out a loan, in addition to the maintenance loan, to cover these 
additional costs. Figure 3.3 illustrates that between the period 2006/07 to 2010/11 the 
average maintenance loan decreased by about 4.6% and tuition fee loans remained 
relatively constant in real terms, which in part is due to the increase in the maximum 
tuition fee institutions were permitted to charge their students. Overall, the average level 
of total student public borrowing, in real terms decreased by just under 3%. It is also 
worth noting that the number of student borrowers increased from 2.9 million in 
2008/09 to 3.2 million in 2009/10 (Student Loan Company, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.3 Average Maintenance Loan and Tuition Fee Loan (£ in 1991 prices) 
England 2006/07-2010/11  
 
 
Notes:  These figures represent awards to English domiciled students who entered 
university in November of the relevant academic year irrespective of where they 
study. 
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Survey, covering only English domiciled students, found that student loans made up 
88% of all student borrowing and the average level of expected debt for final year full-
time students graduating in 2007, who were not part of the ‘new’ student funding 
regime, was about £7,800 (Johnson, et al., 2009). The Push survey (2007) estimated that 
students who started higher education in 2006/07 could expect an average level of debt 
of £17,500 on graduation and those starting in 2007/08 could expect to owe £21,000. 
More recent evidence suggests that students graduating in the years 2009, 2010 or 2011 
anticipate debt amounts of £22,000, £23,000 and £24,700 respectively (Push, 2010). 
Purcell and Elias (2010) report that 31% of final year students graduating in 2008/09 
expect to be in debt by an amount of more than £20,000. These figures are expected to 
be higher in the future in the wake of the Browne report (Browne, 2010). The portrait 
that emerges from this evidence is a significant increase in student expected 
indebtedness from 2006.  
 
International evidence on the debt students expect on graduation is rare. Usher (2005), 
however, reports a wide variation in student debt burden post-graduation across eight 
countries including the UK. The study finds that UK students have the fourth highest 
debt at graduation and only Swedish, Canadian, and US students have higher debts. 
Recent evidence for the US suggests that students graduating in 2009 from private not-
for-profit higher education institutions who relied on student loans to fund their 
undergraduate studies had an average debt of $26,200 (£16,725), and those graduating 
in 2010 on average owed of $28,100 (£18,175) (College Board, 2011).73 It is not easy to 
compare these figures with student debt in the UK, but if student debt expectations are 
realised then these figures may suggest that UK graduates will be at least as indebted as 
their US counterparts in the near future. 
 
  
                                                 
73 The Bank of England annual spot exchange rates were used to convert the $ value debt to its sterling 
equivalent these were 1.5665 for 2009 and 1.546 for 2010. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
 
The previous section provided evidence to show that since the introduction of student 
loans in 1991 and the introduction of tuition fees in 1999 (and its subsequent increase) 
student indebtedness and the level of expected debt have risen considerably. The next 
sub-section provides an overview of the general issues surrounding student 
indebtedness. This is followed by a sub-section that reviews the literature on the 
determinants of debt in the general population which identifies factors that may help to 
explain why individuals get into debt and which may be associated with the causes of 
student indebtedness. The penultimate sub-section reviews the small body of literature 
that is focused on the determinants of student debt and the final sub-section provides a 
brief summary of the literature reviewed. 
 
3.3.1 Issues Surrounding Student Debt 
 
There are several negative consequences associated with high student indebtedness such 
as non-continuation in higher education, its impact on student performance, future 
financial well-being and labour market choices (Purcell and Elias, 2010). It is also 
possible that student indebtedness may impact on income distribution if graduates 
demand higher future wages to compensate for higher levels of debt making it more 
unequal in the future. Nevertheless, advocates of student loans often argue that graduates 
are the main beneficiaries of higher education (e.g., in terms of enhanced future 
earnings) and should contribute to its cost (Barr, 2004; Friedman and Friedman, 1980; 
Glennerster, et al., 1968). This argument is grounded in human capital theory (Becker, 
1993) which supposes that students are able to rationally assess the cost and benefits of 
investing in human capital (post-compulsory education). It is further assumed that 
investment in human capital will enhance an individual’s future productivity (e.g., 
through the acquisition of further knowledge and skills) which in turn raises labour 
market lifetime earnings relative to the earnings that could be earned if the individual 
did not pursue further ‘schooling’.  
 
The net private benefit of higher education is the difference between the present value of 
discounted future earnings with university education and the present value of the 
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discounted earnings without (secondary schooling only). The costs associated with such 
an investment include the direct cost (e.g., expenditures on tuition, learning materials, 
and living expenses) and the indirect (opportunity) costs of participation (e.g., the loss of 
potential earnings while studying). If we set the net private benefit to the cost of human 
capital investment we can find the private rate of return, r (the rate of return the 
individual discounts future benefits and costs), from the following expression: 
 
   ∑ (𝑾𝒖−𝑾𝒔)𝒕(𝟏+𝒓)𝒕𝑹𝒕=𝟏 =  ∑ (𝑾𝒔 + 𝑫𝒖)𝒕𝑺𝒕=𝟏 (𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒕  [3.1] 
 
The left-hand side of expression [3.1] reflects the net discounted benefits associated with 
human capital investment and the right-hand side its costs (both direct and indirect). In 
this expression the subscript u denotes an individual with university education and s 
reflects an individual with only secondary education and Wu and Ws represents the 
earnings stream associated with each level of ‘schooling’. The quantity (Wu - Ws) 
represents the earnings differential between graduate and non-graduate earnings (the net 
private benefits), assumed to be positive, but may be negative for a short time after 
graduation. R and S denote time in the labour market and time in higher education 
respectively and t is the time index. On the right-hand side Du denotes the direct cost and 
Ws is the opportunity cost associated with university participation. We note that the 
greater the earnings differential, ceteris paribus, participation in higher education 
becomes more attractive but a rise in the cost, ceteris paribus, makes participation less 
attractive. It would be rational for the individual to invest in human capital up to the 
point where the net benefits equal the costs as stated in expression [3.1]. It is also 
possible that the market rate of discount, i, differs from r and investment in human 
capital will be financially attractive if: 
 
r > i     [3.2] 
 
This suggests that the perceived price of a loan (the subjective (private) discount rate 
relative to the market rate of interest) will influence students’ borrowing behaviour and a 
reduction of the market interest rate may impact positively on the student’s willingness 
to borrow and invest in human capital. This has implications for the design of the 
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repayment scheme i.e., setting an interest rate on student loans that minimises the 
possibility of non-take up i.e., one that does not deter participation. 
 
However, whether or not a person can participate in higher education will depend in part 
on the extent to which a prospective student is able to borrow freely to finance the direct 
costs and the terms on which such borrowing takes (see, Tumino and Taylor (2013) for 
recent evidence). In this regard the capital market may ration the available credit and fail 
to provide the necessary level of student loans for an efficient level of higher education 
investment. One of the principal reasons cited for such capital market failure is the lack 
of sufficient information on the part of both the lender and borrower (Barr 2012, 2004). 
For instance, lenders will not know how well a prospective student will perform in 
higher education or even if the student is able to complete the degree programme. This 
leads to an uncertain outcome and raises concern over whether the student is able to gain 
suitable graduate employment with sufficient future income to make the repayments. 
Moreover, lenders may be reluctant to lend to students from low-income backgrounds 
with little or no collateral on the basis of uncertain future income, and access to higher 
education for this particular group of students may be hindered. Such an inequitable 
distribution of higher educational resources may further impact on intergenerational 
mobility. Furthermore, students will not necessarily have complete information on what 
they are buying, which is a particular characteristic of students from lower social-
economic groups (Glennerster, 1991), assuming they or their family members or friends 
have no previous experience of higher education. This may also perpetuate the 
possibility of withdrawal or poor performance.  
 
Given that the capital market may fail to provide an efficient or equitable level of 
student loans, for the reasons noted above, then the government may need to intervene 
and provide students with publically funded loans (or grants) to cover some of the direct 
costs of university education. Depending on the terms of the loans this can result in 
students accumulating high levels of debt on the completion of their studies regardless 
of the source of the loans. Moreover, if students expect to realise a net benefit from their 
human capital investment then one may expect students in general to have a positive 
attitude towards using loans as a means of financing their higher education. This may be 
true for students who expect high future earnings with a low risk of unemployment. 
Thus the level of debt students anticipate by the end of their studies may reflect the 
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availability of student loans (or other financial subsidies) and the higher future earnings 
they expect in the graduate labour market. 
 
Several UK studies have found evidence of substantial returns to higher education 
qualifications. For example, Harkness and Machin (1999) analysed earnings data from 
the General Household Survey for the period 1974 to 1995 and found that the wage 
premia on degrees relative to A-levels increased significantly in 1980s, particularly for 
those holding degrees in the Sciences, Social Sciences, and Business. However the 
authors observed little change in the wage premia in the 1990s. Interestingly, they found 
that female graduates have improved their relative wage position by more than men 
since the start of the 1980s. Blundell et al. (2000) find that returns to a first degree, 
relative to A-level qualifications for individuals of about 33 years of age, was about 15% 
for males and 37% for females after controlling for socio-economic factors.  Walker and 
Zhu (2003) find that between 1993 and 2000 the returns to a degree varied between 13% 
to 18% for men and 19% to 31% for women, relative to two or more A-levels using their 
basic specification. Bratti et al. (2008) using data from the British Cohort Study 1970, 
examine the returns to UK degree class and find that graduates with a ‘good’ degree 
class (1st or upper second) earn a wage premia of 6.5% compared to graduates with a 
lower degree class (lower second or 3rd). In a more recent UK study Walker and Zhu 
(2011) find that the hourly wage premia for men with a first degree is around 20% and 
the comparable figure for female graduates is around 31% compared to those with 2 or 
more A-levels. Moreover, they estimate that tuition fees of between £3,290 and £7,000 
p.a. reduce the wage premia by 1-3%. Much of the evidence from UK studies is 
consistent with international evidence (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).  
 
However, the evidence is more mixed as to whether or not students can form realistic 
expectations of their future earnings. For the UK, Jerrim (2011) finds that first year full-
time students over estimate their expected starting salary by 20% and expectations 
become more realistic over time with final year students over-estimating their starting 
salary by about 15%. Brunello et al. (2004) found that business and economics students 
in ten European countries also tend to over-estimate their future wages. However, 
several studies conclude that students can make accurate predictions on their future 
earnings. For instance, Webbink and Hartog (2004) find that the expected wages of 
Dutch students closely match their actual wages. Wolter (2000) finds that future wage 
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expectations made by Swiss students closely matches the actual wage distribution. For 
the US, students were also found to make realistic predictions of their future incomes 
(Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Betts, 1996). It is instructive to note that several UK 
surveys find that UK students expect relatively high earnings post-graduation. Callender 
and Kemp (2000) report that students graduating in 1999 expect to earn on average 
£13,500 in their first job after graduation and £22,000 five years thereafter. Johnson et 
al. (2009) report that full-time students in 2007/08 expect to earn about £19,800 per 
annum in their first job after graduation, and about £32,000 per annum five years later. It 
is also worth noting that the survey finds that higher than average expected average 
earnings are found amongst students studying Medicine and Dentistry, and lower than 
average expected earnings are found amongst those studying Languages. More recent 
evidence suggests that in 2009 31% of final year undergraduates expect to earn an 
average of £19,665 (Purcell and Elias, 2010). The survey also finds that being male, 
Black or Asian, the subject of study (Law or Social Studies), age, and university entry 
tariff, have a positive association with higher expected future earnings. 
 
There is another strand of literature which interprets a system of student loans, and the 
fear of indebtedness, as a potential barrier in accessing higher education. This is 
particularly evident for potential students from lower socio-economic groups, which 
may compromise the stated policy objective to ‘widen participation’. Callender (2003), 
using a sample of 1,953 pre-university students drawn from Further Education (FE) and 
sixth-form colleges, investigated whether the fear of debt acted as a potential barrier to 
higher education. The survey found that students who expressed a feeling that student 
debt would be a major factor inhibiting their decisions to enter higher education were 
generally: white women over 21 years of age; from lower social classes; and studying at 
a FE college. Although anti-debt attitudes were expressed by students with different 
personal characteristics it did not act as a strict deterrence on the decision to enter higher 
education for the majority of students. Students who held anti-debt attitudes were 
generally from lower social classes, lone parents, Muslims, and from minority ethnic 
groups. Students with tolerant attitudes to debt were more likely to participate in higher 
education and were generally male, from independent schools, and from the higher 
social classes. Attitude to debt was measured on a 5-point scale derived from ten 
attitudinal statements. The mean score was 2.78 suggesting that these students had a 
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marginally tolerant attitude to debt.74 In a follow up study Callender and Jackson (2005) 
using the same data, but a different (logit) methodology, found that students studying for 
vocational qualifications were less likely to apply for higher education than students 
studying for A-level qualifications, due to their greater debt aversion. Similar, 
conclusions were drawn for students from a low social class. For further evidence on 
this issue see, Connor, et al. (2001), Knowles, (2000), Forsyth and Furlong (2003), 
Pennell and West (2005) and Johnston et al. (2009).  
 
Furthermore, the expectation of a high level of indebtedness can have some further 
unintended consequences particularly for those students from disadvantaged socio-
economic groups and students with limited financial support from their parents. For 
instance, it can potentially reduce the time these students devote to study through taking 
on paid part-time employment by necessity. Christie et al., (2001) examined the impact 
that changes in the student funding regime (i.e., from grants to loans) had on student 
choices in relation to paid work, their level of debt and savings.  Parental financial 
support was found to be an important factor in determining these choices and students 
without parental financial support found paid work and also go into financial debt.75 
They also reported that even when parental support is generous there is a tendency for 
students to seek paid work. Moreover, they found that student attitudes to debt 
influenced how they accumulated debt (e.g., in the form of overdrafts). Evidence from 
UK national surveys of students’ income and expenditure report that the proportion of 
full-time students working term-time increased from 47% to 58% between the academic 
year 1998/99 and 2002/03 (Callender and Kemp, 2000; Callender and Willkinson, 
2003), and fell slightly in 2007/08 to 53% (Johnson, et al., 2009). The average hours 
students worked during term-time also increased from around 11 hours per week in 
1998/99 to about 14 hours per week in 2002/03 (Callender and Kemp, 2000; Callender 
and Willkinson, 2003) and ranged between 11 and 17 hours per week during term-time 
in 2007/08 (Johnson, et al., 2009). In a more recent survey 47% of final year students 
reported taking on paid work during term-time in the academic year 2008/09 with hours 
worked during term-time varying between 12.5 to 15.5 hours per week (Purcell and 
Elias, 2010). The general picture that emerges is the proportion of UK students working 
                                                 
74 From the responses the authors used factor analysis to extract 3 factors associated with debt attitude: 
liberal, moralistic/debt averse, and fearful of debt. 
75 It should be noted that the sample size was very small and consisted of 49 students. 
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part-time during term-time and the hours worked has generally increased over the last 
decade, but fell slightly towards the end of the decade during the recession that was 
brought on by the financial crisis of 2007.   
 
Moreover, there is evidence that term-time work can also adversely affect student 
academic achievement and experience of higher education. An early UK study by Ford 
et al. (1995) found that in the wake of the changes in student funding arrangement in 
1990, 29% of the 1,059 students sampled worked during term-time. Of these 40% 
reported that academic standards were not affected, 27% said academic work suffered 
and 30% said they were unable to prepare efficiently for tutorials. Metcalf (2003) found 
that term-time working had a negative effect on the quality of university experience in a 
study of 782 full-time 3rd year undergraduates in four UK universities in 2000/01. 
Specifically, 30% of all students found it difficult to balance work with educational 
demands. For those who were in work 78% reported that it affected time devoted to 
study. Furthermore, there was evidence that females (particularly from ethnic minorities) 
were more likely to be in term-time employment which hindered their academic 
performance. Although financial and cultural factors were found to influence the 
decision to work term-time the incidence of work differed across universities in the 
sample and students attending pre-1992 universities were less likely to be working 
during term-time. Humphrey (2006) also confirms the findings that term-time work 
negatively impacts on academic performance (measured in terms of end of year grades), 
and the student experience (i.e., membership of university societies).  The more recent 
UK study by Callender (2008) using a sample of 1,012 full-time students drawn from six 
UK universities in 2002 reports that 53% of students worked term-time. The study finds 
that irrespective of university type term-time work had a negative impact on end of year 
marks and degree classifications. Male students working part-time during term-time 
were less likely to do as well as their female counterparts and older students in work 
performed better than their younger counterparts. For further evidence on these issues 
see, Humphrey (2006) and Brennan et al. (2005). 
 
It is interesting to note that in a study of final year students Metcalf (2005) found that 
between 45% and 47% of the 1,112 students in the sample worked term-time at an 
average of about 14 hours per week. The study found that there was no significant 
difference in the propensity to work between students with and without hardship grants, 
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but term-time work increased for those students without financial support from their 
parents or families. However, those in receipt of hardship grants expected a higher level 
of debt by the end of their studies. Further, students who were deemed to have fewer 
employment opportunities (determined by subject of study) or had lower future earnings 
potential were more inclined to work during term-time. The prospect of rising debt was 
once again found to have a significant negative influence on students’ university 
experience for a large minority of those sampled (29%-34%).  
 
Evidence also suggests that financial problems can be a key influence on the decision to 
withdraw from higher education. For instance, Davies and Elias (2003) in a survey of 
1,510 students who either withdrew from UK higher education in 1996/97 or 1998/99 
found that 18% of former students cited financial pressures as a major reason to 
withdraw from higher education with relatively more males (56%) than females (40%) 
citing financial pressures as the reason for their exit. Those aged 21 years also cited 
financial pressures as a major reason for withdrawal. Yorke and Longden  (2008) in a 
survey of 1st year students who failed to return to higher education for their second year 
found that 29% of a sample of 312 students cited financial pressure as influencing their 
departure. See also McGivney (1996) and Yorke (1999) for further evidence on the 
relationship between financial pressures and the decision to withdraw from higher 
education.  There is also evidence that student debt can inhibit future educational and 
labour market choices, such as the desire to pursue postgraduate studies or the need to 
find non-graduate jobs post-graduation to pay off debts (Purcell and Elias, 2010). 
 
Studies in the US also find that financial pressure is positively associated with term-time 
working which can have a detrimental effect on academic performance, the decision to 
continue with undergraduate studies and future choices (Astin, 1993; Strinebrickner and 
Strinebrickner, 2003; Chapman and Lounkaewa, 2010; Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010; 
Scott-Clayton, 2012; Zhang, 2013). For students from New Zealand, Lange and Byrd 
(1998) suggest that credit-card debt had negative consequences on students’ 
psychological well-being. 
 
Given the issues outlined above it is surprising that the economics academic literature 
has been relatively silent on the determinants of student indebtedness and has not 
sufficiently addressed the question of why students get into debt. Although research on 
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the determinants of student debt is relatively sparse, there is a large body of literature 
that examines the causes of indebtedness in the general population at the individual and 
household level. The factors identified as significant in determining indebtedness, from 
general public surveys, provide useful insights on the factors that may be associated with 
student indebtedness. It should be noted that there is no real consensus on the definition 
of ‘indebtedness’ or ‘over-indebtedness’ in the literature (D'Alessio and Iezzi, 2012) 
whether it being unable to meet regular bills or payments on unsecured ‘structural’ debt 
(OXERA, 2004) or meeting all obligations over a long period of time (Haas, 2006).  
 
3.3.2 The Determinants of Debt 
 
There is a large body of literature that has examined several aspects of individual debt. 
Much of it focuses on the general determinants of ‘over-indebtedness’ but the literature 
also examines, inter alia, the impact of debt on financial hardship and poverty (Mewse, 
et al., 2010; Drakeford and Gregory, 2008; Citizen's Advice Bureau, 2006); health, 
stress and social exclusion (Brown, et al., 2005ba; Drakeford and Sachdev, 2001; 
Taylor, et al., 2011) and its potential to act as a barrier to employment (Kempson, et al., 
2004).  
 
The literature on the determinants of debt has grown over the past decade but studies by 
economists using UK data are still relatively rare. This is all the more surprising given 
the growth in UK individual and household debt over the past two decades (Brown, et 
al., 2005a).76  This in part is due to the lack of suitable UK data and scepticism amongst 
economists over the use of subjective data in such studies. The reasons for such 
scepticism include concerns over the use of attitudinal variables in regression analysis 
and the creditability of inferring subjective expectations from realisations. These 
concerns arise for several reasons. First, the specific wording of the questions and their 
ordering can potentially create cognitive problems on the part of the subject and lead to 
biased responses. Second, certain types of questions may seek to elicit the strength of 
attitudes on numerical scales. Fundamentally, the use of such scales assumes that 
individuals have the same underlying preferences and perceives each point on the scale 
in a similar way. If this assumption does not hold then responses again may be biased 
                                                 
76 In a survey of 1,647 between 1994 and 2000, Kempson (2002) reports that unsecured debt doubled in 
the seven year period. 
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and may only reveal what individuals think the survey wants e.g. averages. In addition 
there is also concern over the nature of questions used to elicit subjective expectations. 
For instance, it is not unusual to find survey questions asking respondent to select the 
likelihood of a certain outcome by reporting if a certain event is ‘unlikely’, ‘probable’, 
or ‘expected’. Again it is debatable if individuals interpret these choices in a similar 
way. Another consideration concerns the use of probabilistic expectations questions as 
there is no general way of assessing how well elicited expectations reflect an 
individual’s way of thinking about an event. For these reasons, and more, economists are 
sceptical about using subjective data, see Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001b), for further details on these issues.   
 
However, the determinants of individual debt – generally focused on unsecured debt 
(e.g. credit card debt) – have been examined in the economics of psychology literature 
and also separately explored in the psychology and sociology literature. An early study 
on the determinants of debt by Berthoud and Kempson (1990) found that about three-
quarters of a survey of 2,000 British households in 1989 use credit as a means to finance 
consumption.77 The authors found that young people and those on low income were 
likely to have debt problems. They also found that attitudes toward credit were 
correlated with indebtedness. Livingston and Lunt (1992) using UK survey data on 219 
adults (including pensioners) and employing discriminant and regression analysis found 
that social, economic, and psychological factors influenced the extent of individual 
indebtedness and debt repayment. They found little evidence of socio-demographic 
factors impacting on debt, but they did find that being in a lower social class increased 
debt. Interestingly, they found that individuals with high disposable income experienced 
high levels of debt, which confirmed the earlier finding by Cameron and Golby (1990)78 
but ran counter to the findings of Berthoud and Kempson (1990). Moreover, they also 
found that subjective attitudes to debt and locus of control79 had a significant influence 
                                                 
77 A similar proportion is reported by Kempson (2002). 
78 These authors also noted that the degree to which individuals had control over financial matters was a 
significant predictor of debt. 
79 Measures of locus of control are used in the psychology literature to gauge the degree to which 
individuals feel in control of their personal circumstances e.g. being in debt. It is constructed by 
presenting subjects with a series of questions related to their personal circumstances, and responses are 
often recorded on a Likert scale. Factor analysis is then employed to identify two common factors. One 
factor is usually related to an individual’s internal locus of control (i.e., the extent to which individuals 
regards their lives as controlled by their own actions) and the other is related to an individual’s external 
locus of control (the extent to which individuals regard their lives as controlled by destiny or other 
people). See Rotter (1966) for further details. 
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on indebtedness. Lea et al. (1993) in a survey of 420 individuals with either no debt, 
mild debt or severe debt with a water company found that those with severe debt were 
characterised as young, from a lower social class, non-home owners and with dependent 
children. Like Berthoud and Kempson (1990) they also found a negative association 
between income and indebtedness. Furthermore, they found that although each debtor 
group generally held anti-debt attitudes those with severe debt held more pro-debt 
attitudes. Similar conclusions were drawn from a follow up study by Lea et al. (1995)80 
except that attitudes to debt and locus of control did not correlate with indebtedness in 
contrast to their previous findings. However, in contrast to non-debtors, they found that 
debtors had high levels of current consumption and lacked the necessary money 
management skills and facilities to manage their debt such as access to direct debit 
facilities. In a later survey of 1,647 UK households Kempson (2002) found households 
held more pro-debt attitudes in 2002 compared to the attitudes they held concerning debt 
in 1989. The study concluded that household indebtedness was influenced by use of 
credit facilities with one in five households holding considerable credit card debt in 
2002. They also found that indebtedness was influenced by family structure and low 
income. Bridges and Disney (2004) found evidence that credit constraints play an 
important role in determining indebtedness, and Kempson et al. (2004) found further 
evidence of young low-income UK households being at greater risk of debt. It is also 
instructive to note that Brown et al. (2010) using data from the UK Expenditure and 
Food Surveys, 2001-2007 found that gambling (financial risk-taking behaviour) is 
positively correlated with credit card use and therefore higher unsecured debt at both the 
individual and household level.  
 
Much of the international literature confirms the findings from the literature cited 
above.81 For instance, Stone and Maury (2006), using US survey data on first term 
enlisted US Air Force personnel, examined the likelihood of indebtedness using a 
sample of 501 individuals. They developed a ‘multi-disciplinary behavioural model’ 
using a logistic regression and found that demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, 
and ethnicity), economic factors (e.g. total income and financial activities), social factors 
(e.g. parental attitudes to debt), psychological factors (e.g. attitudes to money) and 
                                                 
80 The survey data was of a similar size and variables constructed in a similar way to that used in Lea et 
al.  (1993). 
81 Valins (2004) provides a useful review of the international literature on the determinants of 
indebtedness.  
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situational aspects (life altering events), are significant in explaining unsecured debt. 
Crook (2001) using data from 1990 to 1995 found that US household debt is influenced 
by family income, family size, and home ownership. Another strand of the US literature 
has found that credit constraints are a significant influence on household debt (Jeppelli, 
1990; Cox and Jappelli, 1993; Gross and Souleles, 2002).82  Using Italian household 
level data Margi (2007) found further evidence on this latter issue. Ottaviani and 
Vandone (2011) in a survey of 445 Italians found, using a probit model, a significant 
relationship between impulsive behaviour and the probability of holding unsecured debt 
(e.g., credit card debt), but not for secured debt (e.g., mortgages).83  Betti et al., (2007) 
in a study of 13-EU states found that in general the proportion of households in debt fell 
with income. However, in some low borrowing states (including Italy, Greece and 
Portugal) the proportion of borrowers remained relatively constant in income. The 
authors suggest this finding is influenced by the existence of credit constraints that differ 
across member states. 
 
In general much of the literature interprets individual and household indebtedness in 
terms of life-cycle theory (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). Individuals are predicted to 
accumulate debt in the early stages of their working life when income is relatively low. 
Income is assumed to increase during working life and savings are accumulated. Income 
then falls in retirement and consumption is maintained by drawing on savings. 
Individuals are therefore assumed to be debtors in the early part of working life and 
savers in the latter period in order to smooth consumption over the life-cycle.  
 
However, within the life-cycle framework, future financial expectations are an important 
consideration in consumption (saving) smoothing. Surprisingly, few empirical studies 
have explored the association between financial expectations and consumption 
behaviour. As noted above, this is in part due to economist scepticism of using 
subjective expectation data (Dominitz and Manski, 1997). Despite these concerns there 
has been a growing body of economics research that has employed information on 
subjective expectations in various contexts for example, the determinants of household 
                                                 
82 It should also be noted that in the case of the US different states have different tax laws on borrowing, 
where some types of borrowing are tax-deductible (Poterba, 2002) 
83 Impulsive behaviour was determined by ‘electrodermal responses’ to specific tasks. In this case the 
selection of cards from four alternative decks. The choice was recorded using biological skin conductance 
responses (SCR) using an autonomic index of emotional arousal. 
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debt  (Brown, et al., 2005a; Keese, 2012); income expectations (Dominitz and Manski, 
1997; Dominitz, 1998; Das and van Soest, 1999), and self-assessed heath status 
(Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer, 2004).  
 
The study by Brown et al., (2005a) examines the relationship between future financial 
expectations on the current state of indebtedness using UK data.84  They posit a two-
period theoretical model with uncertain second period income. Their basic model is 
outlined in appendix C2. The authors test the model using a sample of 2,700 working 
adults collected from the 1995 and 2000 wave of the British Household Panel Survey. 
The data contained information on the current level of debt at the individual and 
household level as well as information on expected future income. They construct a 
financial expectations index based on the individual’s assessment of their financial 
situation one year ahead from responses to the question: ‘looking ahead, how do you 
think you will be financially a year from now?’ Using a Tobit methodology, due to a 
significant proportion of the sample registering zero debt, they found that there is a 
positive association between optimistic financial expectations and the level and growth 
of debt as predicted by their model after controlling, inter alia, for individual 
characteristics (e.g. gender, ethnicity, marital status, education, household 
characteristics, and occupation) and wealth (e.g. savings, investments, mortgage(s), 
earnings from a second job). Although this research is not specifically focused on 
student debt expectations the model is clearly applicable to the debt students expect to 
accumulate during their undergraduate years as a consequence of their expected future 
income. Thus students who expect high returns to their higher education qualifications 
may expect to accumulate debt whilst at university and repay it later in life.  
 
Keese (2012) examined the factors that influence future expected debt burden using data 
from the 2005-2008 German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). He finds that objective 
(current) debt burden is associated with future subjective (expected) debt burden using 
the responses to the following question: ‘does repaying these [current] loans place a 
major burden on your household, a minor burden or no burden at all?’ Using a random 
                                                 
84 There are now several studies in the economics literature that exploit subjective expectations data. For 
instance, Dominitz and Manski (1997) use income expectation data to fit subjective income expectations. 
Das and Soest (1999) using Dutch household-level data find that financial expectations were low relative 
to realisations.  Souleles (2004) finds that US household expectations are biased and inefficient. See also 
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) and Guiso, et al. (1992; 1996). However, there is still debate amongst 
economists on its predictive value. 
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effects ordered probit model the author found that household and individual subjective 
(expected) debt burden is positively associated with objective (current) debt burden, 
household size, unemployment, but decreases in income, education, and internal locus of 
control. There is also evidence that individuals who are worried about their personal 
future economic and financial security perceive a higher debt burden. Interestingly age, 
gender, and external locus of control were only found to exert a significant influence on 
individual debt expectations and had little effect at the household level.  
 
It is possible that an individual’s attitude to risk will influence overall indebtedness. 
Intuitively, we may expect that an individual who expresses a dislike of risk may be 
fearful of accumulating debt if there is a non-zero probability of not being able to 
service the debt, due to the uncertainty attached to future income streams (e.g., due to 
unforeseen spells of unemployment and/or changes in the real wages). Surprisingly, the 
economics literature examining the relationship between risk attitudes and indebtedness 
is relatively thin, possibly due to the reluctance of economists to use subjective data in 
their empirical models for the reasons noted earlier. However, to gauge ‘global’ risk 
attitudes several authors have used a simple point scale (e.g. 0 = ‘risk averse’ to 10 = 
‘fully prepared to take risks’) and ask individuals and households to select a point on the 
scale which best reflects their attitudes to risk.85 The results from this procedure have 
proved to be a reliable predictor of actual risk-taking behaviour (Dohmen, et al., 2005, 
2011; Ding, et al., 2010; Booth and Nolan, 2012; Donkers and van Soest, 1999) 
however, Keese (2012) using a similar procedure finds that risk attitude has no 
independent effect on expected debt burden for both individuals and households.  
 
Brown et al. (2013) using an alternative method to elicit risk preferences finds that risky 
behaviour is negatively related to unsecured household debt, for a sample of US 
households. This result is also robust across the econometric specifications reported. 
Moreover, risk attitudes were found to be a significant and the most important 
determinant of unsecured household debt. The negative relationship between risky 
behaviour and indebtedness was as expected from the 2-period theoretical model the 
author’s develop that suggests debt is a decreasing function of risk aversion. Similarly, 
                                                 
85 This question has been used to gauge individual ‘global’ risk attitudes in the 2004 wave of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). See Dohmen et al. (2005 ) for summary details for the 2004 survey. The 
questionnaire is available at: http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222729.en/questionnaires.html. Accessed 
04/05/2012.  
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in an earlier study, Crook (2001) found a negative and significant relationship between a 
dislike of risk and desired debt for a sample of US households. 
 
It is also instructive to note that subjective discount rates have also been elicited. It is 
common to find researchers eliciting discount rates for example, by asking individuals 
how much a certain sum of money received in the future is worth in the present or how 
much is the individual willing to sacrifice to get the sum immediately. Such procedures 
have been employed in several studies on financial behaviour. For instance, Donkers and 
van Soest (1999) from a survey of Dutch households, and using a set of nine questions 
that relate to the compensation required not to receive a certain sum in the future, 
construct a measure of a household’s subjective discount rate. They found that subject 
discount rates have a significant negative influence on home ownership and ownership 
of risky assets. Harrison et al. (2002) using experimental economic methods and Danish 
data found that subjective nominal discount rates remain relatively constant over time 
but differ across individuals according to socio-demographic characteristics and 
household types (see also, Harrison, et al., 2005). Using US data Meier and Springer 
(2012) find that subject discount rates influence the decision to become financial 
literate.86  
 
Although students as a group differ in terms of the socio-economic characteristics 
present in the general population they do offer a relatively homogenous group with 
regard to their relatively low income and higher necessary expenditures. They also 
represent a group that are particularly exposed to debt. The evidence reviewed above 
suggests a core set of factors that may also influence student indebtedness.  
 
3.3.3 Student Debt 
 
It was highlighted earlier that changes in public financial support for students in UK 
higher education, over the last two decades in particular, have clearly impacted on 
student indebtedness. However, the determinants of student debt expectations are 
relatively under researched in the UK. An early UK study by Davies and Lea (1995) 
                                                 
86Frederick et al. (2002) provides a critical review of the studies and techniques used to elicit discount 
rates since the 1970s. 
110 
 
 
 
examined the extent of undergraduate indebtedness using a sample of 140 undergraduate 
students of which 43% reported being indebted with an average debt of £306 though 
average debt increased with the year cohort. The study used a ‘pseudo-longitudinal’ 
design for three different cohort years (as a proxy for time) from a single university.87 
Using a logistic regression the authors found that male students are more likely to report 
being in debt compared to their female counterparts and the probability of being in debt 
increased with age. In an OLS regression gender and age were found not to be 
significant in influencing the level of student debt but access to credit cards increased 
debt. In both regressions pro-attitudes to debt had a significant association with higher 
indebtedness.88 It is also worth noting that locus of control had no significant effect on 
debt. However, the study’s main focus was to explore how attitudes to debt changes with 
the level of debt over time.89 They found that the mean level of student debt increases 
most between the first and second year of study with students becoming only slightly 
more tolerant of debt. But between the second and third year, and as debt increases, 
students are found to have more pro-debt attitudes and become more tolerant of debt. 
This led the authors to conclude that increasing indebtedness induces a change in 
attitudes to debt so that attitudes adjust to current behaviour. Variables found to be 
correlated with tolerant attitudes to debt included age, religion, and credit card use. 
Although these authors did not explicitly examine future income expectations they 
interpret these results in the context of a life-cycle model of economic behaviour (i.e., 
students borrow to finance human capital investment in regard to expected future 
income). 
 
A more recent UK survey by Purcell and Elias (2010) utilises the responses from a 
survey of 24,500 undergraduates in 2009 to explore the extent to which final (3rd) year 
students are worried about debt. The extent of their worries was recorded on a 7-point 
scale with the higher scores indicating a greater fear of debt. The majority of students 
were classified as being fearful of debt. The authors report that students expect to owe 
on average £15,700 on graduation and 31% expect to owe more than £20,000.90 Using 
OLS and a sub-sample of their data (n=8,769) they find evidence that higher expected 
                                                 
87 Their survey was conducted in 1992 and consisted of 49 1st year, 40 2nd year, and 51 3rd year students. 
88 Attitude to debt was measured on a 7-point scale: 1=anti-debt; 7= pro-debt. 
89 The mean level of debt indicted that students in the sample were tolerant of debt in contrast to that 
found in the general population (Livingstone and Lunt, 1992; Lea, et al., 1993). 
90 Of the 31% of students, 8% expect to have accumulated £25,000 or more of debt at graduation. 
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earnings on graduation lessened the extent of these worries and male students are less 
fearful of indebtedness compared to their female counterparts.91 But in contrast to 
Davies and Lea (1995) they found that students were more fearful of debt in their final 
year of study than in any of the two preceding years. 
 
Like the general literature on household and individual debt there is a paucity of 
literature on the relationship between student debt and attitudes to risk. Of the few 
studies that exist on this issue Oosterbeek and van den Broek (2009) used a survey of 
5,621 Dutch higher education students to explore the factors that govern student non 
take-up of student loans, and hence their level of indebtedness. They present a model 
that examines the relationship between student borrowing behaviour and risk attitudes 
which was measured on a 10-point linear scale (1= unwilling to take risks, 10 = fully 
prepared to take risks) similar to that used in the general empirical literature discussed 
earlier.92 They find that students who are more prepared to take risks have a higher 
propensity to borrow to finance their higher education as expected. In a related study 
Booji et al. (2012), using a similar procedure to elicit risk attitudes, find a similar 
negative association between risk attitudes and student borrowing. Similarly, Eckel at al. 
(2007) find that individuals who are risk seeking tend to borrow to finance their higher 
education. The general picture that emerges from these studies is that there exists a 
negative empirical relationship between student borrowing/debt and a dislike of risk 
which has been found in the more general literature on debt (see for example, Brown et 
al, 2013). 
 
The studies on the borrowing behaviour of Dutch students by Oosterbeek and van den 
Broek (2009) and Booji et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between the subjective 
discount rate and borrowing. It is informative to note that in both these studies the 
subjective discount rate (or rate of time preference) is elicited by asking students a series 
of questions concerning the value of a sum (Euros) received in the future compared to 
receiving €1000 today. Although relatively simple to construct, this covariate has been 
found to be a significant determinant of student debt in other studies (see, Eckel at al. 
(2007) for a study of Canadian students and Coller and Williams (1999) for a study 
                                                 
91 Students were simply asked to state what they expected their per annum gross earnings to be when they 
start work after graduation. The mean was £19,665. 
92 Note that this is in contrast to the 11-point linear scale used by Keese (2012), Dohmen et al. (2011) and 
Dohmen (2005). The authors justify its use as being more understandable to Dutch subjects. 
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based on a sample of US students). The conclusion to be drawn from these studies 
suggests that the higher the rate of time preference the more likely it is that the 
individual borrows to finance higher education. This assertion conforms to the general 
conclusion drawn from standard intertemporal choice theory93 i.e. the higher the rate of 
time preference the greater the individual discounts future consumption which implies 
that higher utility is gained from current consumption rather than future consumption. 
This then raises the possibility that university students with a high rate of time 
preference will assign a low present value to future consumption and may accumulate 
high levels of debt to finance high levels of current consumption whilst at university.  
 
In a novel contribution to the literature on student debt Oosterbeek and van den Broek 
(2009) included two variables to capture student uncertainty in their estimating 
equations: the probability of completing the course and the probability of finding a job 
post-graduation. The authors argue that the more uncertain the situation (e.g. greater 
uncertainty of finding a suitable graduate job to pay back the loan) the less debt we 
would expect the student to accumulate. However, the authors find no significant 
association between these measures of uncertainty and the willingness of students to 
borrow. But beyond this study there is very little in the academic literature that has 
explicitly explored the relationship between attitudes to uncertainty and student debt.  
 
It is informative to note that Oosterbeek and van den Broek (2009) also find that 
students who are more debt averse (measured on a simple 4-point linear scale) have a 
lower probability of borrowing and if parental income is above the modal value then the 
probability of borrowing (i.e., going into debt), decreases. In addition they also found 
that older students, who are nearer to their undergraduate completion, have a propensity 
to borrow more. Moreover, they find little evidence that future earnings expectations 
affect the borrowing decision of these students. Unlike UK studies they find no 
statistical evidence of gender affecting the desire to borrow which may reflect differing 
cultural attitudes to risk between Dutch and UK students.  
 
Opheim (2009), using data from the Norwegian Graduate Survey 2007, found little 
evidence of gender influencing the take-up of student loans amongst graduates with a 
                                                 
93 See Frederick et al., (2002) for a review of this literature. 
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bachelors and/or masters degree. However, there was evidence that loan take-up was 
influenced by age, study delays, prior educational experience, the time spent at 
university and parental place of birth. Moreover, it was found that student attitudes to 
debt influenced the take up of loans between these groups of students. Interpreted 
broadly, the study only finds a weak association between expected earnings and the level 
of student debt. Seaward and Kemp (2000) in a survey of 230 New Zealand students 
found that over optimistic future financial expectations was correlated with higher levels 
of student debt. The study simply asked students to estimate their future income 
following graduation and in the ten years following graduation. 
 
Studies conducted on student debt using US data often focus on the repayment of debt 
post-graduation (see for example, Chapman and Sinning, 2011; Chapman and 
Lounkaewa, 2010; Shen and Ziderman, 2009; Greene, 1989). A notable exception is the 
study by Norvilitis et al. (2003) that examined credit card debt of 227 US college 
students; 75% of whom held some form of credit card debt. Using psychometric 
methods they found little evidence of personality traits (measures of impulsive 
behaviour, life satisfaction, and internal-external locus of control) influencing the level 
of student debt. However, they found some association between debt and perceived 
financial well-being. Although the study provided little evidence on why students get 
into debt it did find that personality traits were associated with student attitudes to debt. 
The authors conclude that students need to be more informed on the future financial 
consequences of obtaining and using credit cards whilst at college so that their attitudes 
to debt can be more informed.94 In a later study of 445 students in five US college 
campuses Norvilitis et al. (2006) found that student age, the number of credit cards, 
attitudes to credit card use, and lack of financial knowledge were positively associated 
with student debt. However, gender and surprisingly attitudes to debt were found not to 
influence indebtedness, but having debt caused greater distress and decreased financial 
well-being. In a more recent study Norvilitis and Mao (2012) compare financial self-
confidence, perceived financial well-being, and attitudes to debt between college 
students from the US and China. Although they find that Chinese students have less debt 
they report lower levels of financial well-being and financial self-confidence. 
 
                                                 
94 In a study of college seniors Markovich and DeVaney (1997) found that male students were more 
informed on financial matters than their female counterparts. 
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3.3.4 Summary 
 
The general results from this review of the literature point to a common set of factors 
that are associated with indebtedness in the general population at both the individual and 
household level these include: socio-economic/demographic factors (e.g., age, income, 
ethnicity, social class, education, family structure etc.); attitudes to debt; psychological 
factors (e.g., locus of control); risk taking behaviour and attitudes to risk, life events, 
credit constraints and lending practices; money management skills and future financial 
expectations. However, the significance of each of these factors differs between studies 
due to: inter-country difference in terms of lending regulations and lending practices; 
cultural differences that influence attitudes to debt; the time at which the studies took 
place (e.g., the stage of the business cycle); and the nature and the size of the sample 
used. 
 
Several factors that are associated with indebtedness in the general population are also 
found to influence student indebtedness. These include: socio-demographic factors (e.g., 
age, gender, ethnicity etc.), attitudes to debt, access to credit, money management skills, 
risk attitudes, and future income expectations. In addition and more specifically 
associated with student indebtedness, parental income, parental financial support, 
availability of grants and bursaries, and subjective time preference have some 
association with student indebtedness. However, the evidence is mixed on the influence 
that these factors have on student indebtedness. For instance, there is little evidence that 
the locus of control influences student indebtedness (Davies and Lea, 1995; Norvilitis, et 
al., 2003). The influence of gender on indebtedness is found to be a significant influence 
on student indebtedness in the UK literature but seems to have little influence in other 
country studies. However, student attitude to debt is found to be a significant influence 
on indebtedness in many studies (see, for example, Davies and Lea, 1995; Brennan, et 
al., 2005; Johnson, et al., 2009). 
 
3.4 Data 
 
The data for this study were collected through a questionnaire administered to 425 
students in lectures and seminars who were enrolled full-time on three-year business 
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undergraduate degree programmes at a UK university during January/February 2009. 
This means that the final year students sampled commenced their university career 
during the autumn of 2006 and were among the first to face a charge of up to £3,000 to 
cover the cost of their tuition. Information was collected on a student’s socio-economic 
characteristics, year of study, earnings expectations, risk attitude, time preference, 
attitudes to debt and uncertainty, and expected debt at the end of the programme of study 
as well as expected debt at the end of the current academic year. As our focus is on 
student debt we are simply concerned with the amount of unsecured debt students expect 
to accumulate during their undergraduate study. Typically, the level of student 
indebtedness will include the cost of tuition, living expenses, and the use of credit to 
finance other current expenditures (e.g., social activities) over and above income 
received from private (e.g., parents) and/or public sources (e.g., bursaries and grants). A 
copy of the questionnaire and details of how it was administered can be found in 
appendix C3.95 It should be noted that due to time constraints and the practicalities of 
administering several questionnaires to the same set of students, questions concerning 
locus of control were dropped from the final questionnaire.96 Moreover, the literature 
reviewed suggest that locus of control had only a minor role in influencing student 
indebtedness. It was felt that this omission would not seriously affect the empirical 
results. After allowance was made for missing values a sample of 308 useable 
observations was obtained. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis are presented in table 3.1 below. Column [1] reports the summary 
statistics for the sample as a whole and columns [2] and [3] report the sample means and 
proportions by gender.  
 
From table 3.1 column [1] we first note that the proportion of undergraduate students 
expecting to be in debt at the end of their time at university is just over 81%. The full 
sample of students report an average expected debt of £14,022 and those who anticipate 
being debt by the end of their undergraduate studies reckon for an average level of debt 
of £17,276. This latter figure is within the range of expected debt levels reported for 
students graduating in 2009 (Purcell and Elias, 2010; Push, 2010).  
 
                                                 
95 The questionnaire is based on an early draft of a similar questionnaire provided by Peter Dolton. 
96 There were also issues surrounding research ethics and student confidentiality which were pointed out 
by senior university officers. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics: Student Characteristics 
 All students [1] 
Female 
[2] 
Male 
[3] 
t-stat/z-
scorea/ 
 Students debt characteristics     
Proportion of students expected to be in debt 
by the end of their studies 
0.815 0.778 0.841 -1.40 
Proportion of students expected to be in debt at 
the end of the academic year 
0.795 0.746 0.829 -1.79 
Expected debt at the end of studies (£) 
 – all students.  
 
14022 (9543)                
 
12499 (9460) 
 
15077 (9482) 
 
-2.35 
Expected debt at the end of studies (£) 
– students who expect to be in debt.c 
 
17276 (7473) 
 
16236 (7432) 
  
17934 (7449) 
 
-1.76 
Expected debt at the end of the academic year 
(£) – all students. 
 
6641 (5716) 
 
5568 (6117) 
 
7384 (4907) 
 
-2.77 
Expected debt at the end of the academic year 
(£) – students who expect to be in debt.d 
 
8349 (5176) 
 
7463 (4251) 
 
8900 (5619) 
 
-2.13 
 
Students individual characteristics 
    
Male students 0.591 n/a n/a n/a 
Age (years) 20.5 (3.195)         
 
20.222 (3.091) 
 
20.692 
(3.258) 
-1.27 
Ethnicity:     
White non-British e 0.139     0.183 0.110  1.81 
Other ethnic group f 0.250     0.238 0.258 -0.40 
White British 0.611 0.579 0.632 -0.93 
2
2χ   =  0.137
 b     
Cohort:     
First year student 0.623     0.667 0.593 1.30 
Second year student 0.198 0.182 0.209 -0.57 
Third year student 0.179 0.151 0.198 -1.06 
2
2χ   =  0.043
 b     
Has a grant/scholarship 0.516     0.548 0.494 0.92 
Has part-time job during term-time 0.292    0.246 0.324 -1.48 
Students’ family characteristics     
Estimated family annual income (£) 53897 (36292) 52563 (35537) 54821  (36874)    -0.54 
Father went to university 0.314 0.349 0.291 1.08 
Mother went to university 0.256 0.310 0.220 1.97 
Father and mother university educated 0.175 0.222 0.142 1.80 
Receives parental contribution 0.464 0.444 0.478 -0.58 
Monthly parental contribution (£) 152.15  (240.47)    151.49(227.97) 152.60  (249.37) -0.04 
Family home owners 0.854     0.849 0.857 -0.19 
 
Students future income expectations 
    
Expected earnings in first job  
after graduation (£) 
25108  (8227) 
 
23821 (8119) 
 
26000  (8205)  
-2.30 
Expected earnings at age 30  
with a degree (£) 
50397  (22652) 
 
46190  (18447) 53310  (24789) 
 
-2.74 
Expected earnings at age 30  
without a degree (£) 
44561  (44109) 
 
39984 (11131) 
 
47730  (56478) 
 
-1.52 
Students attitudes to debt and risk     
Discount rate 0.084 (0.077)            0.082 (0.077) 0.086 (0.076) -0.51 
Risk attitude 6.166  (2.105)              5.540 (2.226) 6.598 (1.906) -4.48 
Debt aversion 3.406 (1.289)            3.810 (1.237) 3.126 (1.253) 4.73 
Uncertainty aversion 2.990 (1.072) 2.770 (1.104) 3.143 (1.025) -3.04 
N 308 126 182  
Notes to table:  
(a) t-stats are used to test differences in means between male and female students, and z-scores are used to test differences in 
proportions. The appropriate critical value at the 5% level of significance is ± 1.96.  
(b) Chi-squared values are used to test the assumption of independence in the sets of categorical variables between male 
and females. The appropriate critical value at the 5% level of significance is 5.99. 
(c) Number of students who expect to be in debt by the end of their studies is 250. 
(d) Number of students who expect to be in debt by the end of the academic year is 245. 
(e) White non-British includes EU and other overseas students. 
(f) Other ethnic groups include British Asian, British Afro-Caribbean, British Chinese, and other overseas students.  
(g) Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for continuous variables. 
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We also note that 79% of all students expect to be in debt at the end of the current 
academic year (2008/09) suggesting that more students expect to be in debt as their 
undergraduate studies progress. As expected, on average students reckon to be less in 
debt at the end of the academic year compared to the level of indebtedness they expect at 
the end of their course (except third year students). The average level of expected debt at 
the end of the academic year for the full sample of students is £6,641 and for those who 
expect to be in debt at the end of the year the figure is £8,349. 
 
There is a dominance of male students (59%). A large proportion of the sample are 
classified as white British (61%) , about 14% classified as white non-British and 25% 
are from other ethnic groups (see notes to table 3.1 for definitions of these categories).  
The sample average age is just over 20 years and the majority (62.3%) are in their first 
year of study. Just over 29% of the sample of students hold a part-time job during term-
time which is lower than proportions generally reported in national surveys. 
 
The literature suggests that a student’s socio-economic characteristic is associated with 
student debt.  We include several variables to capture different dimensions of a student’s 
social economic background, parental home ownership (including mortgaged homes), 
parental education and parental financial contributions. We note that 85.4% of students 
are from families that own their own home, 31% have a father and 25.6% have a mother 
who went to university, and 17.5% are from families where both parents were university 
educated. In terms of student finance 51.6% report they are in receipt of a student grant, 
scholarship, or bursary and 46.4% receive parental contributions averaging about £152 
per month. 
 
In terms of future graduate earnings students expect to earn on average £25,108 per 
annum in their first job post-graduation, which is higher than that reported in other 
studies (Johnson, et al., 2009; Purcell and Elias, 2010). By the time the individual 
reaches the age of 30 they expect to be earning, on average, £50,397 per annum. It is 
also interesting to note that for these students they would expect to be earning about 
£5,900 per annum less had they not studied for a degree by the time they reach 30 years 
of age. This figure suggests substantial anticipated returns to their investment in human 
capital if such expectations are actually realised.  
 
118 
 
 
 
We measure the personal discount rate by presenting students with five different 
scenarios. In each scenario students were asked to consider if they felt ‘better off’, 
‘worse off’ or ‘the same’ by comparing a given sum of money received by a friend in a 
year’s time compared to £1,000 received by the student today. These sums were: £950, 
£1,000, £1,050, £1,100, £1,200. The discount factor was elicited on the basis of when 
students selected the option the ‘same’.97 Thus, they were implicitly given one of the 
following discount factors: -0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.1 or 0.2. The average discount rate was a 
plausible value of 0.084 (Donkers and van Soest, 1999). Donkers and van Soest (1999) 
argue that it is also possible for an individual to have a negative discount rate if the 
individual does not want to spend all income at once and is prepared to pay a premium 
for self-control. Although simple, and as noted earlier similar procedures have been 
adopted in the literature to elicit individual discount rates, it has been found to be a 
significant determinant of student debt in the Netherlands (Booji, et al., 2012; 
Oosterbeek and van den Broek, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.4, below, depicts the distribution of risk attitudes across the sample of students. 
Risk attitudes were elicited by presenting students with the following question: “How do 
you see yourself? Are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to 
avoid taking risks?” Students were then invited to select a value on an 11 point risk-
scale ranging from 0 (‘not prepared to take risks’) to 10 (‘fully prepared to take risks’) 
and as already noted such a procedure has proven to be a reliable predictor of risk taking 
behaviour (see for example, Dohmen, et al., 2011; Dohmen, et al., 2005 ).The average 
for the sample of students is 6.16 (SD = 2.1) suggesting that, on average, students are 
prepared to undertake some risky behaviour. This is broadly similar to that reported by 
Oosterbeek and van den Broek, (2009). Each bar represents the percentage of 
individuals selecting a particular value on the risk-scale. There is some degree of 
heterogeneity across the sample. In the extremes a small percentage of students (1.6%) 
are not willing to take any risk and have selected zero on the risk-scale, and about 3.6% 
of students report a high degree of willingness to take a risk by selecting 10 on the scale. 
The modal response is 7, which was selected by just over 26% of students.  
 
                                                 
97 This was undertaken to check for consistency in responses. For instance, if a student considered £1,050 
received by the friend the ‘same’ as £1,000 today then for lesser amounts they should feel ‘better off’ and 
for greater ‘worse off’. Only students who responded consistently were included in the sample. 
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Figure 3.4 Student Risk Attitudes 
 
 
Information on student debt aversion was obtained from the question ‘I am not scared of 
being in debt’. Responses were recorded on a five-point scale – strongly agree (1), 
slightly agree (2), neither (3), slightly disagree (4) and strongly disagree (5). Thus, the 
higher the score the more is the student’s aversion to debt. The mean score is 3.4 (SD= 
1.99) and the median 3 suggesting that on average students are neutral in respect of their 
aversion to debt. Similar questions have been used in previous studies attempting to 
elicit the degree to which students are averse to debt (Purcell and Elias, 2010; 
Oosterbeek and van den Broek, 2009).  
 
In the spirit of Oosterbeek and van den Broek (2009) we include a variable that 
explicitly captures students’ dislike of uncertainty. Students were asked to indicate their 
dislike of uncertainty by indicating their strength of agreement with the following 
question: ‘I do not handle uncertainty well’. Responses were recorded on the same five-
point scale as described above. Thus, the higher the score the better the student copes 
with an uncertain situation. The mean score is 2.99 (SD = 1.07) suggesting that students 
are generally neutral in respect of their concerns about uncertainty.98 Intuitively we 
would expect that a student with concerns over an uncertain future is likely to refrain 
                                                 
98 It is instructive to note the coefficient of variation is higher for debt aversion (58%) than for dislike of 
uncertainty (36%).  
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from building up debt due to the uncertainty that may be attached to future income 
streams. Thus we would expect a positive association between our measure of 
uncertainty and student debt. 
 
There are gender differences in the responses to the questions asked and these are 
reported in columns [2] and [3] of table 3.1. The statistical significance of these 
differences is reported in the final column of the table. Relatively fewer females expect 
to be in debt by the end of their undergraduate studies compared to their male 
counterparts, 78% and 84% respectively, and these percentages are broadly comparable 
with those reported by Purcell and Elias (2010). It may also reflect different spending 
patterns between the two gender groups (Davies and Lea, 1995). However, we note that 
this difference is not statically significant (t=-1.4). Male students report a higher level of 
expected debt by the end of their studies and expect to be more indebted than females by 
£2,578 on average. However, there is no significant difference between the level of debt 
expected between males and females who anticipate being indebted by the time they 
complete their studies (t = -1.76). It is also interesting to note that relatively fewer 
females expect to be in debt by the end of the academic year and their end of year 
average expected debt is significantly less than that of their male counterparts. In terms 
of ethnicity and age, the female and male sub-samples are broadly comparable, although 
white non-British are more represented in the female than the male sub-samples.  
 
In terms of cohort, the majority of females are in their first year and proportionately 
more males are in their second and third years, but these differences are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The sub-samples are also broadly comparable in terms 
of the proportion of males and females in part-time work, in receipt of a 
grant/scholarship and receiving financial support from parents. The monthly amount of 
parental financial support received on average is also comparable.  
 
Male graduates expect to earn £2,179 more than their female counterparts in their first 
job and by the time they are 30 years of age they expect to be earning £7,120 more. The 
finding that males expect higher earnings in their first job after graduation is also 
generally found in previous surveys. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference between what male and female students expect to be earning by the time they 
are 30 years of age had they not studied for a degree. 
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The mean discount rate reported by males and females is very similar and the 
distribution of the discount rate by gender is also broadly comparable. However there 
are significant gender differences in reported risk attitudes, aversion to debt and dislike 
of uncertainty. In terms of risk attitudes females are relatively less willing to take risks 
compared to their male counterparts their mean scores being 5.54 (SD=1.9), and 6.59 
(SD=2.2) respectively and this difference is statistically significant (t=-4.48). Figure 3.5, 
below, depicts the distribution of risk attitudes by gender. We first note that the modal 
response is 7, which is the same across gender groups. The figure also reveals that very 
few male and female students, approximately 1.6%, report an unwillingness to take 
risks. However, at the other end of the distribution, a larger percentage of males are 
more willing to take risks than females.  For instance about 60% of males report a risk 
attitude in the range of 7 to 10, and 5.5% have selected 10. In contrast about 45% of 
female students report a risk attitude in the rage of 7 to 10, and less than 1% have 
selected 10. 
 
Figure 3.5 Student Risk Attitudes by Gender 
 
 
In terms of debt aversion female students are on average more averse to debt than their 
male counterparts, which is a standard finding in the literature. We note that about 73% 
of females disagreed with the statement ‘I am not scared of being in debt’ with the 
comparable figure for males about 45%. Similarly, females in the sample appear to 
dislike uncertainty more than their male counterparts. 
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There are also important cohort differences in regard to expected debt, time preference, 
and attitudes to risk, debt, and uncertainty. These differences are reported in table 3.2 
below. We first note that expected debt declines by cohort. First year students anticipate 
an average debt of £14,556 by the end of their degree programme and the corresponding 
figures for second and third/final year students are £14,211 and £11,950 respectively. 
The level of debt reported for third/final year students, however, is lower than that 
reported by Purcell and Elias (2010). It may be that students borrow too much in their 
first and second years and then realise that they do not need to borrow as much in their 
final year. 
 
Table 3.2 Student expected debt, time preference and attitudes by cohort year 
 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 
Expected debt at the end of 
undergraduate programme  
£14,556 £14,211 £11,950 
Discount rate 0.08 0.10 0.09 
Risk attitude 6.16 5.97 6.42 
Debt aversion 3.43 3.41 3.29 
Uncertainty aversion 2.91 3.07 3.18 
 
In terms of the subjective discount rate we see that it rises between the first and second 
year suggesting greater current consumption and higher debt in the second year, and 
falls thereafter, but this may be due to random variation. However, second year students 
expect a lower than average expected debt than those in their first year which runs 
counter to what may be expected. Students also become less willing to take on risks 
between their first and second year and expected debt falls as expected. However, 
between the second and third year they become more willing to take on risk but 
expected debt falls which runs counter to our priors. These unexpected patterns may be a 
result of the small set of observations of second and third year students. 
 
We also note from table 3.2 that there is very little difference between student attitudes 
to debt between their first and second year and students become less debt averse in their 
final year. However, expected debt falls in the third year. This may be explained by the 
level of debt accumulated during the first and second year influencing attitudes to debt 
in the following year. Students who have experienced high debt levels in their first and 
second year may adjust their attitudes to debt in their final year (Davies and Lea, 1995) 
even though they may seek to reduce their debt in their final year. In terms of student 
attitudes to uncertainty we see that students tend to feel that they can cope more with 
uncertain situations as their time at university progresses.  
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3.5 Methodology 
 
 
The dependent variable employed in this study can be described as ‘censored’.  In other 
words, the dependent variable, expected debt, records a zero for students who expect not 
to be in debt by the end of their studies or end of year or a positive non-zero value 
otherwise. As a significant proportion of the sample of students report zero expected 
debt, application of OLS to these data can potentially lead to biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates. We therefore model student expectation of debt using a censored 
tobit model which gives consistent coefficient estimates when the dependent variable is 
censored.99  We define the latent debt equation as: 
 
   y*i  = xi′β  +  ui         [3.3] 
 
where y*i  is a partial latent dependent variable that captures the ith individual’s 
propensity to be in debt, xi is a vector of debt determining variables for individual i, β is 
a vector of  fixed unknown coefficients to be estimated, and ui  ~ N(0, σ2).  Thus: 
 
  yi =  y*i   if  xi′β + ui   > 0    and   
  yi =  0    if xi′β  +  ui   ≤ 0 
 
where yi represents the actual expected debt by the ith individual.  Thus yi is either 
positive (yi > 0) or zero (yi = 0).  Using this information, the log-likelihood function (L) 
can be expressed as follows: 
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where Zi = 1 if yi  > 0, and Zi = 0 if yi =  0, φ is the standard normal density function, Φ 
is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, and ln(⋅) is the natural log 
operator. The parameter values β, and σ are chosen to maximise L (the log-likelihood 
                                                 
99 The tobit estimator has been used in studies on the determinants of student loan default (Greene, 1989), 
the determinants of student part-time work hours (Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010), and household and 
individual debt expectations (Brown, et al., 2005a). Amemiya  (1984) provides an early but extensive 
survey of tobit models. 
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function) using non-linear iterative methods (e.g., the Newton-Raphson method). The 
resultant estimates are known to be consistent and asymptotically normal. The estimated 
coefficients are not readily interpretable as the underlying stochastic index, expression 
[3.3], is not observed when students report zero expected debt. To aid interpretation of 
the estimated coefficients for continuous variables the marginal effects for each 
coefficient is computed (Greene, 1999). The marginal effects for the tobit model can be 
expressed: 
    [ ] 





σ
β′
Φβ=
∂
∂ i
i
ii x
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Thus, the tobit coefficients have to be adjusted by a factor equal to Φ(x′iβ/σ) to find the 
effect on expected debt for small changes in the continuous independent variables.  This 
scaling factor is constructed in the current application using the sample average values 
for xi variables, where (x′iβ/σ) is interpretable as the proportion of non-limit (or non-
censored) observations in the sample based on sample average characteristics. In other 
words, the proportion of the sample that expects to be in debt.   
 
For discrete or dummy variables impact effects are calculated by computing the 
difference in unconditional expected values when the dummy is one and when it is zero.  
If we re-express the latent model in [3.3] as:  
 
y*i  = xi′β  + γDi +  ui          [3.6] 
 
where Di = 1 if a specific characteristic is present and zero otherwise the impact effect 
can be computed as the difference between two unconditional expected values:   
 
E[yi| xi, Di = 1] =  ∆1  = Φ((𝑥𝑖′ β + γ) ÷ σ)[( 𝑥𝑖′ β + γ) + σ φ(𝑥𝑖′ β + γ) ÷ σ)]   [3.7] 
 
E[yi| xi, Di = 0]  =  ∆0  = Φ(𝑥𝑖′ β ÷ σ)[ 𝑥𝑖′ β  + σ φ(𝑥𝑖′ β ÷ σ)]    [3.8]
  
The impact effect in this case is simply expression [3.7] minus expression [3.8].  This 
can be computed at the sample average values of the covariates contained in the x 
vector.  
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3.6 Empirical Results 
 
Five alternative specifications are estimated using a tobit model, and the corresponding 
marginal/impact effects are also estimated for each specification. Each model includes 
variables that capture a student’s individual and socio-economic characteristics. 
Following Oosterbeek and van den Broek (2009) the first specification can be described 
as an ‘uncertainty’ model that includes variables that capture student expected 
(uncertain) earnings post-graduation. Specifications 2 and 3 augment specification 1 to 
allow for student discount rates and attitudes to risk to enter the analysis. Specifications 
4 and 5 can be described as ‘behavioural’ models that augment the uncertainty model to 
include student reported debt aversion and dislike of uncertainty. The coefficient 
estimates for the tobit index functions can be found in appendix C4. We first note that 
the goodness-of-fit measures, reported at the bottom of the table, are satisfactory for 
models of this kind. Furthermore, the majority of the estimated coefficients reported in 
the table are well determined at a conventional level of statistical significance.  
 
Table 3.3 below, reports the estimated maximum likelihood tobit marginal/impact 
effects derived from expression [3.3] for the five expected debt equations. The majority 
of the estimated coefficients, in all five specifications, are well determined at a 
conventional level of statistical significance. Each specification was also tested to 
determine if separate male and female equations fitted the data better than a single 
‘pooled’ equation using likelihood ratio tests. The null of a pooled regression was 
upheld by the data in all cases; see test statistics at the bottom of table 3.3. It should be 
noted that there is no comparable method or routine for adjusting the standard errors for 
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the tobit model as there is in the OLS estimated 
linear regression model (e.g., through use of a robust estimator). Greene (2008) is 
critical of the use of such robust procedures in qualitative response models like the tobit 
because the asymptotic properties of such estimates are unknown. He suggests 
modelling heteroscedasticity directly, but this is not feasible in the current application 
due to the small sample size available. Moreover, it is not always transparent if such a 
procedure actually deals with the problem or merely controls for some underlying non-
linear mis-specification that is unrelated to heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 3.3 Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Marginal/Impact Effects 
Expected debt at the end of the course 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification  3 Specification  4 Specification  5 
Gender (male) 2558.898** 
(1045.40) 
2490.071** 
(1039.27) 
1799.670* 
(1059.86) 
2036.378* 
(1078.06) 
1589.142 
(1068.32)      
white non-
British  
-2492.986 
(1567.60) 
-2629.599* 
(1559.04) 
-2294.468        
(1553.61) 
-2322.105 
(1351.12) 
-2219.983 
(1549.70)     
other ethnic 
group 
-4098.849*** 
(1228.81)    
-4365.615*** 
(1227.65) 
-3499.635*** 
(1254.01) 
-3483.319*** 
(1251.82 ) 
-3313.197** 
(1257.58) 
white British  ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
age (years) -97.137 
(170.55) 
-79.313 
(168.93) 
-62.956 
(167.92) 
-58.074 
(167.98) 
-59.870 
(167.44) 
grant/scholarship 1265.626 
(1144.21) 
1048.938 
(1141.36) 
753.023 
(1135.78) 
850.813 
(1137.06) 
672.601 
(1133.78) 
has part-time job -8590.715*** 
(1208.96) 
-8536.019*** 
(1201.71) 
-8441.873*** 
(1191.73) 
-8457.571*** 
(1189.84) 
-8610.544*** 
(1194.48) 
monthly 
contribution (£) 
-11.709*** 
(2.56)      
-11.628*** 
(2.55) 
-11.909*** 
(2.54)      
-12.029*** 
(2.54) 
-12.082*** 
(2.53) 
first year student 1091.396 
(1471.92)    
1457.336      
 (1471.88) 
1565.639 
(1459.05)      
1494.338 
(1457.77) 
1652.151 
(1455.85) 
second year 
student 
4258.316** 
(1717.30) 
4257.002** 
(1707.18) 
4430.030*** 
(1693.76) 
4447.743*** 
(1689.76) 
4504.362*** 
(1689.31) 
third year 
student ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
family home 
owners 
-3098.619** 
(1420.32) 
-3160.541** 
(1411.47) 
-2880.196 ** 
(1401.89) 
-2944.440** 
(1400.45) 
-3083.756** 
(1405.45) 
Mother and 
father university 
educated 
-3281.140** 
(1381.42) 
-3352.706**   
(1371.92)    
-3474.237*** 
(1362.91) 
-3459.429** 
(1360.58) 
-3505.761*** 
(1358.57) 
Expected 
earnings 
>£30,000 after 
graduation 
4050.037*** 
(1580.87) 
 3973.433** 
(1570.70)     
2568.635*  
(1533.15) 
2773.774* 
(1640.40) 
2622.472* 
(1629.20) 
Expected 
earnings 
>£50,000 at 30 
2740.183*** 
(1023.38) 
 2745.483*** 
(1016.79)     
2590.176*** 
(1009.78) 
2638.543*** 
(1008.89)     
2711.933*** 
(1010.96) 
discount rate § 14199.556** (6507.81) 
13985.731** 
(6449.61) 
13628.944** 
(6441.97)      
13643.780** 
(6432.91) 
risk attitude § §  750.374*** (268.89) 
 797.997*** 
(271.66) 
707.777*** 
(269.71) 
debt aversion § § §  457.355 (400.48) 
§ 
uncertainty 
aversion § § § § 
635.735 
(471.56) 
Log-Likelihood -2686.349 -2683.987 -2680.104 -2679.454 -2679.199 
Scale factor e 0.9209 0.9227 0.9249 0.9255 0.9258 
LR test for 
separate gender 
specificationsf  
13.513  
[0.332] 
19.295 
[0.114] 
14.313 
[0.427] 
13.954 
[0.529] 
15.238 
[0.434] 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
Note to tables:  
(a) Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. 
(b) * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c)  f  denotes base category in estimation  
(d) § denotes variable not used in estimation  
(e) Scale factor used in the computation of the marginal/impact effects. 
(f) The chi squared statistic for these tests are reported in the relevant column. The degrees of freedom are 12, 13, 
14, 15, and 15, for specifications 1- 5 respectively, and the probability value for the null of a pooled specification is 
reported below the relevant statistic in squared brackets.  
(g) All estimations reported were undertaken using NLOGIT 3.0 (2003). 
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It is important to note that the results from estimation strategy adopted do not 
necessarily suggest that causal relationships exist between students’ expected debt and 
all the explanatory variables included on the right-hand side of expression [3.3]. There is 
a possibility that certain key variables may be endogenous. Such variables may include 
those that relate to part-time work and expected earnings. For instance, higher expected 
future earnings may cause students to be less frugal in their expenditures leading to 
higher expected debt and higher expected debt could imply that students expect higher 
future earnings. As outlined in the previous chapter (see section 2.7.1) such ‘reverse 
causality’ will result in the estimated coefficients being biased and inconsistent. In order 
to separate the causal impact from mere correlation we will require a set of suitable 
instruments for each endogenous variable, which is often difficult in practice (see 
section 2.7.1 for the requirements for a good instrument).  
 
However, we conjecture that one possible source of exogenous variation in part-time 
work is a variable that captures whether or not the individual worked before enrolling at 
university. Using previous work experience as an instrument assumes it has no direct 
impact on student expected debt but is correlated with current part-time work, and 
expected student debt does not affect previous work experience, which are both 
plausible. If there is a high positive correlation between previous work experience and 
gaining part-time work whilst at university, then the estimated coefficients relating to 
part-time work may be overestimates of the true causal effect.  
 
Similarly, finding instruments for expected earnings is difficult. We could instrument 
student expected earnings with parental occupation class.100 It is possible that students 
from families where either one or both parents are in a professional occupation, may 
expect higher future earnings than those with parents in more menial occupations, but 
parental occupation class does not affect the debt a student reckons. Additionally, 
previous academic performance (e.g., A-level entry score) could also be considered as a 
possible instrument as we might expect high achieving individuals to presume higher 
future earnings, and previous academic performance is assumed not to effect student 
expected debt. If these relationships hold, then it is possible that the estimated 
                                                 
100 Question 9 on the questionnaire administered to the sample of students invited them to write down 
their parental occupation(s). The responses were difficult to interpret and could not be used in any 
meaningful way. 
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coefficients on student expected earnings are also overestimates of the true causal effect.  
For the reasons raised above the reader should exercise some caution in interpreting the 
estimated coefficients for part-time work and future expected earnings that are reported 
in tables 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
 
We initially focus on a student’s individual personal and socio-economic characteristics 
and examine their impact on expected debt. Several of the estimated coefficients relating 
to a student’s individual characteristics are statistically significant at conventional levels 
and the results remain robust across all specifications reported in table 3.3. There is a 
significant gender effect on expected debt. Male students expect to have more debt than 
their female counterparts by the end of their undergraduate studies. For instance, the 
impact effect in specification 1 suggests that male students, on average and ceteris 
paribus, anticipate a level of debt that is about £2,559 greater than that anticipated by 
female students at the end of their studies. This effect remains after controlling for time 
preference, though the impact diminishes to £1,799 when we control for students’ time 
preference and risk attitudes.  However, the estimated gender effect is statistically 
insignificant when dislike of uncertainty is included in the specification, which may 
suggest a high intercorrelation between gender and this uncertainty measure. 
 
We find evidence that student ethnicity impacts on expected debt. In the basic 
uncertainty model, students classified as being non-white (e.g., British Asian, Black and 
Chinese) expect to be about £4,100 less in debt by the end of their undergraduate studies 
than their White counterparts, on average and ceteris paribus. This result is taken to 
reflect differing cultural and religious attitudes to debt in that non-White ethnic groups 
have a greater aversion to debt than their White counterparts (Callender, 2003). This 
effect remains robust across all specifications but the magnitude of this effect diminishes 
with movement across the five regression models reported in table 3.3.  
 
Students in their second year of study expect a higher debt than their final year 
counterparts, but there is no statistically significant difference between debt expectations 
of students in their first and final years of study. This could be explained by changing 
attitudes to debt over time with students becoming more tolerant of debt between their 
first and second year as debt increases, but in the third year they seek to reduce their 
debt possibly to widen their job market opportunities (Purcell and Elias, 2010; Chapman 
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and Lounkaewa, 2010; Johnson, et al., 1997). It is also plausible that students find that 
they borrow too much in their second year and reduce their borrowing in their third year 
as noted above. 
 
The income received from part-time work is expected to reduce the need for students to 
borrow to finance current expenditure. As expected a large and significant negative 
effect on expected debt is found for students who have a part-time job during term-time. 
The estimated coefficient suggests that holding such a job reduces expected debt, on 
average and ceteris paribus, by about £8,500 in all specifications compared to those 
students who are not in part-time employment. This seems to be a plausible estimate 
assuming a student earns on average about £81 per week for 35 weeks of the academic 
year. 
 
After some experimentation three variables that capture the socio-economic 
characteristics of the student’s family enter the empirical models: parental contributions, 
parental educational background, and home ownership. First, students whose parents 
contribute to their living expenses anticipate their debt to be reduced by just under £12 
for every £’s worth of financial help received per month, on average and ceteris paribus, 
according to specification 1. This result suggests that students may be using parental 
contributions to reduce debt on about a 1:1 basis (i.e., given 12 months in the year every 
£ received in parental contribution reduces debt by a similar amount each month) and 
not used to increase expenditure. This effect is broadly similar across all five empirical 
specifications reported here. Second, on the basis of specification 1, a student whose 
mother and father were university educated expects to be in debt by £3,281 less than 
students with either one or no parent who was university educated, on average and 
ceteris paribus. Again this effect remains reasonably stable across all specifications and 
may reflect the possibility that better educated parents are more able to instruct their 
children on how to manage their finance better than students with less well educated 
parents. Third, students from families that own their own home anticipate being about 
£3,000 less in debt than students who do not possess this socio-economic attribute. It is 
possible that this variable is related to family/household debt and it is well documented 
that home ownership and personal/household debt increased considerably in the UK 
during the 1990s and 2000s (Brown, et al., 2005a; Kempson, 2002; Disney, et al., 2008). 
Thus, home ownership may reflect household or family indebtedness, particularly after 
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the financial crisis of 2007, and this may have influenced the spending and borrowing 
behaviour of the students that comprise the sample.101 But it is also possible that home 
ownership may be picking up other socio-economic attributes that are associated with 
student debt reduction. 
  
There is no evidence that the age of the student or, rather surprisingly, the receipt of a 
grant or scholarship impacts significantly on expected debt. This latter result may imply 
that publically available student financial support is inadequate (Callender and 
Willkinson, 2003) and has little impact on reducing student indebtedness. However, 
student expected debt may be influenced by the earnings they anticipate in the future, 
which may reflect a student’s expected set of employment opportunities. For instance, 
using the results from the first specification, students who anticipate earning more than 
£30,000 in their first job post-graduation expect to be about £4,000 more in debt than 
students who report a more modest future earnings level. This effect is attenuated as we 
control for risk attitudes, aversion to debt and dislike of uncertainty.  A similar, but 
considerably smaller, effect is found for those students who expect to earn more than 
£50,000 by the time they reach 30 years of age. 
 
In terms of time preference we note a significant and positive relationship between the 
subjective discount rate and expected debt as anticipated i.e., higher discount rate 
implies that an individual prefers current consumption to future consumption. This 
finding supports results presented in previous studies. The point estimate reported for 
specification 2 suggests that a one percentage-point increase in the discount rate 
increases expected debt by about £142.102 This particular result remains robust across all 
the specifications reported in table 3.3.  
 
The third specification adds attitude to risk as an additional covariate. The estimated 
coefficient is well determined and statistically significant and as expected suggests that 
the more a student is prepared to take on risk the higher is expected debt. It should be 
noted that in this specification the possibility that risk attitude is endogenous was tested 
using the approach suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986). In conducting this test risk 
                                                 
101 It is instructive to note that real mortgage to debt ratio increased by about 63% from 3.86 in 1999 to 
6.27 in 2009 (Data.Gov.UK). 
102 Given that the discount rate is expressed in proportional terms, multiplying the coefficient estimate by 
0.01 yields the effect of a one percentage point rise in the discount factor. 
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attitude is regressed on a set of four exogenous identifying dummy variables 
(instruments) that include information on whether or not the student: gambles (i.e. 
regularly partakes in lotteries): played a fruit machine in the week in which the 
questionnaire was administered; had a personal savings account; and/or ever participated 
in a dangerous sport. These variables were found to be individually and jointly 
significant in influencing risk attitudes with a F(4, 303) = 11.67 [p-value = 0.000].  
The residuals from this model were inserted into specification 3 and the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficient was tested using a t-test. On the basis of the 
resulting t-statistic we accept the null that risk attitude is weakly exogenous (t-statistic= 
1.48 [p-value = 0.141]). Furthermore, the four identifying instruments were tested for 
orthogonality with the error process using a Sagan test. The test suggests that this was 
indeed the case (𝜒32= 2.45 [p-value = 0.4844]) and we accept the null that the 
instruments are independent of the error process. 
 
Specification 4 introduces the variable designed to capture the student’s attitude to debt. 
The estimated coefficient is counter-intuitively signed but is statistically insignificant at 
a conventional level. Thus, it can be inferred from this sample that a student’s attitude to 
debt exerts no independent effect on anticipated debt, on average and ceteris paribus. 
The final specification replaces attitude to debt with an alternative that measures student 
feelings in regard to uncertainty. Again the estimated effect for this variable fails to 
attain statistical significance at an acceptable level of statistical significance. 
 
As a test for consistency the five specifications are re-estimated but with expected debt 
at the end of the current academic year as the dependent variable. The index functions 
are reported in appendix C5. The fit of these specifications is satisfactory. The 
coefficients found to be statistically significant in the expected debt at the end of course 
specifications are also found to be well determined in the end of year specifications. The 
coefficient estimates for the marginal/impact effects for all five end of year debt 
specifications are presented below in table 3.4. 
 
We note that in general the results are qualitatively similar to those presented above. 
Furthermore, the signs on the estimated coefficients are also broadly similar, but the size 
of the estimated coefficients have fallen, as one would expect given we are considering 
expected debt at the end of current academic year. For instance, belonging to non-white 
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ethnic group, or having a part-time job during term-time, or having parents who are 
university educated, are all associated with a reduction in student expected debt, but the 
impact of these variables on student expected debt, in general, have fallen between one-
fifth and just over one-half. Similarly, every £’s worth of parental contribution now 
reduces expected end of year debt by about half the amount found earlier.  
 
However, there are some differences to what was found above. We find that first and 
second year students expect to be less in debt by the end of the academic year compared 
to their final year counterparts by around £6,600 and £3,300 across all specifications. 
This change in sign on the estimated coefficients is expected as the positive signs on the 
corresponding estimates in table 3.3 reflect the flow of debt through time i.e., student 
can take actions to reduce debt by the end of their course. However, the debt that a 
student reckons at the end of the academic year better reflects their ‘stock’ of debt and 
we may expect students in their final year to accumulate great levels of debt than 
students in either their second and third year. This seems reasonable given the increase 
in tuition fees. Moreover, as found earlier, higher expected earnings are associated with 
higher end of year debt, but unlike the previous finding expected earnings over £30,000 
at graduation have little effect on end of year debt once we control for risk attitudes. The 
estimated coefficients on the risk attitudes and the discount rate both have the expected 
signs and the higher the student’s subject discount rate or the more risk loving the 
student the higher the expected debt.103 The age of the student, and whether or not a 
student is in receipt of a grant or scholarship fail to reach statistical significance. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the results presented in table 3.3, we note that the gender 
effect disappears once we control for risk attitudes this is because debt attitudes and 
gender are highly correlated. However, in general these results give some confidence in 
the results presented earlier for expected end of course debt. 
 
  
                                                 
103 The risk attitude variable was tested for exogeneity using the method suggested by Smith and Blundell 
(1980). The t-test suggests that risk attitudes are once again exogenous (t-stat = 1.29 [p-value = 0.197])  
133 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Marginal/Impact Effects 
Expected debt at the end of the academic year 
 
 Specification  1 Specification 2 Specification  3 Specification  4 Specification  5 
Gender (male) 1207.706 ** 
(561.860 ) 
1174.269** 
(560.095) 
837.001 
(572.583) 
853.661 (583.186) 727.471 
(577.730)      
white non-British  -2008.146 ** 
(845.821 ) 
-2071.940** 
(843.519) 
-1914.079** 
(842.592) 
-1917.042** 
(842.873) 
-1873.063** 
(841.107)     
other ethnic group -2528.346 ***     
(660.471)    
-2645.404*** 
(661.411) 
-2226.401*** 
(677.0137) 
-2225.617*** 
(677.046) 
-2136.361*** 
(679.130) 
white British  ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
age (years) -68.700     
(91.02 ) 
-76.629 
 (90.464) 
-84.610  
(90.147) 
-84.969 
(90.201) 
-86.331 
(89.971) 
grant/scholarship 494.065 
(614.738) 
404.945 
(614.586) 
271.730 
 (612.734) 
278.732 
(614.511) 
231.94 
(612.019) 
has part-time job -3741.685*** 
(650.819) 
-3708.455*** 
(648.617) 
-3668.187*** 
(644.863) 
-3669.471*** 
(644.947) 
-3760.730*** 
(647.420) 
monthly 
contribution (£) 
-5.983*** 
(1.383)      
-5.943*** 
(1.381) 
-6.081*** 
(1.378)      
-6.089*** 
(1.379) 
-6.183*** 
(1.379) 
first year student -6787.403 *** 
(787.350)    
-6646.153 *** 
(788.432) 
-6609.783*** 
(783.230)      
-6614.691*** 
(783.905) 
-6569.478*** 
(782.115) 
second year student -3387.201** 
(911.804) 
-3406.819*** 
(908.513) 
-3328.388*** 
(903.417747) 
-3326.512*** 
(903.440) 
-3288.546*** 
(901.949) 
third year student ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
family home 
owners 
-1428.587* 
(765.679) 
-1450.818* 
(763.064) 
-1312.990* 
(759.756) 
-1317.895* 
(760.439) 
-1415.304* 
(762.050) 
Mother and father 
university educated 
-1925.523*** 
(746.695) 
-1953.696***   
(743.462)    
-2027.237*** 
(740.964) 
-2026.830*** 
(741.001) 
-2038.483*** 
(738.975) 
Expected earnings 
>£30,000 after 
graduation 
1976.738** 
(848.112) 
1940.823** 
(845.097)     
1258.314 
(880.209) 
1273.267 
(885.796) 
1288.625 
(878.681) 
Expected earnings 
>£50,000 at 30 
1207.116** 
(550.792) 
 1208.950** 
(548.668)     
1127.967** 
(546.397) 
1131.747** 
(546.985)     
1190.004** 
(547.437) 
discount rate § 6245.172* 
(3505.419) 
6110.385* 
(3482.807) 
6092.652* 
(3484.801)      
6010.980* 
(3475.618) 
risk attitude § §  370.106** 
(146.319) 
 373.503** 
(148.053) 
347.214** 
(146.909) 
debt aversion § § §  32.560      
(216.146) 
§ 
uncertainty 
aversion 
§ § § § 328.377 
(254.579) 
Log-Likelihood -2493.985 -2492.405 -2489.206 -2489.195 -2488.376 
Scale factore 0.8737 0.8751 0. 8766 0.8766 0.8774 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
Notes to table:  
(a) Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. 
(b) * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(c)  f  denotes base category in estimation.  
(d) § denotes variable not used in estimation.  
(e) Scale factor used in the computation of the marginal/impact effects.  
(f) All estimations reported were undertaken using NLOGIT 3.0 (2003). 
 
 
134 
 
 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The results presented here suggest that there is a gender dimension to student debt 
expectations with males having a greater expected level of debt on the completion of 
their undergraduate studies (and at the end of the current academic year) than females 
supporting the findings from the empirical analysis of Purcell and Elias (2010). This 
particular result may also reflect the role of greater risk-taking behaviour on the part of 
male students and confirms the findings of Ding, et al. (2010) for higher education 
students and Booth and Nolan (2012) for pre-university students. Non-white students 
expect a lower level of debt compared to their white British counterparts suggesting a 
possible cultural impact on expected debt supporting the finding of Callender (2003). 
There also appears to be some change in the level of debt a student expects over time 
with second year students anticipating more debt than their first and third year 
counterparts.  
 
Students who work part-time during term-time expect to have a lower level of debt. If 
there is a trade-off between being a ‘full-time’ student and part-time work then raising 
tuition fees in the future may compromise the time students will devote to study and 
may result in an increase in the withdrawal rate (Yorke and Longden, 2008; Davies and 
Elias, 2003) and/or a reduction in student academic achievement, particularly among 
students from the lower socio-economic groups (Callender, 2008). Student attrition may 
also impact on intergenerational mobility (Blanden and Machin, 2007) and may impact 
on future income distribution if those students who drop-out are ‘scarred’ in the labour 
market in a similar way to the long term unemployed (see, for example, Arulampalam, 
et al., 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2004). These possibilities need to be taken into 
account when setting the level of public financial support. 
 
As in previous studies measures of a student’s socio-economic background are 
significantly associated with the level of debt a student accumulates as well as the level 
of debt a student expects (Callender, 2003; Callender and Kemp, 2000; Callender, 2008; 
Johnson, et al., 2009). Parental home ownership was found to reduce student expected 
debt. It is possible that home ownership may reflect parental/family indebtedness and 
this may act to reduce student borrowing or spending. This may be particularly true for 
the sample students used in the empirical analysis. Parental experience of higher 
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education also had a negative impact on student debt expectations. Further, we noted 
that parental contributions reduced student indebtedness on around a 1:1 basis. This 
suggests that such contributions may not be used to increase expenditures but used to 
reduce debt. There is evidence that students anticipate a high return to their university 
education in terms of high expected earnings, which in turn contributes to higher 
expected debt. Whether or not these expectations are to be realised in the future is 
difficult to discern and may indeed be an overestimate (Jerrim, 2011).  
 
Further, we found that students who have a high discount rate and those with a high risk 
attitude are prone to higher expected debt. These particular results confirm the findings 
from previous, but limited, research that exists on student debt and borrowing behaviour. 
The receipt of a grant, scholarship, or bursary has no significant effect on reducing 
student expected indebtedness and may suggest that current levels of financial support 
are inadequate and ineffective in reducing anticipated debt.  
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Chapter 4 
Grade Inflation in UK Higher Education 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The expansion of UK higher education particularly in the 1990s was also accompanied 
with a higher proportion of new graduates receiving a ‘good’ degree classification. With 
rising staff-student ratios and constraints on public funding some commentators 
questioned if educational standards have been maintained (see chapter 1 for details on 
these issues). 
 
Information on student academic performance is not only of interest to universities 
when reviewing the effectiveness of their teaching and learning provision, but also to 
potential employers who use degree classifications as a signal of a graduate’s ability and 
effort or as a measure of human capital when making job offers. This information is 
also of value to the policy maker when evaluating policy effectiveness (Smith and 
Naylor, 2001a). For instance, if policy is directed at improving student academic 
performance and higher education standards remain constant through time then, based 
on this measure, a rise in the proportion of ‘good’ degrees can be taken as evidence of 
an improving higher educational system. On the other hand, if the proportion of ‘good’ 
degrees awarded falls then this may be interpreted as an indication of a failing or sub-
standard higher educational system and remedial action on the part of the policy maker 
may be necessary. However, if standards in higher education fall (e.g., through more 
lenient marking) and the proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded rise then the information 
contained in degree classifications will not correctly inform on the performance of the 
educational system (Johnes, 2004).  
 
In the UK information on the degree classifications awarded on various undergraduate 
programmes, offered in any particular university,  is available to potential students (and 
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other stakeholders) through a number of public sources.104 This information can 
potentially influence a student’s choice of university and programme of study. Clearly, 
the more accurately a degree class reflects student ability and effort the better will be 
the signal sent to all interested parties.  
 
The substantial rise in the proportion of new graduates receiving a ‘good’ degree since 
the 1990s was seen as evidence of ‘grade inflation’ by some commentators. There is no 
general definition of grade inflation in the literature but in the UK higher education 
context it can be taken to mean an increase in the share of ‘good’ degrees awarded over 
time holding student ability and effort constant or in an American context:  
 
‘an upward shift in the grade point average (GPA) of students over an 
extended period of time without a corresponding increase in student 
achievement’  (Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002:4).  
 
Another version of grade inflation is ‘content deflation’ where students receive the same 
grades as students in the past but with less work required and less learning (Cohen, 
1984). Thus if grade inflation is evident then it may be a consequence of falling 
educational standards.  
 
In regard to economic theory grade inflation has some implication for human capital 
theory (Becker, 1993) and signalling or screening models (Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973). 
In the former, it is assumed that human capital enhances productivity, and greater 
productivity is rewarded with higher pay.105 As human capital theory is concerned with 
the level of ‘schooling' acquired whether or not an individual achieves a particular 
credential (e.g. a ‘good’ degree), which in turn depends on the assessment regime, will 
not materially affect the predictions of the theory. What matters is the acquisition of 
human capital not the credential per se. Given a stock of human capital in the economy 
formal assessments have little role to play in the human capital model, since 
                                                 
104 Information on the final degree classification of new graduates is officially available to the public 
though UNISTATS Key Information Set (KIS) available at: http://www.unistats.ac.uk. Information on  
‘good’ honour degrees awarded by university is also available through HESA’s main website, and the 
websites hosted by national news agencies such as The Times and The Sunday Times and are routinely 
included in the university ‘league tables’ that are published annually on the website of The Complete 
University Guide available at: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-
tables/rankings?o=Good+Honours.  
105 See chapter 3 section 3.3.1 for a description of human capital theory and a brief review of the 
associated empirical literature. 
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productivity gains are reflected by higher earnings in the labour market. Therefore 
formal assessments are of incidental interest at the individual level. However, Johnes 
(2004) points out that aggregate assessment results are important in determining the 
performance of the higher education sector.  In the presence of ‘grade inflation’ (i.e., 
falling standards) the policy maker will find it difficult to use summative assessment 
results as reliable indicators of the performance of educational system. In such a 
situation the association between human capital acquisition and subsequent productivity 
is lost.  
 
In the case of the signalling model (Spence, 1973), employers use educational 
credentials to identify the more able workers, who are assumed to be more productive 
than less able workers in performing the same tasks. More able workers, with higher 
levels of educational attainment, will earn a wage that reflects their presumed greater 
marginal productivity which will be higher than that awarded to the less able. The 
model also assumes that the cost of acquiring education is lower for the more able. As a 
result the more able acquire better qualifications than the less able and the qualifications 
attained act as a signal to employers of the likely productivity of their prospective 
employees. In the case of the screening model (Arrow, 1973) workers perform a variety 
of tasks with some tasks requiring more ability on the part of the worker than other 
tasks. In this case educational qualifications act as a screening device to sort workers 
into jobs. It is interesting to note that recent research suggests that in the US 
College graduates reveal their ability through their final grades, but for high 
school graduates education acts a signal and for such individuals their ability is 
revealed to employers through time on the job (Arcidiacono et al, 2010).106  
 
The signalling model can be viewed as a special case of the more general screening 
model. Nevertheless, in both these models summative assessments do matter. It is the 
individual’s rank in any particular cohort of workers that determines earnings rather 
than an absolute measure of productivity. The individual’s rank will be determined by 
the credential she achieves through formal assessments.  In the presence of ‘grade 
inflation’ if an individual’s rank order in the distribution of grades is preserved then 
                                                 
106 It is possible that the US college system reveals more information to prospective employers than UK 
university system which is based on degree classification without, traditionally, more detailed information 
on graduate skills and abilities. 
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there is little effect on the implications of these models, and formal assessments retain 
their value as a signalling/screening device for allocating workers to particular jobs. 
However, if ‘grade inflation’ results in the ‘bunching’ or ‘compression’ of grades, in 
particular at the top end of the grade distribution, due to an upper limit, then grades lose 
their value in identifying low and high ability individuals. Thus summative assessments 
will lose their value in identifying worker ability and the usefulness of education as a 
signalling/sorting device is reduced.  
 
It is instructive to note that there is no real consensus in the vast empirical literature that 
exists as to which theory best explains the role of education in the labour market. In 
general the evidence suggest that education is productivity enhancing although it does 
play a role in screening or sorting individuals in certain sectors of the labour market (see 
for example, Layard and Psacharopoulos, 1974; Oosterbeek and Groot, 1994; Weiss 
1995; Johnes, 1998; Bedard, 2001; Miller, 2003; Chevalier et al., 2004).107 Moreover, 
existing empirical studies offer very little on the effect of grade inflation on predictions 
of these theories. However, in a study of US students, Summary and Weber (2012) note 
that between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, students’ GPA increased from 2.6 to 3.1. 
This increase occurred despite no observed improvement in university efficiency, 
suggesting ‘grade inflation’.  Moreover, using an entropy index Summary and Weber 
(2012)  report that the information content of grades fell over their sample time frame 
and they conclude that the screening content of education fell. Similarly, Chan et al., 
(2007) develop a theoretical model that shows that as schools relax their grading 
standards the information content contained in grades concerning student ability falls. 
To my knowledge there is no UK empirical literature that examines the association 
between grade inflation and the predictions of the theories noted above. 
 
We noted in chapter 1 section 5 that from 1994/95 through 2011/12 the percentage 
share of new graduates graduating in the UK with a ‘good’ degree increased from 
47.3% to 61.4%. However, the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded differs by 
university type. Figure 4.1 illustrates that between the academic years 1995/96 and 
2011/12 (inclusive) the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded by pre-1992 universities 
was much higher than the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded by post-1992 and post-
                                                 
107 See Brown and Sessions (2004) for a review of the empirical literature. 
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2003 universities.108 In 1995/96 56% of degrees awarded by pre-1992 universities were 
classified ‘good’ and by 2011/12 the figure was 67%. It is also instructive to note that 
the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded by the ‘elite’ Russell group of universities109 
on average is higher than in other university type. We also note that between 2002/03 to 
2011/12 the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded by post-2003 universities increased 
by 12 percentage-points from 44% to 56%, compared to the 6 percentage-point rise for 
pre-1992 universities and  a 7 percentage-point increase for post-1992 universities over 
the same period. Further, the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded increased 
significantly, particularly in post-1992 and post-2003 universities after 2006 when the 
cap on tuition fees increased to £3,000 (see chapter 3) and may reflect universities 
attempting to attract fee paying students through the possible lowering of standards in 
grading. 
 
  
                                                 
108 Macfarlane (1992) found that in 1989 there was variation in the proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded 
across pre-1992 universities but those universities created in the 1960s awarded on average 4.2% more 
‘good’ degrees than their older counterparts. He also reports that ‘big’ universities (those with an annual 
number of first degree graduates of over 2000) tend to award a lower proportion of ‘good’ degrees than 
smaller institutions (with 1000 or fewer annual graduates) 45.5% and 49.6% respectively. Similarly, 
Johnes and Taylor (1987) report that universities created in the 1960s were more likely to award ‘good’ 
degrees than their older counterparts. 
109 These are large research intensive universities and are included in the pre-1992 category of 
universities. 
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Figure 4.1 Good Degree Classifications by University Type (%) 1995/96-2011/12 
 
 
Notes: All universities include post-1992, pre-1992, and post-2003 universities only and 
the degrees awarded by the Open University, Colleges of the Arts, and small specialist 
HEIs are excluded. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the increase in ‘good’ degrees awarded is not uniform 
across academic disciplines. Students graduating in the Social Sciences tend to be 
awarded proportionally more ‘good’ degrees compared to their counterparts from the 
Physical Sciences, Law, and Business. Figure 4.2 below shows that between 1994/95 
and 2011/12 the percentage of new Social Science and Humanities graduates receiving a 
‘good’ degree increased from 58.5% in 1994/95 to 72% in 2011/12. There was also a 
marked increase in the percentage of science students graduating with a ‘good’ degree 
over the same period increasing from 47% to just over 63%. A similar upward trend is 
also noted for new graduates in Law and Business and Administration. However, over 
the entire period the proportion of new graduates awarded a ‘good’ degree in Business 
and Administration was less than the proportion awarded in the other three subject 
groups.  Similar to the data presented in figure 4.1 the increase in the percentage of 
‘good’ degrees awarded in all four subject fields increased significantly after 2006. This 
is particularly evident in the Social Sciences and Business and Administration 
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programmes with the number of students receiving a ‘good’ degree increasing by about 
30% and 61% respectively since 2006.110 
 
Figure 4.2 Good Degrees Awarded by Subject Field (%) 1994/95-2011/12 
 
 
Notes: 
Social Sciences and Humanities include: Sociology, Economics, Political Sciences, 
Humanities, and Languages. 
Physical Sciences include: Biological Sciences, Physics, Mathematics, Computer Science, 
and Engineering, but excludes Medical, Veterinary and Agricultural related degrees. 
Law includes all broadly based Law programmes. 
Business and Administrative Studies include: Business Studies, Marketing, Accounting, 
Office Skills, Human Resource Management, Management Studies, Finance, and other 
broadly based Business programmes. 
 
The reasons for the observed trends in ‘good’ degrees, as depicted above, is an area that 
has received little empirical investigation using UK data. However, the trends 
highlighted in figures 4.1 and 4.2 may suggest that grade inflation is present in UK 
higher education and a reflection of falling standards bringing the integrity of the 
classification system into question (Sadler, 2009). Elton (2004) suggests replacing the 
current system of degree classification with an unclassified degree accompanied with a 
                                                 
110 Several studies have also found evidence that Arts based disciplines award proportionally more ‘good’ 
degrees than Science based disciplines (Nevin, 1972; Macfarlane, 1992). However, the evidence also 
suggests that there is wide variation is the proportion of good degrees awarded within these broad classes 
(Smith and Naylor, 2001a). 
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student portfolio that documents student achievement as they progress through the 
higher education system.  
 
Similar sentiments were expressed in the Dearing Report (1997) which recommended 
that degree classifications be accompanied with a ‘progress file’ detailing the range of 
key skills demonstrated by the graduate alongside the cognitive achievements 
traditionally associated with higher education. The UK government set out proposals to 
introduce a transcript of student achievement over their undergraduate career to 
accompany the final award. This, it was suggested, would provide employers with 
greater insight into a graduate’s full range of academic and non-academic skills, 
abilities, and interests (Department for Education and Skills, 2003a: 49). In 2005 the 
Measuring and Recording Student Achievement Steering Group was set up to consider 
changes to the UK honours degree classification system. The group’s final report on 
behalf of Universities UK111 concluded that: 
 
‘the UK honours degree is a robust and highly-valued qualification but 
the honours degree classification system is no longer fit for purpose. It 
cannot describe, and therefore does not do full justice to, the range of 
knowledge, skills, experience and attributes of a graduate in the 21st 
century.’ (Universities UK, 2007:5) 
 
This body also recommended that a Higher Education Achievement Report (HEAR) 
should be introduced in 2010/11 as ‘the key vehicle for measuring and recording student 
achievement’ and to be available alongside information on a student’s degree class 
(Universities UK, 2007:5). It was reported that over half of UK universities introduced 
the new Higher Education Achievement Report for undergraduate students entering 
higher education in the academic year 2012/13 with the rest expected do so in the near 
future (Higher Education Funding Council for England). Furthermore, in the academic 
year 2013/14 the Higher Education Academy launched a two-year pilot study that 
involves implementing a grade point average (GPA) system as used in the US  to 
measure student academic achievement (see appendix D1 table 1 for further details). 
The study is expected to attract between 20-25 HEIs from across the sector. Each 
                                                 
111Universities UK is an independent advocacy organisation (formally known as the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals of Universities of the United Kingdom (CVCP) until 2000), and is a  
representative body for the executive heads of UK universities and is recognised as the umbrella group 
for the university sector. 
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participating institution will grade student performance according to a proposed 13-
point national GPA scale ranging from zero (representing a fail (grade F)) to 4.25 
(representing an excellent 1st class degree (grade A+)), see appendix D1 table 2 for 
further details. Each student’s GPA will be available alongside the traditional degree 
classification to provide finer detail on a student’s academic progress through the higher 
education system in participating UK HEIs. It is argued the system would also provide a 
means by which the quality of UK graduates could be compared to their counterparts in 
other countries that use the GPA classification system such as China and the US. The 
results from the pilot study are expected to inform on the desirability of introducing a 
GPA system in the UK (Higher Education Academy, 2013).   
 
The compression of degree classifications at the top end of the distribution may cause 
fee-paying students to perceive, rightly or wrongly, that a degree classification below a 
2:1 is of little value for money in regard to gaining meaningful graduate employment in 
a more competitive graduate labour market (Universities UK, 2007:23; Purcell, et al., 
1999).  Indeed, Morley et al., (2006) in a survey of 141 employers from across the UK 
found that although over half the employers in their interview sample were generally 
satisfied with the current system of degree classification some suggested sub-dividing 
graduates falling into the 2:1 category so that the academic qualities of these students 
can be made more transparent. Those that expressed this desire based their justification 
on ‘grade inflation’. They also reported that some employers sort through job 
applications by degree category, and do not consider candidates awarded below a 2:1 
degree class (see also, Universities UK, 2007:22). This practice therefore potentially 
ignores the skills, abilities, and attributes of graduates with a lower second or below.  
This may suggest that student perception of the worth of a degree classification below a 
2:1 may not be misplaced. 
 
The increase in the share of top degree classifications has also been observed in several 
other countries. A particular concern in the US is the increase in the proportion of A-
grades and the cumulative increase in GPA since the mid-1960s. Astin (1998), using a 
large national US survey, noted that between 1969 and 1974 the percentage of A-grades 
awarded to students graduating from US universities and colleges increased from 12.5% 
to 18.8% with a corresponding fall in the proportion of C-grades awarded. Between 
1990 and 1996 the proportion of A-grades awarded was observed to increase from 
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22.6% to 31.5%. Kuh and Hu (1999) observe that the GPA increased from 3.07 to 3.34 
between the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s across 198 US universities and colleges. More 
recently Popov and Bernhardt (2013) report that the GPA across US universities and 
colleges increased by 0.59 points between 1960 and 2000. Particular concern has also 
been focused on the grade inflation observed in the most prestigious or ‘Ivy League’ 
universities (Gose, 1997; Kuh and Hu, 1999; Popov and Bernhardt, 2013).112  Grade 
inflation has also been observed in higher education in Ireland where the share of ‘good’ 
degrees increased from 35.9% to 52.2% between 1994-96 and 2002-04 (O’Grady and 
Guilfoyle, 2007) and in Canada (Dickson, 1984), Australia (Marginson,1995) and 
Germany (Bauer and Grave, 2011). 
 
However, the rise in the number or share of graduates with ‘good’ degrees may not be 
an indication of UK grade inflation, per se. For instance, it can be argued that students 
have become more diligent in their attitude to study realising the connection between 
‘good’ degrees and labour market opportunities and remuneration. It may also reflect 
that more efficient methods of teaching and learning have been successfully employed 
in higher education. It may also be due to an increase in the ‘quality’ of new 
undergraduates, measured by their pre-entry qualifications.113 But it is still possible that 
there has also been a contemporaneous fall in standards.  
 
The primary purpose of this essay is to identify if grade inflation has been evident in 
UK higher education, and in so doing offer evidence on whether the drive to replace the 
current system of degree classification with a GPA system is warranted. To this end we 
use aggregate university level data to explore this issue over a period from 2005/06 
through 2011/12, a period identified above, in which there was a substantial rise in the 
proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded particularly after the academic year 2006/07. We 
complement the primary analysis by focussing on grade inflation in a single university. 
This allows an examination of grade inflation controlling for a rich variety of student 
level information that are not readily available from public sources. Moreover, the 
                                                 
112 A widely reported statistic is that 91 percent of seniors graduated with honours from Harvard in 2001 
largely due to a rise in A and B-grades awarded (Healy, 2001). The US magazine ‘Chronicles in Higher 
Education’ published by the University of Texas provide a vast archive of articles and letters that raise 
concern over grade inflation in various US colleges and universities. These documents are available at: 
http://chronicle.com/section/Home/5 
113 Typically the ‘quality’ of the student intake is measured in terms of A-level scores for students 
educated in England, Wales or Northern Ireland and scores in the Scottish Highers for students educated 
in Scotland. 
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economics literature on ‘grade inflation’ using recent UK data, to the author’s 
knowledge, is thin. Thus, this essay offers a useful contribution to the literature in this 
regard.   
 
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the relevant 
literature. Section 4.3 provides a description of the data employed in the empirical 
analyses. The econometric methodology employed is described in section 4.4 and the 
empirical results are presented in section 4.5. The final section provides some 
concluding remarks.  
 
4.2  Literature review 
 
 
The phenomenon of grade inflation has been well documented in the US but less so in 
the UK and, as noted above, it has been an issue of concern in both counties for some 
time. It has been argued that the upward drift in the proportion of ‘good’ degree 
classifications in the UK, since the early 1990s, is due to the modularisation of degree 
programmes and changes in assessment methods, with the introduction of coursework 
and assignments, without changes in the boundaries delineating degree classifications 
(Elton, 1998; Gibbs and Lucas, 1997).  Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) list several 
reasons for the grade inflation observed in the US since the mid-1960s that include 
changing student attitudes in the 1960s partly as a response to the Vietnam War and the 
reluctance of tutors to award male students low grades which may have resulted in them 
being forced out of higher education and into the military draft. Other reasons include; a 
change in the ethnic and racial mix of students, a change in the curricula and grading 
policies, the impact of student evaluations, students becoming more like consumers, and 
a softening in the academic content of degrees. Suslow (1977) suggests that the rise in 
A-grades in the 1960s and 1970s in the US is due to changes in student behaviour with 
students having more influence over their final GPA, faculty became more inclined to 
award ‘good’ grades to their own students to give them a competitive advantage in the 
graduate labour market and graduate school admission and, changes in grading practices 
that excluded the inclusion of poor grades from student records.  
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McKenzie and Tullock (1981) offered an explanation in terms of market demand and 
supply. They argue that excess demand for university places in the US in the 1960s 
resulted in a rise in the direct price of tuition (tuition fees) and as the supply of 
university and college places increased in the 1970s, universities and colleges resisted 
lowering the price of tuition to its long run equilibrium due to the potential adverse 
signal on quality that such a reduction would send to the market and problems 
associated with reducing fees if staff pay is linked to tuition fee income, thus creating an 
excess supply of places. If the direct price of tuition remains fixed then students could 
be attracted to fill surplus places with a fall in the ‘hedonistic’ price which is assumed to 
depend on such factors as expected grades and employment opportunities through more 
lenient marking and grading (Johnes, 2004). Thus grades were inflated to attract 
students resulting in a fall in standards for a given level of ability and effort. These and 
related issues are at the focus of many empirical studies on grade inflation outlined 
below.  
 
Grade inflation is often taken to reflect a fall in educational standards over time. The 
literature on academic standards identifies future wages as a channel through which 
grades may affect a student’s future welfare. Costrell (1994) develops a theoretical 
model to describe how educational standards are set and demonstrates that if the policy 
maker seeks to promote greater equality in outcomes (e.g., in terms of future labour 
market earnings) then lower standards will be set. Marks (2002) argues that educational 
standards once set share similar characteristics to that of a public good, in that 
educational standards, are known both to students and instructors and are non-
excludable and non-rival in consumption. Such standards are defined by ‘norms’ that 
are informal group held beliefs that govern the expected behaviour of faculty, students, 
and the institution and can act as a guide when grading students, or defining an 
institution’s reputation. The production of norms or standards confirms benefits on 
group members and also on the wider society and are valued by those who adhere to 
them (e.g., increased public trust in the value of university output (grades)). However, 
since norms and standards can be defined as a public good they are subject to the 
familiar free-riding problem. Students may also put pressure on faculty to award high 
grades, and instructors may free-ride on grading norms and award the desired grade 
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through more lenient marking assuming that others will not.114 Johnes (2004) offers a 
simple game theoretic exposition of how student pressure on faculty can affect grading. 
The model assumes two students whose future prospects rely on their ranking in the 
grading distribution. The utility of the ith student is expressed: 
 
Ui = xi – xj,     [4.1] 
 
where i ≠ j  and xi is the grade awarded to the ith student. The grade received is assumed 
to partly depend on some actual standard achieved by the ith student (xoi). Students are 
also assumed to exert pressure on faculty to be more lenient and award a high grade, for 
example to improve their employment opportunities. This is represented by a binary 
variable δ that equals 1 if pressure is exerted. The actual grade received by the ith  
student is then represented by: 
xi = xoi + δi + σδj    [4.2] 
 
where 0 < σ < 1 to reflect the fact that the grade awarded to the ith student will also 
depend on the pressure  the jth student brings to bear on the marker, but not as much  as 
the pressure that the ith student brings to bear.115 The Nash equilibrium in this setting is 
one where both students set δ = 1.   Thus student pressure results in faculty setting a 
grade higher than that commensurate with student ability and grade inflation ensues 
even though both players are no better off in terms of their ranking.116 
 
It is also possible that if faculty tenure, pay or promotion is dependent on course 
enrolments or student evaluation of teaching (SET) then there may be incentives for 
faculty to seek to ‘buy’ favourable SET or improve course enrolments ‘cheaply’ and 
free-ride on standards by grading more leniently. Moreover, if lenient marking becomes 
widespread then ‘grade inflation’ will become a logical outcome (Love and Kotchen, 
2010; Marks, 2002; McKenzie, 1975). In general US empirical literature finds a positive 
and significant relationship between students expected grades117  and SET scores (see, 
                                                 
114 Marks (2002) provides further examples where free-riding on academic standards may occur in higher 
education at the level of the student, faculty, and administration. 
115 This fact was established through correspondence with the author. 
116 Correa (2001) offers a game-theoretic explanation in terms of teaching faculty’s competitive and 
cooperative behaviour that can influence grading policies and course enrolments.  
117 It should be noted that US students were found to be over-optimistic in their expectations (Nowell and 
Alston, 2007). Similarly, first year students in UK higher education were also found to over-estimate their 
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for example, Kau and Rubin, 1976; Dilts, 1980; Aigner and Thum, 1986; Isely and 
Singh, 2005; Langbein, 2008; Ewing, 2012), particularly when SET scores are linked to 
faculty pay, promotion opportunities or tenure (Nichols and Soper, 1972; Mirus, 1973; 
Zangenehzadeh, 1988; Krautmann and Sander, 1999).  
 
In the UK faculty pay, promotion, and tenure is not typically linked to student 
evaluations, and there is little empirical evidence to support the notion that student 
evaluations affect faculty behaviour. However, Rogers and Ghosh, (2001) using 
student-level cross-sectional national data for UK students graduating in 1985, and 
employing a multinomial logit, find that students dissatisfaction with their degree 
programme (used as a proxy for student motivation) reduces the probability of 
achieving a ‘good’ degree by 15% and increases the probability of being awarded a 
third class honours degree by 6.7%. In a later study, Rogers (2007) again using student-
level national data but employing an ordered probit methodology finds that student 
dissatisfaction reduced the probability of achieving a ‘good’ degree by a similar 
magnitude (13.7%) to that previously found. Moreover, we noted earlier that the 
percentage share of ‘good’ degree classifications in the UK increased considerably since 
2006 which coincided with the year in which the results from the first National Student 
Survey (NSS) (administered in 2005) were made available. The NSS is completed by 
final year students (before their degree classification is known) and includes questions 
regarding students overall satisfaction with teaching, learning resources, and course 
design. Soo (2009) investigated student performance in English universities using 
university-subject-level data obtained from the Student Experience Survey administered 
by the Higher Education Policy Institute and data from the NSS for 108 universities in 
2006 and 2007. Controlling for pre-entry scores and student effort (attendance) the 
author finds that overall student satisfaction had no significant effect on a ‘good’ degree 
classification using OLS but a positive and significant association was found employing 
2SLS/GMM. Based on this result and those from specifications using average degree 
performance as an alternative dependent variable the author concludes that teaching 
quality (measured by the NSS score) impacts positively on degree performance. 
However, when the sample was divided by university type it was reported that student 
                                                                                                                                               
actual performance and this over-estimation differs according to gender and social class (Chevalier, et al., 
2009). 
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satisfaction was a significant factor determining performance in pre-1992 universities 
but was insignificant for post-1992 universities. 
 
Faculty may free-ride on educational standards and grade more leniently to increase 
course enrolments and thereby improve job security. Dickson (1984) using Canadian 
data controlling for course size (student enrolment), student year of study, and the staff-
student ratio finds evidence that professors in classes with a low staff-student ratio have 
an incentive to inflate grades due to low student enrolment and fear over job security. 
But as Johnes (2004) points out classes with low staff-student ratios provide an 
environment in which learning can takes place more effectively with fewer 
opportunities for students to free-ride and higher grades may not be a consequence of 
falling standards in this case.  
 
Bar et al., (2009) examined the effect that grading practices had on students’ subsequent 
course choice at Cornell University in 2006. The study aimed to establish if providing 
students with information on the grades awarded in various subjects in 1994 and 2004 
influenced subsequent subject choice.  The data employed were aggregated to the 
course-level and the authors employed a course-level fixed effects methodology to 
estimate the relationship between course enrolment and grades. The authors found 
evidence of ‘compositional’ grade inflation with proportionally more students opting for 
courses where grading practices were more lenient. More recent US evidence confirms 
the finding that grading practices can influence the pattern of enrolments and has 
contributed to grade inflation. See for example, Ehrenberg (2010), Ost (2010) and Rask 
(2010) for evidence on grading standards and student persistence in Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Technology (STEM) subjects. Arcidiacono, et al., (2012) 
provide evidence on the effect that student ethnicity and grade inflation have on course 
choice. 
 
Anglin and Meng (2000) using Canadian data for the years 1973/74 and 1993/94 
suggest that grade inflation is due to faculty attempting to increase course enrolments as 
a result of universities having to compete for limited public funds that in turn are 
dependent on course enrolment and student continuation. Similarly, in a more rigorous 
analysis Bagues et al., (2008) examined the effect that university funding mechanisms 
based on student academic performance have on the grading practices adopted in the 
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fields of study in Italian public universities.  The study exploited data from the Italian 
Survey on University-to-Work Transition for 1998, 2001 and 2004. It included 
information on students who graduated from public universities three years prior to the 
date of the survey. They estimate the relationship between final grade and the field of 
study by OLS using data aggregated to the departmental level controlling for student, 
institutional and location specific characteristics as well as the student’s self-reported 
labour market information (i.e., earnings and employment history). They found 
evidence that differential grading practices and standards are employed across Italian 
universities, university departments, and geographical regions. They argue that 
competition for limited public funds, that is based on course enrolment or student 
performance, provides an incentive for universities to encourage enrolment and achieve 
better outcomes by lowering the ‘hedonistic’ price (i.e., by adopting lower standards). 
They also suggest that competitive public funding favours universities with low 
standards.  
 
Bauer and Grave (2011) also examined the effect that the introduction of a performance 
(output) based university funding mechanism had on grade inflation in Germany, with 
funding being partly dependent on student academic achievement (i.e., the number of 
graduates universities produce). The policy was introduced in several German federal 
states starting in the 1990s to improve the efficiency and performance of universities via 
more intense competition. The study employed a difference-in-difference approach and 
exploited student-level data obtained from the German Student Surveys 1983-2007 for 
students who attended university in one of 13 German states over the period. The 
authors conclude that the change in funding arrangements had increased competition 
amongst German universities for the available public funds but in contrast to Anglin and 
Meng (2000) and Bagues et al.,(2008) they found no significant evidence of grade 
inflation as a consequence of the policy. 
 
It is interesting to note that Bagues et al., (2008) find that Italian graduates from low 
grading academic units earn a higher average wage than graduates from high grading 
fields. Similarly, Freeman (1999) suggested that divergent grading practices are due to 
the market benefits that the course offers in terms of a student’s future earnings. To test 
this hypothesis course-level data were obtained from the 1996 US National Center for 
Education and Statistics that included the average grade (GPA) achieved in 59 fields of 
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study in 648 US colleges and universities from which students graduated in 1992/93 and 
course-specific earnings one year after graduating. The relationship between grades and 
earnings was estimated by OLS and GLS controlling for student demographic 
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity), pre-entry scores (measured by average 
course-specific Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores - taken before entry into 
higher education), field of study, and the type of university/college (public/private). The 
results from the analysis are consistent with grade divergence: graduates from high-
grading fields (e.g., in the Arts and Humanities) have lower labour market earnings than 
those from low-grading fields (e.g., STEM subjects and those that are Business related). 
Freeman suggests that subject areas in fields in which the labour market earnings are 
low have excess places to fill and by way of attracting students the ‘hedonistic’ price is 
lowered through lenient grading practices. This explanation may also help to explain the 
grade inflation evidenced across university departments and fields of study in several 
US studies that often focus on a single institution or a small group of institutions. For 
example, see Jewell and McPherson (2012) for evidence from the University of North 
Texas, Achen and Courant (2009) for evidence for the University of Michigan, Sabot 
and Wakeman-Linn (1991) for evidence for Williams College, Kolevson (1981) for 
evidence from Virginia Commonwealth University, and Prather et al.,(1979) for 
evidence from Georgia State University.  
 
In the UK it is widely reported that the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded varies 
across academic disciplines, and fields of study (see, for example, Nevin, 1972; Sear, 
1983; Macfarlane, 1992; Chapman, 1996; Yorke, et al., 2002). As portrayed in figure 
4.2, between 1994/95 and 2011/12 the percentage share of ‘good’ degrees awarded in 
the UK was higher in the Social Sciences and Humanities than in the Physical Sciences, 
Law, or Business related disciplines. Early UK econometric studies using OLS and 
exploiting national data aggregated up to the university-level find little evidence that the 
field of study impact on degree outcome (Bee and Dolton, 1985; Johnes and Taylor, 
1987).  However, the influential study by Smith and Naylor (2001a) finds evidence of a 
significant association between the field of study and degree classification. They 
exploited national student-level data from the UK Universities’ Statistical Records 
(USR)118 comprising information on 94,485 students who graduated from pre-1992 
                                                 
118 The Universities Central Council on Admissions (UCCA) was the body responsible for compiling the 
USR since its inception in 1963 (a predecessor to HESA). In 1993 UCCA merged with Polytechnics 
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universities in 1993. Using an ordered probit, and controlling for a variety of student 
level and institution level characteristics, they find that students were more likely to 
secure a ‘good’ degree, relative to degrees in Social Studies, if they specialised either in 
Biological Sciences, the Humanities, or Literary and Classical Studies, but performed 
worse in Mathematics, Computing, Languages, and Education (see also, Rogers (2007) 
who finds similar results using the same methodology). The recent UK study by Soo 
(2009) finds that students perform better in Creative Arts and Design and Mass 
Communication Studies and perform worse in Architecture, Business Studies and Law.  
 
Whether the different percentage share of ‘good’ degrees across academic disciplines in 
the UK, depicted in figure 4.2, is a consequence of departments trying to fill excess 
places in certain fields by reducing the ‘hedonistic’ price or an attempt to attract 
publically available tuition fee income that is dependent on programme enrolment is not 
easy to discern, due to the lack of UK literature on this issue, but it is a possibility. 
Further, it may also be possible that the grade differential between the subject fields 
may reflect the labour market earnings associated with a particular degree subject. In 
regard to this last point empirical estimates using large national UK datasets suggest the 
earnings premium on STEM and Business related degrees, are in general higher than 
those in the Arts and Humanities (see, for example, Harkness and Machin, 1999; 
Blundell, et al., 2000; Walker and Zhu, 2003; 2011) and it would appear that subjects 
that are more leniently assessed in the UK attract lower labour market returns than those 
that are more harshly marked as evidenced by Freeman (1999).  
 
Yorke (2002) examined the association between subject field and the upward drift in 
‘good’ degree classifications in the UK between 1994/95 and 1998/99. Using HESA 
data aggregated to the subject field and employing a basic OLS specification the study 
found that the magnitude and direction of the trend varied over the five years and 
between subject fields. The upward trend was found to be particularly significant in 
STEM subjects and in Languages and Humanities. The author offers several pedagogic 
reasons for the general upward trend. These include curricula development and 
changing methods of assessment that focus on competences (i.e., leaning outcomes) 
                                                                                                                                               
Central Admissions System (PCAS) to form the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). 
The compilation UK higher education statistics were transferred to the Higher Education Statistical 
Agency (HESA) in 1993. 
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with a move from norm-referencing towards criterion-referencing (i.e., a move from 
assessing students on their relative performance to an absolute measure of 
performance). Other suggestions offered include greater student diligence, the closure of 
departments that under-perform in the RAE, the influence of external monitoring of 
standards by government agencies (Elton, 1998), such as the Quality Assurance Agency 
(QAA),119 and the pressures on universities to improve their ‘league table’ position. 
Yorke et al., (2002) provide evidence to suggest that the nature of the marking schemes 
adopted (i.e., the use of percentage marking or grade-point scales) on specific modules 
in post-1992 universities between 1994/95 and 1998/99 influence the spread of marks 
and students’ overall attainment. In general the adoption of percentage marking was 
found to narrow the spread of marks and grade-point marking widens the spread. The 
marking processes adopted by different subject areas provide a further reason why 
‘good’ degree classifications differ between various subject groupings and could 
contribute to grade inflation more generally. 
 
Grade inflation in the US has been found to differ according to university and college 
type (see, for example Astin, 1998; Suslow, 1977). Popov and Bernhardt (2013) 
develop a theoretical model based on labour market outcomes that can potentially 
explain why ‘good’ universities award proportionally higher grades than other 
universities. The authors demonstrate that if employers, when assigning graduates to 
high skill and low skill jobs, are unable to distinguish between the abilities of graduates 
who are awarded high grades by both university types, particularly on the margin, then 
‘good’ universities will became more lenient in their grading practices as the demand 
for graduate skills increase (e.g., due to technical progress), by reducing the boundary 
that delineates A-grades from B-grades. It is argued that faculty recognise that 
employers find it difficult to distinguish between graduates with A-grades and try to 
improve the employment prospects of their graduates (i.e., to secure high skilled jobs) 
by inflating their grades. These arguments may explain why grade inflation has been 
observed in ‘Ivy League’ universities in the US (Gose, 1997; Kuh and Hu, 1999; Healy, 
2001). 
 
                                                 
119 The QAA is an independent body that replaced Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) in 1997 
and monitors standards in UK higher education. The QAA reports back to HEIs and advise on how 
quality and standards can be improved. Further details on the work of the QAA can be found at: 
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/Pages/default.aspx.  
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The evidence presented in figure 4.1 reveals that UK pre-1992 universities award 
proportionally more ‘good’ degrees than other university types. Yorke (2002) suggests 
that for the period 1994/95 to 1998/99 this was due to the higher entry requirements or 
tariffs (i.e., A-level UCAS points) required for admission to a pre-1992 universities. 
This is also true for the period 2002/03 – 2011/12 over which the median entry score120 
on average was 356 for pre-1992 universities which is higher than that associated with 
post-1992 universities (233 points) and post-2003 universities (225 points). Moreover, 
the median entry score for students entering the ‘elite’ Russell group of universities is 
much higher at 416 on average. If entry scores reflect student ability we may expect to 
observe proportionally more ‘good’ degrees being awarded by pre-1992 universities and 
the Russell group of universities than by other types of university as depicted in figure 
4.1.  
 
Numerous UK studies using national data have confirmed the importance of pre-entry 
A-level scores, inter alia, as a significant determinant of undergraduate degree 
performance in UK higher education as well as finding evidence that the share of ‘good’ 
degrees awarded varies by university (see, for example, Macfarlane, 1992; Chapman, 
1996; Johnes and Taylor, 1987; Rogers and Ghosh, 2001; McNabb, et al., 2002; Naylor 
and Smith, 2004a; Rogers, 2007). Smith and Naylor (2001a) found that a one letter 
grade increase in each A-level subjects taken prior to university entry, ceteris paribus, 
increases the probability of securing a ‘good’ degree by between 9 and 10 percentage 
points. They also find that the probability of securing a ‘good’ degree varies across the 
pre-1992 universities that comprise their sample. Bratti (2002) explicitly examined 
student performance across 53 pre-1992 UK universities. Specifically, the study was 
concerned with degrees awarded in the Life Sciences using student-level data for a 
cohort of students graduating in 1993 drawn from USR. Using a two-stage estimation 
procedure to correct for possible selectivity bias and an ordered probit to estimate the 
probability of being awarded a specific degree class, the study finds that ‘good’ degree 
classifications, in Life Sciences, vary across pre-1992 universities. Soo (2009) using 
national university-level data found that student pre-entry quality (measure by median 
A-level entry scores) has a significant and positive impact on the award of a ‘good’ 
degree. However, after controlling for unobserved student ability using 2SLS/GMM 
                                                 
120 See appendix D2 for a description of the current point system which also includes the points awarded 
for achievement on non A-level pre-entry courses. 
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median pre-entry A-level points were found to have no significant effect on degree 
classification beyond a proxy for student ability. Smith and Naylor (2004a) report a 
general upward increase in pre-entry A-level point scores between 1982 and 1992.  
 
Another branch of the literature considers whether faculty characterises influence 
grading practices. It is interesting to note that Jewell and McPherson (2012) find that 
female faculty tend to inflate grades at a greater rate than their male counterparts. The 
authors suggest that female faculty are more concerned with job insecurity, than their 
male counterparts and tend to award higher grades.121 Kolevzon (1981) also finds that 
departments with more female faculty award higher grades.  
 
The studies cited above suggest a number of factors that can potentially lead to grade 
inflation. However, many of the empirical studies cited exploit cross-sectional or pooled 
data and employ standard regression techniques. It is also important to note that much 
of the economics literature on student academic achievement treats such achievement 
within the framework of an educational production function, where students represents 
the ‘raw materials’ to which educational resources or inputs are added to produce an 
output (e.g. final ‘grade’ or test scores).122 It is debatable if the grade inflation observed 
in these studies captures ‘pure’ grade inflation or is a result of increased student effort 
or diligence or due to a better quality student intake. In particular the rise in the 
proportion of ‘good’ degree classifications may be a result of falling standards but may 
be conflated by a rise in university efficiency in transforming raw material (students) 
into outputs (grades).  
 
To address this issue Johnes and McNabb (2002) examines grade inflation in UK higher 
education controlling for changes in university efficiency using a standard stochastic 
frontier specification with a truncated half normal error term to control for changes in 
university efficiency over time. The specification also included time dummies which if 
statistically significant, it was argued, would indicate changes in standards and hence 
grade inflation. The study focuses on two time frames 1973-1993 and 1995-2000 and 
exploited institution-level data obtained from USR and HESA that included information 
on the proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded by pre-1992 universities for the earlier 
                                                 
121 See Ginther and Khan (2004) for a discussion of female faculty’s job security in US universities. 
122 For a discussion of the conceptual and empirical issues involved, see Hanushek (1979). 
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period and pre-1992 and post-1992 universities in the latter period, excluding Scottish 
universities from both samples. The estimation strategy employed, controlled for 
student-specific characteristics (gender, pre-entry A-level scores, type of previous 
school and domicile), but did not include any university controls. The authors report no 
evidence of grade inflation in the later period. This general result seems surprising given 
that UK higher education expanded considerably during this period and the concern was 
raised over falling standards (see chapter 1). However, significant coefficients on the 
time dummies were reported for the earlier period. Specifically, between 1984 and 1993 
there was evidence of grade inflation with a 14% rise in students graduating with a 
‘good’ degree (measured by the estimated coefficients on the time dummies over this 
period) that could not be attributed to changes in university efficiency which remained 
relatively stable between 1973 and 1999 with a reduction in university efficiency in 
2000. However, it was also acknowledged that significant coefficients on the time 
dummies may also indicate changes in student motivation possibly due, for example, to 
increasing labour market returns for successful completion of an undergraduate 
programme, or a better quality of student intake brought about by improving 
pedagogical processes used in lower levels of education (assuming no grade inflation 
has occurred in at the tertiary or secondary level of UK education)123  or the influence of 
external monitoring by the QAA. It should be noted that although the authors used a 
panel data set the frontier estimator employed could not exploit the temporal (within) 
dimension of the data leading to the possibility of inefficient and inconsistent parameter 
estimates.  
 
In a very recent study building on the work of Johnes and McNabb (2002),  Johnes and 
Soo (2013)124 exploit data from the Sunday Times University Guide for the period 2005 
to 2012 employing an institution-level true random effect stochastic frontier estimator 
using a half-normal distribution for the efficiency term. They specify an austere model 
                                                 
123 It should be noted that A-level grade inflation has also been a concern in the UK for some time. It is 
reported that there has been a steady rise in students achieving the top A-level grades since the 1980s 
(Tymms and Fitz-Gibbons, 2001). More recently Smithers (2011) shows that between 1982 and 2012 the 
percentage of students passing with an A-grade increased from 8.9% in 1980 to 27% in 2011, with a 
slight 0.4% fall in 2012. The A-level pass rate (grades E to A) also increased, from 68.2% to 98% in 
2012. These trends lead to the annual furore over A-level grade inflation reported in the popular media 
and expressed by government ministers and contended by teaching unions. The important issue here is 
that if grade inflation at A-level is genuine then A-levels grades may not send the correct signals on 
students’ ability/quality. 
124 This study only came to light in October 2013 after the much of this chapter was drafted for 
submission. 
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controlling for student pre-entry (median) A-level point scores and university 
characteristics including expenditure on educational facilities, staff-student ratio, the 
institution’s RAE score, student satisfaction scores obtained from the NSS, and time 
dummies. The study found A-level scores, student satisfaction, and expenditure on 
library facilities impact positively and significantly on a ‘good’ degree classification. 
Although they found significant coefficients on the time dummies these were negatively 
signed indicating negative grade inflation between 2006 and 2011. However, in their 
most basic specification controlling for pre-entry A-level point scores and employing 
time (year) dummies grade inflation was observed in 2011 and 2012. They also found 
little evidence of changes in university efficiency which was on average about 95% over 
the sample time frame.  
 
4.2.1 Summary 
 
The literature reviewed above suggests a number of factors that can potentially explain 
grade inflation. Explanations offered from US studies include: the demand for and 
supply of undergraduate courses, graduate labour market conditions, the introduction of 
SET, and pressures placed on faculty that incentivise them to free-ride on standards or 
norms. There is also evidence that the characteristics and attributes of faculty and 
students are also associated with grade inflation. In addition the rate of grade inflation is 
found to differ according to academic subject/discipline, and varies between university 
departments and institutions. Several of these factors are found to influence student 
performance and grade inflation in other countries. In particular UK studies note the 
importance of; pre-entry qualifications, gender, socio-economic class, ethnicity, and 
domicile, the subject studied at A-level and the A-level grade achieved, and the 
undergraduate discipline studied, as significant determinants of degree classification. In 
terms of university characteristics, the amount of spending on teaching related facilities, 
changes in assessment methods and curriculum, staff/student ratios, student evaluations, 
and university size are also found to significantly influence degree classification. 
Studies conducted in other countries generally support the importance of these factors in 
determining student performance. UK studies that specifically examined changing 
standards found no evidence of grade inflation in UK universities between the mid-
1990s and 2000, but did find evidence of grade inflation (or changing standards) 
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between 1984 and 1993. However, grade inflation was detected in 2011 and 2012. It is 
also interesting to note that in the case of Italy the movement towards funding 
universities based on graduate performance has been argued to contribute to grade 
inflation. 
 
4.3 Data 
 
 
In the primary analysis we examine grade inflation using university-level data. These 
data cover the academic years from 2005/06 to 2011/12 inclusive and comprise 700 
observations on 100 UK universities. These universities include pre-1992 and post-1992 
universities as well as post-2003 universities. We include variables that capture specific 
characteristics of the graduating cohort including the gender mix, their region of 
domicile, the nature of degree programme studied, the type of previous school attended, 
and the UCAS points for the pre-entry qualifications attained. We also include 
information on university characteristics these include variables that capture university 
size, expenditures on educational services and facilities, a measure of university 
performance (i.e., first year student attrition), and university stability. The definitions of 
the variables employed in this analysis and their associated sources can be found in 
appendix D2.  
 
In addition we use student-level data obtained from the Strategic Planning Unit at the 
University of Brighton to explore student performance and grade inflation. These data 
include information on students gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic background, 
pre-entry qualifications, mode of study and their school and course of study over a five 
year period. These data are employed to examine the extent to which student 
characteristics and the type of programme studied impacts on the proportion of ‘good’ 
degrees awarded which was not possible with the university level data used in the 
primary analysis. These data provide anonymised individual level information on 
11,358 undergraduate students who completed their programme of study between 
2005/06 and 2009/10.125 These students were enrolled on various educational 
programmes offered in each of fourteen schools of study across the university. Students 
                                                 
125 The university departments were reorganised in 2010/11 and it was not possible to access further data 
for inclusion in this analysis. 
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enrolled for higher national diplomas, foundation degrees, professional qualifications 
and other HE qualifications are excluded from the analysis. 
 
We first describe the data used in the primary analysis followed by a brief description of 
the University of Brighton data. 
 
4.3.1 Data: Primary Analysis 
 
 
The sample time frame considered in the primary analysis is restricted to seven recent 
years for several reasons. First, due to changes in the measurement of important 
variables over the period (e.g., A-level pre-entry scores, see below); second, due to data 
availability, and third it is necessary to use lags of up to three academic years for some 
variables so that the characteristics of the graduating cohort are aligned as closely as 
possible with their entry characteristics. Following previous studies (Bee and Dolton, 
1985; Johnes and Taylor, 1987; Johnes and Taylor, 1990; Yorke, 2002; Johnes and 
NcNabb, 2002; McNabb, et al., 2002) we exclude Scottish universities for several 
reasons. First, Scottish students admitted to Scottish universities can start their 
university career at the age of 17 (usually 18 in most other UK universities). Second, it 
takes an extra year to graduate from a Scottish university with a honours degree 
compared to other UK universities and third, the award of non-honours degrees can be 
bestowed after three years of study. This last fact increases the proportion of 
pass/ordinary degrees in the sample data. For these reasons it is difficult to compare 
Scottish awards with those awarded in other UK universities.  We also exclude degrees 
programmes in Medicine, Architecture, and Education which typically take longer than 
three years to complete.126 The summary statistics for the data employed in the 
empirical analysis are reported in table 4.1 below. Column [1] shows summary statistics 
for all universities and columns [2]-[4] contain summary statistics broken down by 
university type.  
 
                                                 
126 It is also possible that graduating students on other undergraduate programmes can take 4 years instead 
of 3 years to complete e.g., students on sandwich courses are generally required to undertake work 
placement and some programmes require a year of study abroad, typically this extra year of study is 
undertaken in the 3rd year.  From the information available it is not possible to separate those who take 
four years from those who take three to graduate. However, the majority of students still complete their 
degrees after 3 years and we expect the proportion of students graduating from English, Welsh and 
Northern Irish universities after 4 years to be relatively small. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics: Primary Analysis 
 
 
All 
universities 
[1] 
Pre-1992 
Universities 
[2] 
Post-1992 
Universities 
[3] 
Post -2003 
Universities 
[4] 
t-statb 
Students 
characteristics 
     
% Good Degrees 59.27 (10.09) 
65.81 
(8.92) 
53.15 
(6.13) 
51.97 
(6.37) 18.59 
% Female Graduates 55.57 (7.12) 
53.36 
(5.38) 
55.32 
(4.83) 
62.16 
(10.17) -4.41 
% Science Graduates 24.75 (13.34) 
28.24 
(14.84) 
24.04 
(10.48) 
16.33 
(8.79) 3.69 
% UK Domiciled 
Students (lagged 3 
academic  years) 
83.56 
(9.54) 
78.97 
(10.02) 
86.24 
(5.74) 
91.53 
(5.89) -9.86 
% Students from State 
Schools (lagged 3 
academic years) 
89.51 
(11.13) 
82.97 
(12.10) 
95.51 
(4.80) 
96.99 
(1.42) -14.77 
Median entry  points 
( lagged 3 academic 
years) 
294.88 
(84.65) 
358.52 
(72.18) 
234.02 
(34.10) 
226.30 
(27.03) 24.14 
NSS score (lagged 1 
academic year) 
81.67 
(5.30) 
84.67 
(4.39) 
78.24 
(3.97) 
79.44 
(4.91) 17.76 
 
University 
Characteristics 
     
University type 1.00 0.50 0.32 0.18 N/A 
ln Expenditure (in 
1998 prices) 
9.12 
(0.71) 
9.38 
(0.65) 
9.17 
(0.51) 
8.34 
(0.54) 4.02 
Staff-Student Ratio 17.64 (3.43) 
15.40 
(2.76) 
19.72 
(2.61) 
20.16 
(2.03) -18.69 
% FTE Undergraduate 
Students 
81.13 
(8.08) 
76.67 
(8.26) 
85.18 
(4.16) 
86.32 
(5.63) -14.28 
% First Year Drop-outs 
(lagged 3 academic 
years) 
8.89 
(4.02) 
6.36 
(3.06) 
11.26 
(2.87) 
11.71 
(3.70) -19.12 
VC tenure (years) 5.39 (3.79) 
4.87 
(3.42) 
5.62 
(3.82) 
6.45 
(4.43) -2.47 
N 700 350 224 126 574 
Notes to table:  
(a) Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for continuous variables. 
(b) t-stats are used to test differences in means between pre and post 1992 universities. The appropriate 
critical value at the 5% level of significance is ±1.96. 
(c) Scottish Universities, the Open University, colleges of the arts, and small specialist colleges are 
excluded from the analysis due to their atypical undergraduate intake. The University of Buckingham 
which is a private institution that awarded honour degrees after two-years of study is also excluded.  
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We first note that pre-1992 universities comprise 50% of the sample with post-1992 and 
post-2003 universities accounting for 32% and 18% respectively. On average, just under 
60% of honour degrees awarded by these universities are either first or upper second 
class. We also note that pre-1992 universities award proportionately more ‘good’ 
degrees (65.8%) compared to post-1992 universities (53.1%) and post-2003 universities 
(51.9%). These percentages are in general agreement with the sector percentages 
reported in figure 1.5 in chapter 1, and figure 4.1.   
 
There have been numerous studies on the effect of gender on degree performance. 
Several recent studies suggest that females out-perform their male counterparts in 
achieving a ‘good’ degree classification.127  We control for a possible gender 
differential in degree performance by including the percentage of females graduating 
from each university and note that on average a higher percentage of women (55.6%) 
graduate each year compared to their male counterparts. This is true for all university 
types and is particularly evident in post-2003 universities where on average just over 
62% of new graduates are female.  
 
The literature also suggests that the rate of grade inflation differs across universities, 
departments within universities as well as across different subject groups. In particular, 
science and quantitative based programmes were generally found to be low grading 
fields. To capture this effect we include information on the percentage of students 
graduating with a Science degree from each university. These data reveal that just under 
a quarter of all students graduate with a Science degree and we also note that the 
percentage graduating in the sciences is higher in pre-1992 universities (28.2%) than in 
the other university types.  
 
In general empirical evidence suggests that UK domiciled students perform better than 
their non-UK counterparts.128 To examine this effect we include the percentage of UK-
domiciled students in each university. The data show that 83.6% of students are UK-
                                                 
127 See for example, (Barrow, et al., 2009; Woodfield and Earl-Novell, 2006; Naylor and Smith, 2004a; 
McNabb, et al., 2002; Rogers and Ghosh, 2001; Macfarlane, 1992). However, it should be noted that 
some earlier studies found no significant difference in performance between male and female students, 
and in some studies males were found to perform better than females (see, McCrum, 1994; Johnes and 
Taylor, 1990; Rudd, 1984). 
128 See Makepeace and Baxter (1990), Marshall and Clinton (1995), Da Vita (2002), Leslie (2005), 
Morrison et al., (2005), Barrow et al., (2009), Richardson (2010), and Iannelli and Huang (2013). 
163 
 
 
 
domiciled this percentage is particularly high in post-2003 universities at 91.5%. This 
variable is lagged three academic years so that it is aligned with the graduating cohort 
who began their degree typically between two and a half to three years previously. 
Similarly, we include a variable that takes account of students from state schools. 
Previous research has also found that students from state schools perform better than 
their counterparts from public schools (Naylor and Smith, 2004a; HEFCE, 2014; 
Crawford, 2014) whereas Johnes and NcNabb (2002) find the opposite. The inclusion of 
this variable will enable us to observe if the former finding still holds. This variable is 
also lagged by two academic years to account for the cohort issue noted above. We note 
that on average 89.5% of new students enrolled in UK higher education were educated 
in state schools or colleges and the percentage is highest in post-2003 universities 
(97%). It would also appear that pre-1992 universities enrol a significant proportion of 
students (17%) from the independent sector.  
 
University admission is mostly determined by the grades achieved on a variety of 
qualifications recognised by the higher education funding councils. These include A-
levels, Scottish Highers (the Scottish equivalent to A-levels) and vocational 
qualifications (e.g., Advanced Vocational Certificate in Education (AVCE)) amongst 
others. The latter qualification was introduced in 2000 as a vocational alternative to the 
more ‘academic’ A-level qualification and can also be combined with A-level subjects. 
Points are awarded for the grades achieved on specific pre-university qualifications and 
summed over the number of qualifications taken.129 The UK literature on student 
performance finds that pre-entry points, typically A-level entry points, are a significant 
predictor of undergraduate degree performance.  It is important to note that the A-level 
points system was revised in 2000 with the introduction of a new two-year A-level 
structure: ‘syllabus 2000’ (see appendix D3 for details).  Students examined in 2002 
were the first to be awarded points according to the new points system and if they then 
pursued higher education they would have typically graduated in 2005, assuming no 
‘gap’ year. Moreover, entry points are only available as a median value and it is difficult 
                                                 
129 The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) is the organisation formally responsible 
for managing applications to higher education courses in the UK and provide a centralised application 
service for prospective undergraduates. The points awarded for specific qualifications can be found on the 
UCAS website at: http://www.ucas.com/how-it-all-works/explore-your-options/entry-requirements/tariff-
tables 
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to covert previous A-level scores (where they exist) to make them comparable to the 
current point system and the data available. This is one reason why the sample period is 
restricted as noted earlier. To account for the variety of qualifications now available in 
UK tertiary education and recognised as valid by the funding councils we use the 
median entry points for all qualifications as a measure of student pre-entry quality. We 
argue that including the points for all pre-entry qualifications as our measure of 
students’ prior ability will more accurately reflect student quality than just focussing on 
A-level point scores that is typically used in previous studies. Moreover, given the 
changing nature of institutions now classified as ‘universities’ and the drive to widen 
participation it would seem desirable to use a wider measure of student pre-entry 
quality. The median entry points for all universities is around 295 (equivalent to about 
two grade Bs and one grade C at A-level, see appendix D3) and is lagged two academic 
years to coincide with the relevant graduating cohort. We note that on average, and 
based on this measure, pre-1992 universities attract better qualified undergraduate 
students than both post-1992 and post-2003 universities.  
 
Student evaluation of teaching was found to contribute to the grade inflation witnessed 
in the US. We thus include the results from the National Student Survey (NSS) to 
account for this possibility in the UK context. As noted earlier these data are only 
available for 2005 onwards, the year the NSS was introduced. The NSS is conducted 
annually usually before the publication of university examination results and are often 
presented through the popular media in terms of ‘league tables’. The results from the 
survey are recognised nationally as a key measure of student satisfaction and favourable 
results are widely publicised by the university in question. Final year students are 
encouraged to complete an anonymous questionnaire on line.130  We use the overall 
satisfaction score which is the response to question 22 on the questionnaire: ‘Overall, I 
am satisfied with the quality my course’ which is reported as a percentage. The higher 
the percentage the greater is the student’s level of satisfaction with the university and 
course. As the NSS score is published at the end of the academic year this variable is 
lagged by one year to account for this fact. This is a further reason why the sample data 
start in the academic year 2005/06. It is assumed that the lower the NSS score the higher 
will be the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded in the following year. It is assumed 
                                                 
130 The student questionnaire is available at: http://www.thestudentsurvey.com/, accessed 30/10/2013.  
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that faculty respond to poor NSS scores by being less harsh in their grading the 
following year as universities, and departments seek to improve their ranking in the 
NSS ‘league table’. It is possible that the upward drift in percentage share of ‘good’ 
degrees since the introduction of the NSS may be a response by faculty and universities 
to improve their position in the ‘league table’ and to secure future income streams from 
fee-paying students. Thus we may expect a negative association between student 
satisfaction and good degrees. In other words, student dissatisfaction (a low NSS score) 
may lead to more lenient marking the following year. We note that the overall level of 
student satisfaction is just under 82% indicating a reasonable level of student 
satisfaction across the sector. However, there is variation in student satisfaction across 
the sector with students being more satisfied with their higher education experience in 
pre-1992 universities than in either post-1992 and post-2003 universities. 
 
In terms of university characteristics we include total university real expenditures (with 
the base at 1998=100) on student academic facilities including library and IT 
expenditures and the cost of academic service (e.g., academic staff costs and student 
support services). It is anticipated that increases in these expenditures will enhance 
learning and improve grades. We note that pre-1992 universities spend more on these 
services than other university types. Similarly, the lower the staff-student ratio the better 
should be student performance. Smaller tutorial/seminar sizes would offer greater 
opportunity for students to engage with tutors and as already noted would lessen the 
possibility of free riding so that more effective learning can take place. We note that on 
average there is between 17 and 18 students per member of teaching staff. A lower 
staff-student ratio is found in pre-1992 universities with classes, on average, comprising 
around 15 students per academic teaching staff with the ratio highest in post-2003 
universities that operate with about 20 students per teaching staff. We also include a 
variable that reflects university student composition, the percentage of FTE 
undergraduate students. On average, just over 81% of all FTE students are on 
undergraduate pathways. This percentage is lowest in pre-1992 universities (76.7%) and 
about 10 percentage points higher in post-2003 universities (86.3%). It is ambiguous, a 
priori, the effect that this variable will have on degree classification. 
  
We include a variable that can potentially capture student motivation and preparedness: 
the percentage of student attrition in the first year. It is acknowledged that there are 
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many factors that can influence a student’s willingness to continue with their study 
beyond their first year (see, for example, Smith and Naylor, 2001b; Astin, 1995; Johnes, 
1990; Johnes and Taylor, 1989). It is possible that higher rates of student attrition imply 
that the students that graduate from the cohort are of higher ability and more motivated 
than students that drop out. We would therefore expect higher attrition rates to be 
positively associated with ‘good’ degrees if this assumption is true. However, it is also 
possible that higher rates of attrition are associated with the adoption of poor methods 
of teaching and learning in a particular university and negatively associated with ‘good’ 
degrees. It can also indicate that high standards are applied in the first year and if 
carried through to the final year can potentially negatively impact on ‘good’ degrees.   
Thus the anticipated sign on this variable is ambiguous. This variable is also lagged two 
academic years. We note that, on average, about 9% of students drop out after their first 
year of study and note that attrition rates are higher in post-1992 and post-2003 
universities compared to pre-1992 counterparts.  
 
Finally, we include a variable to capture university managerial stability using Vice 
Chancellor (VC) tenure. We argue that the longer the VC stays in post the more stable is 
university policy and academic standards. The average VC tenure is just under five and 
half years, with those administering pre-1992 being in post for a shorter time period 
compared to those administering post-1992 and post-2003 universities. The figures 
reported in the table are in broad agreement with those reported in chapter 2.     
 
4.3.2 Supplementary Analysis using University of Brighton Data 
 
These data cover the period from 2006 to 2010 and include rich information on student 
characteristics. After allowing for missing values the sample consists of 11,358 
individual observations on students who graduated from the university between 2006 
and 2010. The summary statistics and variable definitions are reported in appendix D4. 
We first note that over the sample period just under 55% of degrees awarded were 
classified as either a first or upper second and this is comparable to the national figure 
of 56% for this period using the data presented in appendix A8. In terms of student 
characteristics about 58% of students are female, about 72% are in the 18-20 year old 
category, 82% of students reported their ethnicity as ‘white’, 92% are UK domiciled, 
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98% are on full-time honours degree programmes, just over 11% reported a disability, 
and just over 8% entered the university through clearing. These statistics are in broad 
agreement with the national percentages reported by HESA for the period. We also note 
that the majority of students in the sample, 57%, are from households where the head is 
in a white collar or professional occupation.  
 
In terms of entry qualifications the majority of students (77%) enter university with 
traditional A-level and/or AVCE qualifications with 27% entering with between 161 
and 260 UCAS point equivalent to between two and three grade-Cs at A-level on 
average. We note also that about 12% enter with a HE qualification below the level of 
an honours degree, and just under 5% hold a non-UK qualification. In terms of cohort 
issues the proportion of students graduating each year is relatively evenly spread across 
the five years covered by these data. Finally, in terms of the type of degree awarded in 
the fourteen schools of study we note that the largest proportion of students (14.5%) are 
graduates in Business or Finance and the smallest proportion, just over 3%, graduate 
with a degree in engineering. 
 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
 
The primary focus of this essay is to examine grade inflation in UK higher education 
from 2005/06 to 2011/12 inclusive. We first examine the phenomenon using the 
university-wide data described in section 4.3.1. It was noted earlier that Johnes and 
McNabb (2002) and Johnes (2004) suggest that the empirical literature on grade 
inflation, that generally use educational production functions, fail to control for changes 
in university efficiency and the ‘grade inflation’ observed may be a result of universities 
becoming more technically efficient in teaching and learning. To account for changes in 
efficiency they use a stochastic production frontier framework.131 Recent advances in 
stochastic frontier modelling and software development have made it possible to 
                                                 
131 Stochastic cost and production frontier models were introduced in the literature by Aigner et al (1977) 
and their theoretical basis is described by Farrell (1957). There are a number of surveys on the 
applications of frontier analysis in several contexts (see, for example, Førsund, et al., 1980; Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000). Schmidt and Sickles (1984) provide an early discussion on the use of production 
frontiers with panel data. 
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estimate stochastic frontier models that can exploit the temporal nature of the data 
(Belotti, et al., 2012 ; Belotti, 2012).  We employ the ‘true’ (university) random effects 
estimator (TRE) advanced by Greene (2005), which develops previous stochastic 
random effects panel models in that it allows for time varying university inefficiency to 
be distinguished from cross section university heterogeneity. Following Johnes and Soo 
(2013), and for the purpose of comparison we transform the continuous variables into 
natural logarithms. We also control for additional student and university characteristics 
that have been found to influence student performance. 
 
The basic model can be expressed as: 
 
git = (α + ωi) + β' Xit +  ∑γ
=
T
2t
tt D  +  vit  - uit       i = 1,2,….,N t= 1,2,….,T [4.3] 
 vit ~ NID(0,σv2)  and   uit ≥ 0  where  uit ~ N+(0,σu2) 
 
where: git is the natural logarithm of the percentage of good degrees awarded by the ith 
institution at time t;  Xit is a k×1 vector of performance determining variables. 
Specifically, the vector Xit includes variables that describe student specific 
characteristics (i.e., the natural logarithm of; the percentage of female graduates, the 
percentage of science graduates, the percentage of students who are UK domiciled, the 
percentage of students from comprehensive schools, and the median A-level entry score 
of the graduating cohort. It also includes a set of variables that describe institution 
specific characteristics (i.e., a university type dummy variable, the natural logarithm of 
expenditure on student resources, the natural logarithm of the staff/student ratio, and the 
natural logarithm of the percentage of undergraduate students). Vector X also includes 
the natural logarithm of Vice Chancellor (VC) tenure (in years) to control for the level 
of managerial stability in the ith institution. We argue that this variable captures 
standards in university policy that can be attributed to specific VCs. Variables that 
reflect university performance are also included in the vector X and these too are 
transformed to natural logarithms (i.e., student attrition rate, and the results from the 
NSS). A set of time specific dummies (Dt) are employed to capture exogenous factors 
that affect all universities in their award of ‘good’ degrees that are independent from 
changes in university efficiency (e.g., a general fall in standards). The unknown 
parameters α, ωi, β, and γt are estimated using simulated maximum likelihood 
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techniques (for details see, Greene, 2005).  In this specification ωi, is a random effect 
and captures variation due to unobserved university-specific heterogeneity not 
associated with university-specific variation in efficiency. Moreover, it is assumed that 
ωi,, is uncorrelated with the included variables contained in the vector X. This is a strong 
assumption and if it is not upheld then the coefficient estimates are inconsistent. This 
should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
The error term vit - uit in expression [4.3] is a composed error term and comprises of two 
elements. The first term vit is symmetrically distributed and captures conventional 
exogenous random shocks (i.e., effects not under the control of the institution) that vary 
across universities.  The second term uit is one-sided and assumed to capture changes in 
university (technical) inefficiency over time. Several, distributions can be assumed for 
the one-sided error term: half normal, truncated normal, and exponential (Greene, 2005; 
Belotti, et al., 2012 ). However, there is no real guidance as to the choice between these 
distributions and we assume a half normal distribution as this appears to be popular in 
the literature. It should be noted that the assumed distribution may give different 
inefficiency estimates to the alternatives available (Greene, 2005). Moreover, the 
identification of vit and uit can be problematic if the shape of the distributions is similar 
or if one of these parameters account for a large proportion of the overall distribution of 
the composed error. This latter issue is due to the signal-to-noise ratio,(σu2 σv2⁄ ), which if 
vary large or very small will mean the likelihood function will be relatively flat leading 
to convergence problems in the maximum likelihood algorithm.132   
 
Further, we employ the method suggested by Jondrow et al., (1982) to estimate the 
expected value of university-specific inefficiency which uses the information on the 
composed error term i.e., E (uit | vit – uit) and can be expressed formally: 
 
                                                 
132The ‘true’ fixed effects estimator (TFE) was also employed but the likelihood function was found to be 
relatively flat. As a result parameter estimates become unstable and thus lack precision (Belotti, et al., 
2012). The coefficient estimates are not reported in the text. It is instructive to note that two issues arise 
when using the TFE estimator to estimate non-linear panel models. The first is due to computational 
problems regarding the number of parameters to be estimated, which increases substantially and the 
second is an inferential issue surrounding the number of so-called ‘incidental’ parameters that arises when 
the number of units are large relative to the length of the panel. These issues imply that the fixed effects 
will be inconsistently estimated (Belotti, et al.,2012).  For a detailed discussion of the ‘true’ random/fixed 
effects estimators see Greene (2005). 
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𝑢�𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑖|𝜀𝑖𝑖] = 𝜎𝜎1+𝜎2 � 𝜙(𝑎𝑖𝑖)1−Φ(𝑎𝑖𝑖) − 𝑎𝑖𝑖�    [4.4]
  
 
Where εit = vit – uit, σ = �(𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜎𝑣2), λ= σu / σv, 𝑎𝑖𝑖 =  𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜆/𝜎, ø is the standard normal 
density and Φ is the standard normal CDF. We evaluate efficiency using exp(-uit). 
 
We also compare the estimated coefficient estimates from the TRE specification with 
those estimated from a standard university-random effects specification (without the 
inefficiency term) and a standard university-fixed effects model as a check of 
robustness. The fixed effects model can be expressed: 
 
git = αi + β' Xit +  ∑γ
=
T
2t
tt D  +  vit        i = 1,2,….,N t= 1,2,….,T       [4.5] 
 
This specification allows for within-university correlations across years for the 
institutions that feature in these data. In this framework omitted unobservable university 
effects (e.g., university efficiency) remain fixed over time and consumed in αi which is 
allowed to be correlated with the included variables. The assumption that omitted 
unobservable university effects remain fixed over time may be a strong assumption in 
this case given the data spans seven years, but the estimator will give more consistent 
parameter estimates, compared to the random effects estimator, if unobservable 
university heterogeneity is correlated with the included variables. The variables git, Dt, 
and those included in the vector X are as described above, but exclude the university 
type dummies. The parameters αi, β and γ are unknown where αi represents university 
fixed effects and γt is assumed to capture changes in standards or grade inflation in any 
particular year. The error term vit is assumed to conform to standard assumptions i.e.,   
vit ~ iid(0,σ2). The random effects model assumes αi is randomly determined but as in 
the case of the TRE it is assumed that αi is uncorrelated with the included regressors 
and if this assumption is not upheld the parameter estimates will be inconsistent and 
inefficient. As a check for robustness we re-estimate the models described in 
expressions [4.3] and [4.5] in their original units i.e., percentages. 
 
171 
 
 
 
In the supplementary analysis we use the student-level data described in section 4.3.2 
and examine grade inflation using a standard binomial probit model. The latent 
performance equation can be defined as: 
 
g*i  = β′Zi +  ∑γ
=
T
2t
ttD  + ui     i= 1,….N    [4.6] 
 
where g*i  denotes the latent dependent variable that captures the ith individual’s 
propensity to be awarded a ‘good’ degree, Zi is a h×1 vector of student level degree 
performance determining variables for the ith student (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, 
domicile,  mode of study, entry qualifications, and field of study),  Dt is a set of time 
dummies and as noted above are employed to capture grade inflation, and ui is the error 
term that conforms to standard assumptions i.e.,  ui  ~ N(0, σ2).  If the latent variable 
exceeds zero a ‘good’ degree is awarded thus: 
 
 gi =  1   if  g*i  > 0    and   
 gi =  0    if g*i  ≤ 0 
 
The unknown parameters to be estimated are; β which represents a vector of fixed 
unknown coefficients including the constant, and γt that captures exogenous factors that 
affect the award of a ‘good’ degree class. In order to identify these parameters the 
conventional normalisation is made and we set σ2 = 1.  
 
Setting Vi = β′Zi + ∑γ
=
T
2t
ttD , the log-likelihood function can be expressed: 
 
  L = ∑
=
n
1i
gi ×ln[Φ(Vi)] + ∑
=
n
1i
(1 – gi )×ln[1– Φ(Vi)]   [4.7] 
 
Where, ln(·) is the natural logarithm operator, and Φ is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal. Conventional algorithms can be employed to 
expression [4.7] to provide maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter vector β 
and γt. As the variables contained in vector Zi are either categorical or dummy variables, 
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and to aid interpretation, the estimated impact effects are reported in the following 
section (see, Greene, 2008). This transformation allows the ceteris paribus effect on the 
probability of achieving a ‘good’ degree for discrete changes in the independent 
variables to be more transparent.   
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
 
 
The results for the TRE stochastic frontier estimates [expression 4.3] with the 
continuous variables transformed to natural logs, and  assuming a half normal 
distribution for the inefficiency term uit, are reported in column [1] in table 4.2 below. 
The alternative coefficient estimates for the standard fixed and random effects 
specifications, are reported in columns [2] and [3] respectively. We also estimated the 
parameters of the TRE specification assuming an exponential distribution for the 
inefficiency term. The coefficient estimates were very similar to those reported 
assuming a half normal distribution. These estimates are reported in appendix D5 for 
purposes of comparison.133  We first note that the statistical significance and the signs 
on the estimated coefficients are fairly robust across the specifications reported in table 
4.2. The fixed effects specification fits the data reasonably well, but the variation in 
‘good’ degrees explained by the university fixed effects is high at 88%.  
 
It is important to note that the results from the estimation framework adopted in this 
chapter do not necessarily suggest that causal relationships exist between the proportion 
of good degrees awarded and all the explanatory variables included on the right-hand 
side of expression [4.3]. There is a possibility that certain key variables may be 
endogenous causing the coefficient estimates for these variables to be biased and 
inconsistent. This will require the use of instrumental variables in place of the 
problematic variables (see chapter 2 section 2.7, for a brief discussion of what 
constitutes a good instrument). It may be the case that the variables that relate to student 
entry points and the NSS score may be endogenous. For instance, a higher proportion of 
good degrees may attract students with higher entry scores and higher entry scores may 
                                                 
133 It should be noted that we also estimated the specification assuming a truncated normal distribution for 
the efficiency term but the simulated log-likelihood function failed to converge resulting in imprecise 
coefficient estimates and these are not reported. 
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also be associated with a higher proportion of good degrees awarded, suggesting a 
possible ‘reverse’ causality. In the current context it is extremely difficult to come up 
with suitable instruments as it would appear that anything that may influence these two 
variables will also impact on the proportion of good degree awarded. For instance, if we 
could get a measure of student ability which is likely to be correlated with entry score 
(e.g. more able students perform better at A-level) we would also expect more able 
students to perform well at university and achieve a ‘good’ degree classification, which 
rules out using ability as an instrument. However, the NSS questionnaire does not 
explicitly ask students about the material environment in which study takes place, 
generally it is concerned with student opinions on teaching quality, assessment, 
academic support, course organisation and management, access to learning facilities and 
personal development. We may conjecture that a better learning environment (e.g. 
adequate infrastructure, well maintained buildings and grounds) may improve the NSS 
score but may not be correlated with the share of ‘good’ degrees awarded. Nevertheless, 
again finding suitable instruments to address the endogeneity that may be inherent in the 
NSS and entry score variables is a difficult task. Moreover, suggesting the direction of 
bias in the relevant estimated coefficients would likewise be mere conjecture.  
 
In addition, bias may be introduced in the estimated coefficients through omitted 
variables. For instance, it is intuitively plausible that variables that capture student 
ability, which is missing, may be positively correlated with the A-level performance and 
variables that capture student motivation, and/or teaching quality may also be positively 
correlated with the NSS score. Since these variables are omitted from specifications 
[4.3] and [4.6] the coefficient estimates for the NSS score and A-level points may be 
overestimated. Finding suitable proxies for the missing variables is difficult given the 
available data and given the possibility of ‘reverse’ causality the estimated coefficients 
reported in table 4.2 and 4.3 below should be interpreted with caution. We focus our 
discussion on the coefficient estimates reported in column [1] for the TRE specification 
and compare these to those reported in columns [2] and [3]. 
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Table 4.2 True Random Effects, Standard Random Effects and Standard Fixed 
Effects Estimates (log form) 
 
Variable Name 
True University 
Random Effects 
(Half Normal) 
[1] 
University 
Random Effects 
 
[2] 
University  
Fixed Effects 
 
[3] 
Students Characteristics    
Ln (% Female Graduates)   0.077 (0.070)   0.078  (0.088) -0.140  (0.206) 
Ln (% Science Graduates) -0.007 (0.009) -0.017  (0.009)* -0.015  (0.012) 
Ln (% UK Domiciled Students)   
(lagged 3 years)   0.151 (0.082)*   0.124  (0.098)   0.386  (0.180)** 
Ln (% Students from State Schools) (lagged 3 
years) -0.268 (0.102)*** -0.253  (0.045)***   0.078  (0.151) 
Ln (Median entry  points)  
(lagged 3 years)   0.254 (0.046)***    0.253  (0.045)***   0.152  (0.051)*** 
Ln  (NSS score) (lagged 1 year)   0.001 (0.102) -0.041  (0.099) -0.065  (0.107) 
University Characteristics    
Pre-1992 university   0.042 (0.019)**   0.054  (0.025)** † 
Post-2003 university -0.025  (0.036) -0.037  (0.026) † 
Post-1992 university f f † 
Ln (expenditure (in 1998 prices)) -0.001  (0.011) -0.006  (0.723) -0.002  (0.018) 
Ln (Staff-student ratio) -0.011  (0.027) -0.010  (0.029) -0.006   (0.034) 
Ln (% FTE undergraduate students) -0.083  (0.107) -0.053  (0.125)   0.056  (0.170) 
Ln (% First year drop outs) 
(lagged 3 years) -0.032  (0.014)** -0.042  (0.015)*** -0.025  (0.014)* 
Ln (VC tenure (years))   0.0004 (0.0039)   0.0004 (0.0043)   0.003  (0.004)     
Year Dummies    
Year dummy 2012 0.096  (0.013)*** 0.103  (0.014)*** 0.116  (0.017)*** 
Year dummy 2011 0.054  (0.011)*** 0.068  (0.012)*** 0.078  (0.014)***  
Year dummy 2010 0.031  (0.011)*** 0.046  (0.012)*** 0.052  (0.014)   
Year dummy 2009 0.009  (0.009) 0.023  (0.009)** 0.032  (0.009)*** 
Year dummy 2008 0.003  (0.007) 0.014  (0.008)* 0.022  (0.008)*** 
Year dummy 2007 0.002  (0.009) 0.007  (0.007) 0.012  (0.007) 
Year dummy 2006 f f f 
σi  † 0.067 0.153 
σe † 0.056 0.056 
rhoi † 0.589 0.882 
Within-R2  † 0.314 0.337 
ρ † † -0.039 
𝜎𝑢
2
 0.081  (0.008) *** † † 
𝜎𝑣
2 0.029  (0.004) *** † † 
𝜎𝑣
2/𝜎𝑢2 2.767  (0.011) *** † † 
F-statistic§ / Wald test 𝜒202  665.83[p= 0.000] 589.25 [p= 0.000] 8.35 [p = 0.000]  
Log likelihood -915.6472   1090.5931 
Observations 700 700 700 
Number of universities 100 100 100 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by university are reported in parentheses.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c) † denotes not applicable in estimation. 
(d) f  denotes base category in estimation.  
(e) σi and σe are the estimated standard deviations for the fixed effects and the error term respectively,  rhoi is the fraction of the 
variation in the dependent variable accounted for by the fixed effects an ρ is the correlation between the fixed effects and the 
included variables.  
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In terms of student characteristics there is no statistical evidence that the gender-mix has 
a significant impact on the percentage share of ‘good’ degrees. This result is robust 
across the specifications reported in table 4.2, but runs counter to several studies that 
find a positive and significant female effect on performance. These studies are generally 
based on earlier student cohorts (Smith and Naylor, 2001a; McNabb, et al., 2002; 
Barrow, et al., 2009). However, it does confirm the finding of Johnes and McNabb 
(2002) of no significant female effect on degree performance between 1995-2000 for 
pre-1992 and post-1992 universities (see also, Rogers, 2007). The result reported here 
may reflect a quality shift with new female entrants being of lower ability (in terms of 
pre-entry requirements) than females in the past and may be a result of widening 
participation that has narrowed the gender differential in performance. 
 
Students graduating with a Science degree are found to be less likely to achieve a 
‘good’ degree compared to non-science graduates using the standard random effects 
specification. The point estimate suggests that a ten-percent increase in the proportion 
of science students reduces the number of ‘good’ degrees awarded by 0.17%, on 
average and ceteris paribus. This particular result may suggest that Science subjects are 
more harshly marked or graded than subjects in other subject fields and confirms the 
findings of existing research on this issue noted earlier although the effect is fairly 
inelastic. However, this effect disappears when we control for changes in efficiency 
which may suggest that more efficient teaching methods or learning technologies have 
been successfully employed in this field of study. No significant effect is detected using 
the standard fixed effects specification. 
 
The estimated coefficient for UK domiciled students in the graduating cohort is 
statistically significant. This particular result is in agreement with the general finding 
reported in the empirical literature on student performance (see, for example, Morrison, 
et al., 2005; De Vita, 2002). The point estimate suggests that a one-percent increase in 
the proportion of UK domiciled students raises the share of ‘good’ degrees by 0.15%, 
on average and ceteris paribus. A significant effect is also detected in the fixed effects 
specification reported in column [3] however being UK domiciled has about two and a 
half times the impact on ‘good’ degrees compared to the effect detected using the TRE 
estimator. These results can be taken to suggest that UK students have, on average, a 
relative advantage over non-UK domiciled students. However, it should be noted that 
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non-UK domiciled students include both EU and non-EU students and there may be a 
wide variation in the performance of these students compared to their UK counterparts. 
  
We detect a significant negative association between the percentage of students enrolled 
from state secondary schools in the same graduating cohort and the award of a good 
degree.  The coefficient estimate suggest that a one-percent increase in the proportion 
students from state schools lowers the share of ‘good’ degrees by just under 0.27%, on 
average and ceteris paribus and is in agreement with the finding of Johnes (2004), but 
runs counter to the results reported by Smith and Naylor (2001a; 2005) and McNabb et 
al, (2002) for earlier cohorts of students typically drawn from pre-1992 universities and 
the more recent studies by HEFCE (2014) and Crawford (2014).. Smith and Naylor 
(2001a; 2005) argue that although students drawn from the independent sector perform 
better in terms of their A-level points those admitted from state schools with similar A-
level scores are of higher relative ability and are more motivated than their independent 
sector counterparts while at university and perform better on average than their 
independent counterparts. The results presented here suggest that there has been some 
reversal of this between 2006 and 2012. However, it should be noted that the studies by 
Smith and Naylor (2001a; 2005), McNabb et al, (2002) HEFCE (2014) and Crawford 
(2014) all use a different level of aggregation to the one used here. They focus on 
individual level as well as university level characteristics to uncover association 
between school type and student performance, and aggregation bias may be a reason 
why the results from previous studies differ from the results presented here (see Johnes, 
2004). A similar effect is reported for the standard random effects specification, but the 
coefficient estimate is insignificant in regard to the fixed effects specification in column 
[3]. This latter effect may also be due to a high correlation between the fixed effects and 
this particular variable and may reflect the fact that potential state-school/public-school 
educated enrolees are attracted to certain types of universities based on unobserved 
university characteristics (e.g., university reputation) not captured in these data.  
 
Like many previous studies we find a significant and positive relationship between pre-
entry points and the percentage of good degrees awarded. For instance, a 10 percent 
increase in the median entry points increases the share of ‘good’ degrees by about 2.5%, 
on average and ceteris paribus. This also implies that a university with an average 
intake of students with three As at A-level will award 4% more ‘good’ degrees than a 
177 
 
 
 
university with an intake profile which on average achieve three Bs at A-level and this 
result is intuitively plausible. This effect is marginally smaller than the 5% differential 
reported by Johnes and Soo (2013).134 However, unlike Johnes and Soo (2013) we use 
the median UCAS entry points for all entry qualifications, and control for a more 
comprehensive set of covariates and this difference may have been anticipated. A 
similar entry score effect is detected for the random effects specification reported in 
column [2] but is smaller in the fixed effects specification, which suggests that a 10% 
increase in the median entry score increases the share ‘good’ degrees by about 1.5%.   
 
In contrast to the findings of Soo (2009) and Johnes and Soo (2013), we find no 
statistical evidence that student assessment of teaching via the NSS impacts on degree 
outcome. Unlike the performance specifications employed by Johnes and Soo (2013) 
the NSS score is entered using a one-period lag to reflect the reality that the results from 
the survey are generally available after the final degree classifications are awarded.135 
We argue that lecturers alter their behaviour in response to the NSS score the following 
year to improve ‘league table’ ranking. However, there appears to be little incentive for 
faculty to behave in such a way. This is also in contrast to US studies where the pursuit 
of high SET scores may induce faculty to free-ride particularly if faculty pay, promotion 
or tenure is dependent on student satisfaction scores. 
 
We also find that pre-1992 universities award more ‘good’ degrees compared to their 
post-1992 counterparts. The point estimate, suggests that that this differential is 4.2 
percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, using the TRE specification in 
column [1]. However, a larger and significant effect is detected using the standard 
random effects estimator. This result may be picking up a quality effect with students of 
higher calibre are admitted to pre-1992 universities and we may expect better student 
outcomes for these universities. Very few other university characteristics are found to 
be statistically associated with a ‘good’ degree classification. There is no evidence that 
                                                 
134 A basic TRE specification using just the median entry score and year dummies as regressors was also 
estimated, which concurs with the specification reported by Johnes and Soo (2013). The estimated 
coefficient for the pre-entry point score was 0.378 [p-value = 0.000], suggesting that universities with an 
average intake of students with three As at A-level award 8.5% more ‘good’ degrees than an institution 
with an average student intake with three Bs, which is higher than that reported by Johnes and Soo 
(2013), but is in general agreement  with Smith and Naylor (2001a) 
135 It is acknowledged that student satisfaction may enhance motivation and increase performance in the 
current year, but it is not clear that students who report a high satisfaction score are necessarily more 
motivated than less satisfied students. 
178 
 
 
 
university spending on student related learning facilities and the staff-student ratio is 
significantly associated with the share of ‘good’ degrees awarded. This is in contrast to 
the results reported by Johnes and Soo (2013) who find marginal evidence that these 
factors impact on ‘good’ degrees.  Student composition and our proxy for university 
managerial stability exert no significant effect on the percentage of ‘good’ degrees 
awarded. The statistical insignificance of these factors is found across all specifications 
reported in table 4.2. However, there is evidence that as the rate of student attrition, in 
the first year, increases by one-percent ‘good’ degrees awarded falls by 0.03%, on 
average and ceteris paribus. This result may indicate that high standards are applied in 
the first year and if carried through to the final year could potentially negatively impact 
on the share of ‘good’ degrees awarded. On the other hand high attrition rates may be 
associated with poor standards of teaching in the first year and if continued to the final 
can also negatively impact on the share of good degrees awarded. It is therefore difficult 
to interpret this association precisely. 
 
We now turn our attention to changes in educational standards and grade inflation. In 
terms of standards we note that the size of the estimated coefficients on the academic 
year dummies increase monotonically in all specification reported in table 4.2 since 
2005/06. Using the TRE specification reported in column [1] the estimated coefficients 
on the year dummies are statistically significant from the academic year 2008/09 
onwards after controlling for student and university characterises, and most importantly 
university efficiency. The point estimate on the 2011/12 dummy suggests that the 
proportion of ‘good’ degrees awarded increased by about 9.6% since the academic year 
2005/06 and this accounts for about four-fifths of the 12% increase in share of ‘good’ 
degrees over the sample period (see appendix A8).136 Similar effects are noted when the 
standard random and fixed effects estimators are employed, however the coefficients on 
the year dummies become significant two-years earlier using these specifications. This 
may be taken as evidence of falling standards that may have resulted in the upward drift 
in the percentage of ‘good’ degrees awarded (i.e., grade inflation), and there is robust 
evidence of grade inflation since the academic year 2008/09. However, these results are 
in contrast to those reported by Johnes and Soo (2013) who find ‘negative’ grade 
inflation after controlling for university expenditures on student facilities, entry scores, 
                                                 
136 This is calculated using the ratio of  proportion of good degrees awarded in 2012 to the proportion 
awarded in 2006 and taking the natural logarithm of this ratio i.e., ln(0.614/0.544). 
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student satisfaction and university research quality, but they do find some evidence of 
grade inflation in 2011 and 2012 in their most austere model. Johnes and Soo  (2013) 
argue that the grade inflation observed in their data may be explained by the increase in 
tuition fees in 2006 and 2012. However, we feel the evidence presented here provides 
more convincing evidence that this may be the case. The difference between these 
results and those presented by Johnes and Soo (2013) may be due to our use of more 
contextual data.  
 
However, even after controlling for changes in university efficiency it is also possible 
that the estimated coefficients on the time dummies may not be an indication of ‘pure’ 
grade inflation. It is possible that the monotonic increase in the size of the coefficients 
that is observed may be due to a general increase in student motivation, the use of better 
teaching technologies, or simply due to a general rise in student ability for instance due 
to better teaching technologies being employed in lower levels of education. But it is 
still possible that to a certain extent the size of the estimated coefficients do reflect 
changing (falling) standards. 
 
We now examine the evolution of technical efficiency over the sample time period. We 
recover the uit  based on the specification reported in column [1], from which we derive 
efficiency scores for each university in the dataset using the transformation exp –(uit) 
suggested by Jondrow et al., (1982). These are then averaged across institutions for 
each year  and the results are presented in figure 4.3 below. We first note that in general 
(technical) efficiency has remained relatively constant over the period, averaging about 
94%, with a median of about 95% concurring with the level of efficiency reported by 
Johnes and Soo (2013) using a TRE estimator. Similar results were found in the earlier 
study by Johnes and McNabb (2002) using a standard stochastic frontier estimator who 
report that mean technical efficiency remained relatively constant at around 93% 
between 1973 and 1993, but observed a small increase in inefficiency in 2000. The 
evidence presented in figure 4.3 suggests a small fall in efficiency across the sector 
between 2009 and 2012. However, the general picture suggest that university efficiency 
was relatively high and stable since the mid-2000s. The finding that university 
efficiency has remained stable over the time period covered in the current analysis may 
help explain why the standard random effects specification and fixed effects produced 
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similar results to the TRE specification, and the use of stochastic frontier models may 
be too elaborate in this application.  
 
Figure 4.3 Average Technical Efficiency (%) UK Universities 2006-2012  
 
 
As a check of consistency we re-estimate the models presented in table 4.2 with the 
variables in their original percentage form. The results from this exercise are presented 
in table 4.3 below. We note that, in general, the signs on, and the significance of the 
estimated coefficients are similar to those reported in table 4.2. Specifically, we find a 
negative association between the percentage share of ‘good’ degrees and the percentage 
of students admitted to university from state schools and the percentage of science 
students, although this latter effect is more robust across the specifications reported in 
table 4.3. Using the point estimate for the TRE  reported in column [1] for this latter 
effect a one-percentage point increase in the percentage of students graduating with a 
science degree reduces the share of ‘good’ degrees by just over 0.07 of a percentage 
point, on average and ceteris paribus. We find no significant role for gender and NSS 
score in influencing the percentage share of ‘good’ degrees. 
 
We note a significant and positive association between the percentage share of ‘good’ 
degrees and UK domiciled students and pre-entry scores. For instance, using the 
coefficient estimate from the TFE specification reported in column [1] the estimate 
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suggests a 20-point increase in the median entry points (equivalent to a one grade 
increase at A-level) increases the percentage of good degrees by one percentage point, 
ceteris paribus. This also implies that a university with an average intake of students 
with three As at A-level will award 3 percentage points more ‘good’ degrees than a 
university with an intake profile which on average achieve three Bs at A-level. A 
similar entry score effect is detected for the random effects specification reported in 
column [2] but is smaller in the fixed effects specification, which suggests that a 20-
point increase in the median entry score increases the percentage of ‘good’ degrees by 
about 0.6 of a percentage point.  These results are in general agreement with the 
findings presented in the models in log form. 
  
As with the log models presented above very few university characteristics are found to 
be associated with a ‘good’ degree classification.  Moreover, in comport with the results 
presented in table 4.2 the estimated coefficients on the time dummies increase 
monotonically in all three specifications reported. Using the results for the TRE 
specification reported in column [1] of table 4.3 the point estimates on the time 
dummies suggest that since 2008/09 onwards the percentage share of ‘good’ degrees 
increased by just over six percentage points to 2011/12. This effect accounts for a large 
proportion of 7.2 percentage point rise in ‘good’ degrees awarded over the sample 
period. A similar effect is detected using the standard random effects estimator (column 
[2]) and the standard fixed effects estimator (column [3]), although grade inflation is 
detected starting in 2007/08 using the former specification and in 2007/06 using the 
latter. In general, the results reported in table 4.3 give some confidence for the results 
reported in table 4.2.  
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Table 4.3 True Random Effects, Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimates 
(percentage form) 
Variable Name 
True University 
Random Effects 
(Half Normal) 
[1] 
University 
Random Effects 
 
[2] 
University  
Fixed Effects 
 
[3] 
Students Characteristics    
% Female Graduates 0.016  (0.076) 0.019 (0.096) -0.162   (0.193) 
% Science Graduates -0.075 (0.029) *** -0.082 (0.035) ** -0.074  (0.041) * 
% UK Domiciled Students   
(lagged 3 years) 0.118 (0.044) *** 0.101 (0.070) 0.225  (0.127) * 
% Students from State Schools  
(lagged 3 years) -0.214 (0.054) *** -0.207 (0.063) *** 0.073   (0.112) 
Median entry  points  
(lagged 3 years) 0.050  (0.008) *** 0.048 (0.009) *** 0.031 (0.009) *** 
National Student Survey (NSS) score 
(lagged 1 year) 
 
-0.011 (0.062) -0.030 (0.069) -0.046 (0.074) 
University Characteristics    
Pre-1992 university 2.716  (1.104) *** 3.525  (1.422) ** † 
Post-2003 university -1.185  (0.941) -1.796 (1.444) † 
Post-1992 university f f † 
(ln) expenditure (in 1998 prices) -0.172  (0.552) -0.242  (0.685) -0.141  (0.962) 
Staff-student ratio -0.019  (0.089) -0.057  (0.085) -0.026  (0.093) 
% FTE undergraduate students -0.069  (0.066) -0.027  (0.089) 0.060  (0.112) 
% First year drop outs 
(lagged 3 years) -0.246  (0.087) *** -0.294  (0.087) *** -0.203  (0.092) ** 
VC tenure (years) 
 0.031  (0.051) 0.027  (0.051) 0.072   (0.052)     
Year Dummies    
Year dummy 2012 6.079  (0.781) *** 6.228  (0.818) *** 6.621  (0.855) ***    
Year dummy 2011 3.851  (0.706) *** 4.217  (0.724) *** 4.403 (0.768) ***   
Year dummy 2010 2.570  (0.718) *** 2.982  (0.727) *** 3.049  (0.779) ***   
Year dummy 2009 0.702  (0.540) 1.143  (0.519) ** 1.477  (0.534) *** 
Year dummy 2008 0.254  (0.459) 0.570  (0.445) 0.943 (0.432) ** 
Year dummy 2007 0.056  (0.398) 0.267  (0.389) 0.510  (0.387) 
Year dummy 2006 f f f 
σi  † 4.096 8.877 
σe † 2.934 2.934 
rhoi † 0.661 0.901 
Within-R2  † 0.362 0.382 
ρ † † 0.111 
𝜎𝑢
2
 3.334  (0.600)*** † † 
𝜎𝑣
2 2.158  (0.292)*** † † 
𝜎𝑣
2/𝜎𝑢2 1.545 (0.857)* † † 
F-statistic§ / Wald test 𝜒202  1248.52  [p= 0.000] 614.82  [p= 0.000] 9.48  [p= 0.000] 
Log likelihood -1878.0014   -1674.6104 
Observations 700 700 700 
Number of universities 100 100 100 
See notes to table 4.2  
  
183 
 
 
 
Again, and in general, we note the similarity between the estimated coefficients reported 
using the TRE estimator and those reported using standard random effects estimator in 
table 4.3. This may imply that controlling for university efficiency, which has remained 
relatively constant over the sample period, as illustrated in figure 4.3, has little influence 
on the share of ‘good’ degrees awarded. Thus differences in university efficiency may 
be assumed fixed and time invariant over the short period of time reviewed here. 
Moreover, given the possibility that the estimated random effects may be correlated 
with the included variables, which lead to imprecise coefficient estimates, the results 
using the fixed effects estimator may therefore provide more consistent parameter 
estimates.137 Furthermore, if the fixed effects estimator is preferable then based on the 
evidence presented above, and in contrast the Johnes and Soo (2013), we assert that 
grade inflation has been evidenced in UK higher education since 2006/07. 
 
We now turn to the probit estimates using administrative data for the University of 
Brighton that are the focus of the supplementary analysis to examine the influence that 
student characteristics have on student performance. The coefficient estimates for the 
probit index function, which are not discussed below, are reported in appendix D6, but 
we note that the majority of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 
conventional levels and the signs on the coefficients are intuitively plausible supporting 
the findings from many previous studies on the importance of student individual 
characteristics in determining student academic performance.  
 
The estimated impact effects are reported in table 4.4 below. The estimated gender 
effect is statistically significant and suggests that being female increases the probability 
of achieving a ‘good’ degree classification by just over 9.4 percentage points, on 
average and ceteris paribus.  This effect is in contrast with the results presented in the 
aggregate university-wide analysis, but it could reflect that females perform better in 
post-1992 universities. We also note that older students perform better than their 
younger counterparts and ‘White’ students perform better than other ethnic groups. 
Students whose household head is in a professional occupation are 9.9 percentage 
                                                 
137 The fixed effects specification is preferred to a random effects specification in table 4.3 based on the 
results from a Hausman test. The test statistic overwhelmingly rejects the random effects model in favour 
of fixed effects:  χ2 (17 df) = 44.69 [p-value = 0.000]. Similarly based on a Hausman test the fixed effects 
specification in table 4.2 is preferable to the random effects estimates, χ2 (17 df) = 41.19 [p-value = 
0.000].  
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points, on average and ceteris paribus, more likely to secure a ‘good’ degree than a 
student whose family head is in a skilled-manual or non-manual occupation suggesting 
a socio-economic dimension to student performance.  
 
There is further evidence that the higher a student’s pre-entry UCAS points the greater 
the probability of securing a ‘good’ degree classification. For instance, having three A-
grades at A-level increases the probability of gaining a ‘good’ degree classification by 
30.1 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, than a student entering with 
only two D-grades. We also note that there is evidence of differential grading across 
schools of study.  
 
Moreover, we note that the estimated coefficients on the academic year dummies 
increase monotonically and become statistically significant from the academic year 
2009. The estimated coefficient on the 2010 year dummy suggests that a student 
graduating in this particular year is 7.9 percentage points more likely to be awarded a 
‘good’ degree than students graduating in 2006, after controlling for student 
characteristics and school of study. Furthermore, this increase is in line with the 7.2 
percentage point national rise in ‘good’ degree reported over the period and lends 
support to the grade inflation observed using the TRE estimator. This result suggest that 
grade inflation may have occurred since 2008 in this particular university and  supports 
the previous findings using the TRE and standard random and fixed effects estimators 
presented above, but it is acknowledged that the increase in the probability of receiving 
a ‘good’ degree can be due to the other factors as discussed earlier. 
 
It is also noted that using the results presented in table 4.3 the 95% confidence interval 
for the point estimate on the dummy variable for 2010 using the fixed effects 
specification is [1.522, 4.576] which suggests a significant difference between the 
probit estimate and the estimate presented in table 4.3. This is also true for the 
coefficient estimate on the year dummy for 2009 reported in table 4.3 with an estimated 
confidence interval [0.430, 2.523] using the fixed effects specification. However, the 
confidence interval for the coefficient estimate for 2012 from table 4.3 is [4.886, 8.356] 
which suggests no statistical difference between the coefficient estimates for 2010 using 
the probit specification and the fixed effects specification.  
 
185 
 
 
 
Table 4.4  Probit Maximum likelihood Estimates for Good Degree Classification  
 
 Impact Effect 
 Coefficient Standard error 
Constant n/a 
Female 0.094*** 0.022 
Age at entry  
21-24 0.091*** 0.017 
25-29 0.098*** 0.031 
30+ 0.126*** 0.049 
18-20 f    
  
Ethnicity  
Asian/British Asian -0.165*** 0.034 
Black/British Black -0.185*** 0.021 
Mixed race -0.078*** 0.029 
Other ethnic -0.156*** 0.032 
Ethnicity unknown or refused 0.045 0.035 
White f   
  
Occupational group of H/H head  
Professional/managerial 0.099***  0.015 
Semi-skilled/unskilled -0.017 0.016 
Unemployed/retired -0.151*** 0.029 
Skilled manual/non-manual f    
  
Domicile  
UK 0.127*** 0.047  
Overseas -0.081 0.051  
EU f   
  
Pre entry qualifications  
161<UCAS points< 260 0.030 0.020 
261<UCAS points< 320 0.246*** 0.020 
UCAS points > 320 0.301*** 0.024 
Other UK qualification  0.020 0.036 
HE Qualification 0.083*** 0.027 
Non UK qualification 0.181*** 0.055 
No formal qualification -0.008 0.046 
UCAS points < 160 f   
  
Other Characteristics  
Full time =1 0.067* 0.039 
Disability declared -0.024 0.019 
Clearing =1 -0.034 0.027 
  
School of Study  
Architecture and Design -0.119*** 0.009 
Arts and Communication 0.039*** 0.012 
Historical and Critical Studies -0.024** 0.010 
Service Management -0.088*** 0.015 
Computing, Mathematical and Information Sciences -0.163*** 0.002 
Sport science -0.159*** 0.006 
Education -0.178*** 0.013 
Languages -0.004 0.009  
Applied Social Science -0.146*** 0.010 
Health Professions -0.038** 0.017 
Engineering -0.014 0.009 
Environment 0.044*** 0.003 
Pharmacy and Biomolecular Sciences 0.010 0.008  
Business and finance f   
  
Year of Graduation  
2010 0.079*** 0.030 
2009 0.041* 0.023 
2008 0.040 0.027  
2007 0.026 0.028 
2006 f   
Psuedo_R2   0.093 
Loglikelihood -7098.884 
Observations   11358 
Notes to table: 
(a) Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering across academic units.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c) f  denotes base category in estimation. 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine evidence for the presence (or otherwise) of 
grade inflation in UK higher education.  We employed a true random effects 
methodology to distinguish between changes in university efficiency from unobserved 
university heterogeneity. We also employed a standard random and fixed effects 
estimator to check for robustness. The results reported suggest that the fixed effects 
specification is preferable to both random effects specifications, given that efficiency 
seems to have remained relatively stable over the time horizon considered in this 
analysis. The use of a stochastic frontier specification may therefore be unnecessary in 
this particular application, and the results from other studies that use such a 
specification may be more elaborate than required (Johnes and NcNabb, 2002; Johnes 
and Soo, 2013).   
 
The results confirm some standard findings in the literature. For instance, the 
importance of pre-entry scores and student region of domicile are found to be important 
determinants of UK student performance. In the primary analysis using university-wide 
data we find no statistical evidence that female undergraduates outperform their male 
counterparts, which may reflect a fall in average female ability and motivation, as more 
females participate in higher education that are drawn from a wider ability distribution.  
 
We find that as the proportion of students enrolled from state secondary schools and 
colleges increase the proportion of good degrees awarded falls. This may be a 
consequence of the policy of ‘widening’ participation with many more students from 
secondary schools and colleges, and from low participation areas accessing higher 
education during the period covered by these data (see chapter 1 for details). This result 
may also suggest that universities may be failing to cater for a wider range of students 
that now differ in many respects, in terms of abilities and skills, from students that have 
traditionally accessed UK higher education, even though spending on student facilities 
and learning technologies have increased over the past decade (this may also explain 
why spending on student facilities was found to be significant in the empirical analysis). 
It may also simply indicate that on average state schooled students are of a lower quality 
than those admitted from state schools in previous decades. Student satisfaction scores 
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(lagged one year) and Vice Chancellor tenure were found to have no significant impact 
on student performance.   
 
Although very few university characteristics were found to be significantly associated 
with a ‘good’ degree classification we do find that for any particular graduating cohort 
the attrition rate in their first year reduces the share of ‘good’ grades awarded. This 
effect may be due to high standards being applied in the first year that are maintained 
over the remaining years of study. 
 
Finally our results from the primary analysis show that grade inflation may have been 
present in English, Welsh and Northern Irish universities since 2008/09 after controlling 
for university (technical) efficiency (which remained relatively constant over the sample 
time frame), university type, university and course characteristics and the characteristics 
of the graduating cohort. It seems plausible that the observed upward drift in ‘good’ 
degree classifications may have been due to changes in the methods of assessment and 
the result of modularisation of degree programmes (Yorke, 2002; Elton, 1998).  
 
The results from the analysis based on performance data drawn from the University of 
Brighton suggest that after controlling for a wide variety of student level characteristics 
there is possible evidence of grade inflation from the academic year 2007/08 onwards 
reinforcing the nationally based results obtained.   
 
The presence of grade inflation in UK higher education since 2008/09 is in mild 
agreement with the evidence presented in the limited UK literature on this topic. In one 
of the two unpublished papers using UK data Johnes and Soo (2013) find some 
evidence of grade inflation in all UK universities since 2011, but negative grade 
inflation in preceding years. It is unclear why there should be negative grade inflation 
and it would seem counterintuitive given the rise in the share of ‘good’ degrees over the 
period of their analysis.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
 
Since the late 1980s the funding of UK higher education became a major focus of public 
policy debate as student participation rates increased. Public subsidy to students in the 
form of maintenance grants and ‘free’ tuition were gradually replaced by maintenance 
loans and tuition fees. Funding for undergraduate teaching, through the ‘block grant,’ 
became formulaic and distributed to institutions in accordance with the number of FTE 
students they enrol and the nature of undergraduate programmes offered. Along with 
these changes there has been increasing demand for information on the participation 
rates of under-represented groups, undergraduate non-continuation rates, and graduate 
employment rates. During this period of ‘mass’ higher education VC pay, student debt, 
and grade inflation (an indication of falling education standards) in UK higher education 
have received substantial public interest. This thesis has provided an empirical analysis 
of whether recent public concern over these and related issues have some justification. 
In particular, we offer new and original evidence of the factors that are associated with 
VC pay, student debt expectations, and grade inflation, using data drawn from a variety 
of sources.  
 
The primary analysis undertaken in the second chapter empirically examined the 
relationship between VC pay and elements of a university’s ‘mission’ and financial 
performance over an eleven-year period in the UK spanning the academic years 1998/99 
to 2008/09. The data employed also allowed the examination of the influence that 
internal and external pay benchmarks exert on the pay determination process. These 
variables, it is argued, capture some of the information that remuneration committees 
utilise when determining VC pay. The results presented confirm some of the findings 
reported in earlier research on this issue. Moreover, new evidence of a relationship 
between VC pay and mission-based performance measures was detected and this 
represents a novel contribution to the literature on the determination of VC pay. 
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Specifically, the evidence presented reveals that VC pay is linked to widely published 
performance indicators, including those related to ‘widening participation’, suggesting 
that there may be scope in the setting VC pay to introduce incentive pay schemes 
aligned to these indicators.  We also find that VCs are rewarded financially for securing 
steady financial flows through funding council grants as a possible reward for sound 
financial management although the responsiveness of VC pay to this variables is fairly 
inelastic. Overall, these results provide evidence that VCs are not entirely paid like 
public sector bureaucrats but good management and furthering the institution’s mission 
is rewarded. These results reflect to some extent the predictions from agency theory 
suggesting that VCs are rewarded according to their managerial performance.  It may be 
the case, therefore, that VC pay is more merited than some of the harsher public 
criticism suggests. However, there is evidence from the estimated year effects that even 
after controlling for a rich array of observable and unobservable factors, there has been 
sizeable annual increases in real VC pay in the more recent years covered by the 
analysis that are not readily explainable. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the presence of highly paid staff impacts positively on 
VC pay and confirms the findings from previous research (Dolton and Ma, 2003; 
Tarbert, et al., 2008). Whether these results provide evidence of ‘tournaments’ in 
determining VC pay is difficult to confirm as most VCs are appointed externally. 
However, it is interesting to note that just over one-fifth of the VCs in the primary 
analysis reach their position through internal promotion. Of these, 55% VCs were 
promoted internally in ‘new’ and 45% in ‘old’ universities. This may further suggest 
that ‘tournaments’ impact positively on VC pay if internal promotion reflects success in 
a promotional contest. 
 
Remuneration committees may seek to set VC pay commensurate with the pay awards 
of VCs at comparable institutions in regard to the guidelines set by the Committee of 
Universities Chairs (2009:27). We find evidence that this is indeed the case and the 
finding in this regard is congruent with that reported by Tarbert et al. (2008). Such pay 
awards may also represent a signal of comparable quality and assist retention thus 
reducing the costly process of recruitment. Moreover, comparative pay awards may also 
be used by the remuneration committee to justify the increase in pay to relevant 
stakeholders (e.g., lecturer unions, academic staff and students). However, our results 
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reveal that that the effect is fairly inelastic suggesting that the responsiveness of the 
remuneration committee to VC pay in other comparable universities is relatively low.  
 
In the additional analysis of chapter two the relationship between VC pay and VC 
personal characteristics was examined after controlling for university specific 
characteristics over a fifteen year period from the academic year 1994/95 through 
2008/09. The results from this analysis confirm the significance of internal pay 
structures, external pay benchmark, university size, and institution growth by merger 
impacting on VC pay. However, only a few VC specific characteristics are found to 
influence pay. Specifically, after controlling for a variety of university specific 
characteristics we find some evidence that male VCs are paid more than their female 
counterparts. Whether this reflects gender discrimination in this labour market is 
difficult to discern given the small sample of female VCs. There is evidence that certain 
aspects of VC training (i.e., whether the incumbent was a former VC), and current 
employment (tenure) impacted positively on VC pay. There was little evidence that a 
VC’s previous work experience influences pay. This is all the more surprising given the 
drive to appoint a VC with commercial experience. However, there was little evidence 
of other VC characteristics impacting on pay, and we conjecture that the characteristics 
examined may be more important in determining employment than pay. The results also 
confirm the existence of substantial VC pay inflation, particularly since the academic 
year 1998/99 onwards. 
 
Modelling the relationship between CEO pay and performance in the public sector is 
not an easy task. Equally the relationship between VC pay and performance is also 
fraught with difficulties given data constraints not least because it is often difficult to 
determine what exactly constitutes ‘performance’ in higher education (e.g., income 
generation, research/teaching quality, student enrolment), and indeed what elements of 
performance are legitimately ascribed to VC effort alone. However, if more detailed 
data on internal university pay structures (such as the pay of professors or other highly 
paid staff), or if compatible performance data on other aspects of performance not 
covered in this research (such as teaching and research) becomes available, we may gain 
more fruitful insights into the pay-performance relationship. This would be a 
worthwhile avenue for further research in this area.  
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The analysis of chapter three is focused on the determinants of student expected debt in 
UK higher education using a sample of Business and Finance students within a single 
university.  We argue that such an approach using data for a single institution has the 
merit of removing the effects of inter-institution heterogeneity. However, it is 
acknowledged that some of the results presented may not be generalizable to the broader 
UK student population. Nevertheless, the quality and richness of the data permit the 
inclusion of variables that would otherwise be unavailable in national datasets. We 
believe that the analysis presented offers some stylised facts that are likely to be 
reflected in most comparable UK institutions, and take the view that the content of our 
findings potentially has broader implications. 
 
After controlling for a variety of factors the empirical analysis suggests that the receipt 
of a grant, scholarship, or bursary has no significant effect on reducing student expected 
indebtedness. This may be indicative of the fact that current levels of financial support 
are inadequate and ineffective in reducing anticipated debt and resonates with the 
findings of many recent studies and surveys on student finance and debt. This issue has 
clear policy implications and suggest that the level of public financial support should be 
raised to reduce student borrowing and hence debt. Typically students in receipt of 
public financial support are from lower socio-economic groups. If these students 
perceive such support as inadequate they may choose not to participate in higher 
education which may ultimately impact unfavourably on widening participation in UK 
higher education. This is particularly important at a time when the majority of UK 
universities increased their tuition fees to £9,000 per annum in the academic year 
2012/13. In addition there is evidence that parental financial support reduces student 
debt on a 1:1 basis. This result may suggest that students from families, who are unable 
to provide financial support (presumably from lower socio-economic groups), may 
perceive higher debt than those from better-off families, and may negatively impact on 
the policy objective of ‘widening participation’ in UK higher education.  
 
There is evidence that students anticipate a high return to their university education in 
terms of high expected earnings, which in turn contributes to higher expected debt. 
Whether or not these expectations are to be realised in the future is difficult to discern 
and may indeed be an overestimate (Jerrim, 2011). Moreover, if wage expectations are 
unfulfilled, for instance due to unforeseen shocks to the graduate labour market or 
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simply because students are ill informed on graduate wages and/or job opportunities, 
then their life choices could be severely compromised (Jerrim, 2011; Callender and 
Kemp, 2000; Purcell and Elias, 2010). Improving the quality of information on graduate 
wages and jobs may not only help to match graduates to jobs but may also help to 
moderate student wage expectations and attenuate graduate debt (Norvilitis, et al., 2003; 
Novilitis, et al., 2006). Further, we found that students who have a high discount rate 
and those with a high risk attitude are prone to higher expected debt. This is a novel 
finding for UK students and supports the findings of Oosterbeck and van de Broek 
(2009) in their study of the borrowing behaviour of Dutch students. The results 
presented also confirm the findings from previous research on student debt that a 
student’s gender, participation in term time-work, cohort year, and socio-economic 
background are associated with student anticipated debt. 
 
Robustness checks were also carried out and the results provide some confidence in the 
findings reported and the conclusions drawn. It would be interesting to see if these 
results generalize to other universities and for students on different degree programmes 
across the UK higher education sector. It would also be interesting to see if these results 
extend to A-level students contemplating higher education and whether or not their 
expectation of debt and the debt they actually incur in higher education are correlated. 
These provide fruitful avenues for further research particularly in the wake of the 2010 
Browne Report. 
 
The purpose of the final essay was to examine evidence for the presence or otherwise of 
grade inflation in UK higher education.  A true random effects methodology was 
employed to distinguish between changes in university efficiency from unobserved 
university heterogeneity. We also employed a standard random and fixed effects 
estimator to check for consistency. The results confirm some standard findings in the 
literature for instance, the importance of pre-entry scores and student region of domicile 
as important determinants of UK student performance. In the university-wide analysis 
we find no statistical evidence that female undergraduates outperform their male 
counterparts, which may reflect a fall in average female ability and motivation, as more 
females participate in higher education that are drawn from a wider ability distribution.  
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The results from the primary analysis of chapter four show that grade inflation may 
have been present in English, Welsh and Northern Irish universities since 2008/09 after 
controlling for university (technical) efficiency (which remained relatively constant 
over the sample time frame), university type, university and course characteristics and 
the characteristics of the graduating cohort. It seems plausible that the observed upward 
drift in ‘good’ degree classifications may have been due to changes in the methods of 
assessment and the result of modularisation of degree programmes (Yorke, 2002; Elton, 
1998). If grade inflation is associated with lenient marking (or changes in the curricula 
and the introduction of new methods of assessment) then it is possible that there may be 
a conscious effort by UK universities to lower the ‘hedonistic’ price by lowering 
standards to attract fee paying students. This may also reflect that the work of the QAA 
and/or the external examination system that is a central feature of determining degree 
classifications may not be as effective as it could be and this too may need re-
appraising. Our finding may suggest that employers’ concern over using UK degree 
classifications as signals of graduate ability and current government efforts to review or 
replace the current system of degree classification may not be misplaced. The results 
from the supplementary confirm some standard findings regarding student performance. 
Specifically, the evidence presented confirms the importance of a student’s age, 
ethnicity, socio-economic background, pre-entry qualifications and field of study in 
determining academic performance. Moreover, there is possible evidence of grade 
inflation from the academic year 2007/08 onwards reinforcing the nationally based 
results obtained.   
 
The presence of grade inflation in UK higher education since 2008/09 is in mild 
agreement with the evidence presented in the limited UK literature on this topic. It is 
acknowledged that the time frame used in this analysis is short, covering only seven 
recent years, and we were unable to control for important factors in the empirical 
analysis. These include a detailed description of the learning, teaching, and the 
assessment strategies employed, at the course level and a description of the individual 
characteristics of tutors over a longer time frame. The inclusion of these factors in 
future empirical analyses would be a fruitful area for future research. It would also be 
interesting, using a longer time frame, to examine the impact that the recent increase in 
student tuition fees in the UK impacts on university grading in the future. Moreover, it 
is not clear, in the UK case, how and if the introduction of a grade point average system 
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would remedy grade inflation. The availability of such suitable data in the future this 
represents one avenue for future research in this particular area.
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Appendix A1 
 
A Chronology of UK Universities to 2011 
 
Pre-1992 Universitiesa 
 
 
Ancient Universities 
 
Oxford † (1167), Cambridge† (1209), St Andrews (1413); Glasgow† 
(1451); Aberdeen (1495); Edinburgh† (1495).  
 
Civic and Red Brick 
Universities 
 
 
 
Durham†  (1832); Manchester†(1904); Birmingham†(1900); 
Liverpool†(1903); Leeds†(1904); Sheffield†(1905); Bristol†(1909); 
Queen’s Belfast†(1908); Reading‡(1924); Swansea (1920); 
Nottingham†(1948); Southampton†(1952); Hull (1954); Exeter† 
(1955); Leicester‡(1957); 
 
University of Wales Founding Constituent Colleges (1894): 
Aberystwyth; Bangor; Trinity St David (2010) - formed by a merger 
between Trinity UC and UW, Lampeter. 
 
University of London Constituent Colleges (excluding medical and 
art colleges and LBS): King’s† (1836); UCL † (1836); Royal 
Holloway‡ (1879); Queen Mary†  (1885); LSE† (1895); 
Goldsmith’s‡(1904); Imperial College† (1907); SOAS‡ (1916); 
Birkbeck‡ (1926); Institute of Education London‡ (1987).  
 
1960s Universities 
 
 
 
 
Sussex‡ (1961); Keele (1962); Newcastle†(1963 )- became 
independent from Durham; Dundee (1967); Cranfield (1969) (PG). 
 
Plateglass Universities: East Anglia‡ (1963); York† (1963); 
Lancaster‡ (1964); Strathclyde (1964); Essex‡ (1965); Kent (1965); 
Warwick† (1965); Heriot-Watt (1966); Stirling (1967); Ulster (1968). 
 
CAT: Aston (1966); Salford (1965); Bath (1966); Bradford (1966); 
Brunel (1966); Loughborough‡ (1966); Surrey (1966); Cardiff† (1966); 
City (1966);  
 
Post-1992 Universitiesb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abertay Dundee; Anglia Ruskin; Bedfordshire (2006) – formerly 
university of Luton (1992); Bournemouth; Brighton; Birmingham City 
(2007) - formerly University of Central England (1992); Central 
Lancashire; Coventry; De Montfort; Derby; East London; Glamorgan; 
Glasgow Caledonian; Greenwich; Hertfordshire; Huddersfield; 
Kingston; Leeds Met; Liverpool John Moores; Lincoln; London 
Metropolitan (2002) – formed by a merger between North London 
University (1992) and London Guildhall University (1992); 
Manchester Met; Middlesex; Napier; Northumbria; Nottingham Trent; 
Oxford Brookes; West of Scotland (2007)  – formed by a merger 
between University of Paisley (1992) and Bell College of HE); 
Plymouth; Portsmouth;; Robert Gordon; Sheffield Hallam; South 
Bank; Staffordshire; Sunderland; Teesside; West London (2010)  - 
formerly Thames Valley University (1992); UW Newport; UWI 
Cardiff; West of England; Westminster; Wolverhampton.  
 
Post-2003 Universitiesc 
 
 
Former University 
Colleges 
Bath Spa (2005); Canterbury Christ Church (2005); Chester (2005); 
Chichester (2005); Liverpool Hope (2005); Northampton (2005); 
Worcester (2005); Buckinghamshire New (2007) – formerly Bucks 
Chilts. 
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Former Colleges of HE Gloucestershire (2003); Bolton (2004); Roehampton Institute (2004); 
Southampton Solent (2005); Winchester (2005); Edge Hill (2006); 
York St John (2006); Cumbria (2007) ; Glyndwr (2008)  - formerly 
NE Wales inst. of HE;  Swansea Metropolitan (2008); 
 
Medical and Business 
Schools 
Brighton and Sussex Medical School; Institute of Cancer Research  
(PG); Hull York Medical School; London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine (PG);  Royal College of Nursing; Royal Veterinary 
College; School of Pharmacy; St Georges Hospital Medical School; 
UW College of Medicine; London Business School (PG).  
 
Colleges of Art, Music or 
Drama 
Arts UC Birmingham; Central School of Speech and Drama; 
Conservatoire for Dance and Drama; Courtauld Institute of Art; 
Edinburgh College of Art; Glasgow School of Art; Guildhall School 
of Music and Dance; Leeds College of Music; Liverpool Institute for 
the Performing Arts; Norwich UC of Arts;  Ravensbourne; Rose 
Bruford;  Royal Academy of Music; Royal College of Art; Royal 
College of Music; Royal Conservatoire of Scotland; Royal Northern 
College of Music; Royal Welsh College of Music and Drama;Trinity 
Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance; University of the Arts 
London; University for the Creative Arts (2008); UC Falmouth 
(2005).  
 
Other HE Institutionse Agricultural Colleges Harper Adams; Royal Agricultural College; 
Scottish Agricultural College; Writtle College. 
 
University Colleges: Bishop Grossetteste UC Lincoln (2006); Leeds 
Trinity UC (2009) – formerly Trinity and All Saints College; Newman 
(2007); Queen Margret UC, Edinburgh; St Mary’s UC Belfast; St 
Mary’s UC Twickenham (2007); Stranmills. 
 
HE institutions: Bretton Hall; Heythrop; St Martin’s College; 
University Campus Suffolk; University College Birmingham (2008) – 
formerly Birmingham College of Food, Tourism and Creative Studies 
 
Miscellaneous Institutions Open university (1969); University of Buckingham (1976); Institutes 
of the University of  London (e.g. advanced legal studies, 
Commonwealth studies, Germanic studies, Historical Research,  Latin 
American studies, Marine Biological station, Warburg institute). 
 
Notes: Dates in parenthesis indicate year of establishment/granted the Royal Charter where appropriate. 
‘PG’ denotes postgraduate institution. 
† Denotes the 24 universities that are members of the Russell group – large research intensive universities. 
‡ Denotes the 12 universities that are members of the 1994 group – small research intensive universities. 
(a) The classification ‘pre-1992’ is used in the text refers to the following institution types: Ancient, Civic 
and Red Brick, and the 1960s universities. Civic universities are those established between the late 19th 
century and the late 1950s. 1960s universities are those created just before and as a result of the Robbins 
Report 1963. Note that Chelsea College of Advanced Technology was later subsumed as part of Kings 
College London. 
(b) Post-1992 Universities include former Polytechnics and Higher Education Institutions that were 
granted university status shortly after the passing of Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
(c) Post-2003 received the Royal Charter from 2003 onwards and includes former university colleges 
(UC) and other higher education institutions. 
(d) Institutes that offer HE programmes but have not received full degree awarding powers by 2011.  
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Appendix A2 
 
Major Mergers within the UK Higher Education Sector 1994/95-2008/09 
 
2009-20010: 
 
University of Wales, Lampeter merged with Trinity UC to form University of Wales, Trinity St David  
in July 2010. 
 
2008-2009: 
 
Reading University merges with the Henley College of Management. 
Royal Holloway enters into collaborative agreement with St George’s Hospital University of London. 
 
2007-2008: 
 
Dartington College of Arts merged with UC Falmouth in April 2008 
Paisley University merged with Bell College HE on 1st August 2007 to form University of West 
Scotland. 
St Martin’s College and Cumbria Institute of Arts merged on 1st August 2007 to form the University of 
Cumbria. 
 
2005-2006: 
 
Trinity College of Music and Laban College of Dance merged to form Trinity Laban Conservatoire of 
Music and Dance (2005). 
 
University College for the Creative Arts formed by a merger between Kent Institute of Art and Design 
and the Surrey Institute of Art and Design in May 2005. It received the Royal Charter in 2008 and 
became the University College for the Creative Arts. 
 
2004-2005: 
 
University of the Arts London, formed by a merger between, Camberwell School of Art, Central St 
Martin’s College of Arts and Design, Chelsea College of Arts and Design, London College of 
Communication, London College of Fashion, and Wimbledon College of Art. 
 
 
2003-2004:  
 
University of Wales College of Medicine merged with Cardiff University on 1 December 2004 
UMIST merged with the Victoria University of Manchester on October 1, 2004 to form the University 
of Manchester. 
 
2002-2003:  
 
London Guildhall University and University of North London merged on 1 August 2002 to become 
London Metropolitan University.   
 
2001-2002:  
 
Northern College of Education merged with Aberdeen and Dundee Universities   
Bretton Hall College merged with University of Leeds   
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2000-2001: 
 
College of Guidance Studies merged with Canterbury Christ Church University College   
Westminster College, Oxford merged with Oxford Brookes University   
Wye College merged with Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine   
North Riding College merged with The University of Hull   
 
1999-2000:  
 
St Andrew’s College of Education merged with The University of Glasgow   
Westhill College merged with The University of Birmingham   
 
1998-99:  
 
United Medical and Dental Schools of Guy ’s and St Thomas ’s Hospitals merged with King’s College 
London   
Loughborough College of Art and Design merged with Loughborough University   
Moray House Institute of Education merged with the University of Edinburgh   
The Scottish College of Textiles merged with Heriot-Watt University   
Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine merged with University College London  
 
1997-98:  
 
Royal Postgraduate Medical School and Charring Cross and Westminster Medical School merged with 
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine   
Institute of Psychiatry merged with King’s College London   
La Sainte Union College of higher education merged with the University of Southampton  
  
1996-97: 
 
Coleg Normal merged with University College of North Wales,  
Bangor Winchester School of Art merged with the University of Southampton   
Salford College of Technology merged with the University of Salford   
 
1995-96:  
 
The British Postgraduate Medical Federation was incorporated into Imperial College of Science, 
Technology and Medicine, King ’s College London, University College London and London 
University - Senate institutes   
St.Bartholomew ’s Hospital Medical College and the London Hospital Medical College merged with 
Queen Mary and Westfield College   
 
1994-95:  
 
West London Institute of Higher Education merged with Brunel University   
The Welsh Agricultural College merged with the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth   
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art merged with The University of Dundee   
Other mergers, both within the higher education constituency and across the higher/further education 
boundary are under discussion. 
 
Source: University of Edinburgh and university websites.  
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Appendix A3 
 
Total and Average FTE HE Students in UK Higher Education 1995/96-2010/11  
(by institution type) 
 
 Number of HEIs by type Average FTE enrolments by HEI type Total FTE enrolments by HEI type 
Academic 
Year 
All 
HEIs 
Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
Post-
2003 
arts All HEIs Pre-1992 Post-1992 Post-2003 arts All 
HEIs 
Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
Post-
2003 
arts 
1995/96 157 61 41 21 23 9006 9206 12684 4605 1197 1413968 561561 520045 96710 27539 
1996/97 157 61 41 21 23 9068 9799 13701 5045 1354 1423673 597709 561752 105953 31146 
1997/98 157 61 41 21 23 9066 10141 13969 5093 1367 1423339 618627 572720 106962 31436 
1998/99 157 61 41 21 23 9161 10437 14003 5084 1413 1438204 636652 574107 106757 32489 
1999/00 157 61 41 21 23 9263 10586 13947 5330 1407 1454366 645760 571843 111921 32365 
2000/01 158 61 41 21 23 9209 10646 13882 5408 1495 1454951 649412 569143 113574 34387 
2001/02 168 61 41 22 24 8990 11155 14216 5756 1517 1510275 680485 582869 126628 36405 
2002/03 170 61 41 22 25 9275 11716 15092 5940 1484 1576763 714654 618783 130670 37092 
2003/04 169 61 41 22 24 9622 12177 15352 6258 1642 1626060 742769 629451 137669 39405 
2004/05 168 60 41 22 24 9814 12646 15630 6227 1730 1648735 758740 640830 136999 41516 
2005/06 168 59 40 22 25 9999 12981 15944 6372 1970 1679847 765900 637760 140194 49240 
2006/07 170 59 40 22 26 9969 13226 15800 6427 1986 1694659 780325 632012 141395 51631 
2007/08 166 59 40 22 22 10397 13404 16114 6619 1815 1725819 790823 644554 145626 39934 
2008/09 165 59 40 22 21 10790 13842 16687 6848 1899 1780376 816707 667484 150662 39884 
2009/10 165 59 40 22 21 11363 14501 17601 7291 2000 1874916 855571 704024 160397 41991 
2010/11 164 59 40 22 21 11537 14677 17534 7424 2061 1892048 865918 701355 163335 43289 
%-change 
1995/96-
2010/11 
     
28% 59% 38% 61% 72% 34% 54% 35% 69% 57% 
Source: Students in Higher Education (HESA (various years)) 
Notes: Post graduate institutions, medical and business schools, the Open University and small specialist colleges are excluded. 
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Appendix A4 
 
The Allocation of Teaching Funds by Price Group 
 
Public funds for teaching are allocated according to the number and type of students 
enrolled and subject mix. For the academic year 2010/11 the ‘base price’ for teaching 
was set at £3,951. Each ‘price group’ is given a weight according to their anticipated 
resource cost. There are currently 4 price groups as shown in the table below:  
 
 
Price Group Subjects  included Weighting 
A clinical stages of: medicine and dentistry and 
veterinary science 
4 
B laboratory-based subjects including: science, 
pre-clinical stages of medicine and dentistry, 
engineering and technology 
1.7 
C subjects with a studio, laboratory, or 
fieldwork element 
1.3 
D all other subjects 1 
Source: Guide to Funding. How HECFE Allocates Funds (Higher Education Funding Council for 
England, 2010, p.23). Available at: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/year/2010/201024/ [Accessed 24 10 
2012]. 
 
The base price is multiplied by the weight and the number of FTE students in each 
category and adjustments are made according to London weighting and non-completion 
rates to arrive at an overall figure for an institution’s funding for teaching or its 
‘standard resource’. Further teaching funds are also available for enrolling students from 
under-represented groups i.e., for ‘widening participation’, retention, and success. These 
extra funds accounted for 20% of the teaching funds awarded in 2010/11 (Higher 
Education Funding Council for England, 2010). Income secured from Funding Councils 
for teaching and research form a large proportion of the block grant the rest include 
funds for community engagement and infrastructure maintenance and improvement. See 
HEFCE (2010) for further details. 
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Appendix A5 
 
Media Comments on VC Pay 
 
The following articles were published in Times Higher Education (magazine) (THE): 
 
‘The Annual Pay Review: Are VCs Worth Every Penny? (March 28, 2013);  
‘Identity check: Vice-chancellors’ education and pay revealed’ (March 24, 2011);  
‘It was fun while it lasted’ (April 1, 2010). 
 
 
The following articles were published in Times Higher Education Supplement (THES):  
 
‘Large rises at top as pay dispute grips sector’ (March 10, 2006);  
‘25% wage hike for V-Cs’ (March 10, 2006);  
‘Heads enjoy 100% rise in pay over ten years’(February 25, 2005);  
‘V-C pay survey: Thriving V-Cs net 6.1% rise in wages’ (February 20, 2004);  
‘Disparity is a disgrace’ (March 1, 2002);  
‘Union fury at ‘shameless’ V-C pay rises’ (January 26, 2001);  
‘Pay rises for university chiefs more than double increases given to their staff’ (January 
26, 2001);  
‘Uni boss’s pay top £250,000’ (January 28, 2000);  
‘Union envy 4.8% rise’ (February 5, 1999); 
‘Institution chief’s pay rise’ (February 6, 1998);  
‘More v-cs get six appeal’ (February 7, 1997);  
‘Pay watch for vice chancellors’ (February 9, 1996);  
Vice chancellor’s pay’ (March 24, 1995).  
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Appendix A6 
 
UK Undergraduate (Bachelors) Degree Classification 
 
Degree Class Thresholds across contributory assessments 
1. First Class with honours (1st) ≈ 70%+ 
2. Upper Second with honours (2:1) ≈ 60-69% 
3. Lower Second with honours (2:2) ≈ 50-59% 
4. Third class with honours (3rd) ≈ 40-49% 
5. Pass or ordinary degree without honours ≈30-39% 
6. Fail or unclassified degree < 30% 
Source: Barrow, Reilly, and Woodford (2009) 
Notes: 
a) Across universities there may be some variation in the thresholds that delineate the degree class but 
in general degree classifications are awarded according to the scheme presented above with the award 
of a first class honours degree ranked the highest. Universities in Scotland often awarded students 
ordinary degrees after three years of study and honour degrees are awarded to students who 
satisfactorily complete a further year of study. 
b) The University of Cambridge may award a ‘double first’ which means that a first class was 
achieved in two sets of examinations corresponding to two different parts of the Triposes system. 
c) Aegrotat degrees are sometimes awarded to students who for reasons of illness or death were unable 
sit their final examinations or assessments. They are honour or pass degrees without classification. 
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Appendix A7 
 
Media Comments on Grade Inflation 
 
 
‘Universities fix results in 'race for firsts'’ (The Telegraph, July 15, 2013); 
‘How to get a first-class degree’ (The Telegraph, February 19, 2013);  
‘British universities bend their rules to award more firsts’ (The Sunday Times, July 13, 
2013);  
‘Top jobs 'restricted to graduates with first-class degrees' (The Telegraph, July 4, 2012);  
‘University marking to be reviewed over grade inflation fears’ (The Guardian, 
September 10, 2009); 
’Bursting bubbles; education standards’ (The Economist, September 29, 2007);  
‘Degree grades ‘are too crude’’ (Times Higher Education, May 7, 2004); ‘ 
‘Grade expectations: university exams’ (The Economist, March 20, 2004);  
‘Tear up the class system’ (The Guardian, October 14, 2003); 
 ‘Rise in good degrees not just grade inflation’ (Times Higher Education, March 29, 
2002). 
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Appendix A8 
 
Number of All Graduates in Each Degree Class 1994/95-2011/12 
 
year 
Total First 
Degrees 
‘Good’ 
Degree 
First 
class 
Upper 
second 
Lower 
second 
Third 
class Pass 
1994/95 237798 112511 16687 95824 82898 13770 27874 
1995/96 251248 120025 17305 102720 89146 13536 28541 
1996/97 255260 123028 18079 104949 90802 22190 19240 
1997/98 258753 128060 19472 108588 89491 21205 18158 
1998/99 263671 132479 20728 111751 92048 20829 18315 
1999/00 265270 135510 21770 113740 90300 20110 19350 
2000/01 272660 142560 24095 118465 89750 21150 19205 
2001/02 274440 147695 26455 121240 86650 19625 20475 
2002/03 282380 152430 28635 123795 88260 20670 21010 
2003/04 292090 158110 30175 127935 90470 20785 22725 
2004/05 306365 165235 32465 132770 92605 22285 26235 
2005/06 315985 172060 34825 137235 94265 22850 26815 
2006/07 319260 175390 36645 138745 92795 23195 27880 
2007/08 334890 189415 41150 148265 95145 23990 26255 
2008/09 333725 191485 43125 148360 93030 23800 25325 
2009/10 350860 203780 46830 156950 96970 24455 25540 
2010/11 369010 219305 53210 166095 99210 24825 25535 
2011/12 390985 240030 61605 178425 100310 23935 26715 
% change  
      1994/95-2011/12 113.34 269.18 86.20 21.00 73.82 -4.16
1994/95-2001/02 31.27 58.54 26.52 4.53 42.52 -26.54 
2001/02-2006/07 18.75 38.52 14.44 7.09 18.19 36.17 
2006/07-2011/12 36.855 68.11 28.59 8.10 3.19 -4.18 
Notes to table: 
(a) The figures quoted include both UK and non-UK domiciled students graduating from all UK 
university types excluding post-graduate institutions. 
(b) Data were collected from the Higher Education Statistical Agency, available at: 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/content/view/1973/239/. Accessed 28/7/2013. 
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Appendix B1 
 
Data Sources 
 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE, various years). Accessed at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=13101 
 
Halifax House Price Data (average UK county level house price). Accessed at 
http://www.hbosplc.com/economy/HistoricalDataSpreadsheet.asp 
 
Higher Education Performance Indicators.  
Accessed at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/learning/perfind/default.asp for 1996/97 to 2001/02 
and at www.hesa.ac.uk/pi/ for 2002/03 to 2008/09 
 
Higher Education Statistical Agency, (1994/95-2008/09). Reference Volume: 
STUDENTS in Higher Education Institutions. Cheltenham: HESA. 
 
Higher Education Statistical Agency, (1994/95-2008/09). Reference Volume: 
RESOURCES of Higher Education Institutions, Cheltenham: HESA. 
 
International Who’s Who (various years), London: Europa Publications Limited. 
 
Times Higher Education Supplement (THES). Vice Chancellors’ Salary Data accessed 
at http://www.thes.co.uk/statistics/ 
 
Who’s Who (1993-2010). An Annual Biography, London: A and C Black,  
 
Who’s Who (various years), Vice-Chancellors, Presidents, Principals, Rectors, The 
Association of Commonwealth Universities, London: ACU. 
 
Who’s Who in British Art (various years), Andover: Art Trade Press 
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Appendix B2 
 
VC Pay by Institution Type 1994/95-2008/09 (£ in 1998 prices) 
All HEIs Including Arts Colleges 
 
Academic 
Year 
Pre-1992 
university 
Post-1992 
university 
Post-2003 
university 
Colleges of the  
‘Arts’ 
 Mean Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
1994/95 102,173 
(15,144) 
101,607 103,685 
(14,185) 
100,515 78,657 
(12,022) 
76,859 75,841 
(21,050) 
69,774 
1995/96 106,667 
(15,237) 
105,983 106,729 
(14,714) 
102,728 82,225 
(14,320) 
76,957 75,827 
(23,031) 
67,426 
1996/97 110,475 
(15,241) 
111,703 108,092 
(13,249) 
105,497 82,941 
(14,613) 
76,958 76,846 
(19,082) 
70,280 
1997/98 112,034 
(16,115) 
113,000 107,029 
(11,519) 
104,727 83,222 
(13,639) 
82,000 76,399 
(18,735) 
69,698 
1998/99 116,970 
(18,119) 
115,231 110,041 
(11,599) 
107,352 85,164 
(16,805) 
86,634 80,741 
(19,488) 
74,124 
1999/00 119,695 
(17,504) 
118,612 113,370 
(11344) 
111,916 88,038 
(13,284) 
86,567 83,579 
(20,225) 
77,719 
2000/01 127,399 
(27,218) 
123,138 121,240 
(16,272) 
120,318 88,157 
(15,058) 
88,970 87,515 
(23,060) 
82,519 
2001/02 132,079 
(22,638) 
128,508 124,947 
(13,005) 
122,961 94,617 
(13,241) 
94,301 88,906 
(18,621) 
87,182 
2002/03 138,881 
(27,305) 
129,385 130,309 
(13,245) 
128,487 96,472 
(12,292) 
92,547 92,077 
(21,220) 
88,772 
2003/04 145,819 
(28,686) 
140,476 132,768 
(17,532) 
130,006 102,523 
(14,590) 
102,346 94,406 
(20,866) 
93,065 
2004/05 154,516 
(30,748) 
150,173 136,174 
(19,568) 
135,791 107,269 
(15,217) 
108,763 97,019 
(22,080) 
91,921 
2005/06 159,387 
(28,236) 
158,706 142,209 
(16,976) 
139,793 112,327 
(16,561) 
114,428 98,278 
(21,543) 
94,784 
2006/07 160,451 
(28,062) 
160,850 147,956 
(24,587) 
143,021 115,903 
(17,169) 
115,906 105,932 
(25,223) 
96,736 
2007/08 170,031 
(33,149) 
169,877 155,433 
(21,830) 
146,804 117,583 
(17,648) 
119,065 116,635 
(39,063) 
100,735 
2008/09 183,209 
(30,920) 
181,423 163,792 
(22,300) 
158,559 131,736 
(23,447) 
129,588 119,858 
(31,764) 
123,871 
% Change 79.3  57.9  67.5  58.1  
Mean pay 
1994-2009 
135,985 
(34,429) 129,925 
126,918 
(24,829) 124,000 
97,837 
(21,949) 95,654 
90,003 
(25,346) 83,438 
Institutions 
Institutions (%) 
VCs 
Observations 
55 
40.4 
141 
825 
 
39 
28.7 
92 
585 
 
23 
(16.9) 
57 
345 
 
19 
(14.0) 
35 
268 
 
Notes : Standard deviations are in parentheses 
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Appendix B3 
 
VC Average Pay by Gender 1994/95 to 2008/09 (£ in 1998 prices) 
 
   Male Pay Female Pay 
Year N Male 
(%) 
n Mean St. 
Dev 
Median Min Max n Mean St. 
Dev 
Median Min Max 
1994/95 136 94 128 95,257 18,946 97,604 54,628 141,117 8 90,402 23,643 89,043 61,131 136,570 
1995/96 136 93 127 98,574 20,512 100,279 58,049 152,145 9 94,287 20,149 91,744 61,289 135,483 
1996/97 136 92 125 101,232 20,188 102,141 61,023 149,671 11 91,959 20,259 92,051 60,402 134,457 
1997/98 136 92 125 101,423 20,191 103,000 60,000 147,000 11 93,691 21,775 93,000 61,000 139,000 
1998/99 136 92 125 105,515 21,852 105,382 49,227 180,469 11 93,900 20,253 94,548 63,033 138,869 
1999/00 136 90 123 108,717 21,220 108,089 60,262 154,004 13 96,135 19,503 95,654 66,002 140,612 
2000/01 136 89 121 115,492 27,866 111,858 50,759 236,877 15 96,787 22,361 91,836 60,253 144,758 
2001/02 136 88 119 119,714 24,860 119,262 73,499 201,545 17 103,677 22,926 104,470 68,414 154,395 
2002/03 136 88 119 124,681 28,254 123,095 74,217 225,526 17 109,185 25,419 112,313 70,982 159,935 
2003/04 136 86 117 129,982 30,085 129,133 74,522 227,728 19 113,159 26,897 115,173 71,547 165,779 
2004/05 136 86 117 135,545 33,160 135,750 63,633 237,563 19 119,539 26,367 123,871 72,117 171,384 
2005/06 136 85 116 139,775 31,835 139,381 77,297 238,471 20 128,171 31,974 128,404 72,363 193,243 
2006/07 131 84 110 144,261 31,355 143,109 80,855 243,640 21 136,918 36,038 133,253 79,636 239,698 
2007/08 131 83 109 153,262 36,668 147,884 79,630 266,716 22 138,423 29,108 142,046 83,313 194,145 
2008/09 129 83 108 164,509 36,350 161,223 82,289 261,463 22 149,339 29,403 150,516 91,637 205,054 
% 
change 
  -15.6 72.7 91.9 65.2 50.6 85.3 175.0 65.2 24.4 69.0 49.9 50.1 
N /  
Mean 2023 88.8 121,454
 121,454 34,003 117,523 49,227 266,716 235 115,564 32,426 113,715 60,253 239,698 
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Appendix B4 
 
Variable Definitions: University Characteristics 
 
Variable1 Definition of variable a 
University Mission and Financial Performance Variables  
 
Merger/expansion Dummy variable 1 = Successful merger, zero otherwise 
 
Hit benchmark for comprehensive 
schooled students 
Dummy variable 1 = hit benchmark for comprehensive 
students, zero otherwise 
 
Hit benchmark for students from low 
participation areas b 
Dummy variable 1 = hit benchmark for students from low 
participation areas, (areas from which university participation 
in less than 2/3 of the national average), zero otherwise 
 
(ln) Funding Council Grants Natural log of real grants from all UK funding councils, and 
include block grants for general teaching and research, and 
capital grants.  
 
(ln) Tuition fees c  Natural log of real fees for full-time/part-time, degree and 
sandwich degree, diploma and other HE credit-bearing and 
non credit-bearing courses for UK and non-UK domiciled 
students.  
 
(ln) Research grants and contracts Natural log of real income from externally non-government 
sponsored research, and income from UK research councils 
and other non-UK sources. 
 
University Size Variables 
 
#Cost Centres Number of cost centres 
(ln) FTE students Natural logarithm of all FTE students in year of observation. 
 
Institution Hierarchical Structure 
  
Proportion of senior academic staff Proportion of senior academic staff to all academic staff 
 
Proportion of professors Proportion of professors to all academic staff 
 
Proportion of Staff Remunerated > 
70k 
Total FTE staff (academic/non academic, excluding the VC) 
remunerated £70,000 per annum or more to all FTE staff.  
 
 
Other Contextual Variables 
 
 
Average Regional House Prices Natural   log of real average county level house prices (Halifax 
House Price Index, Halifax PLC) in year of observation 
 
Notes: 
(a) All financial variables are in real terms (1998=100). 
(b) Areas for which the participation rate is less than two-thirds of the UK average rate are defined as 
low-participation neighbourhoods. Students are allocated to these neighbourhoods on the basis of 
their postcodes. 
(c) This also includes education grants and contracts. 
235 
 
 
 
Appendix B5 
 
Variable Definitions: VC Personal Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition 
Male = 1 if Male. Zero otherwise. 
Age   Age in years (year of observation minus year of birth). 
Age <=55  = 1 if VC is 55 years of age or younger in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Age 56 to 60 = 1 if VC is aged 56 to 60 in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Age >=60 = 1 if VC is aged 61 or over in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Education Background  
 School Attended Categorical variables 
Public School = 1 if attended a public school.  Zero otherwise. 
Grammar School = 1 if attended a grammar school. Zero otherwise. 
Secondary Modern = 1 if attended a secondary modern. Zero otherwise. 
Other   = 1 if attended another type of school including technical colleges    and 
ecclesiastical colleges. Zero otherwise. 
Overseas educated = 1 if schooled overseas.  Zero otherwise. 
Type of University Attended Categorical variables 
Ancient/Civic = 1 if attended either an ancient (medieval) university (excluding Oxford and 
Cambridge) or a civic ‘red brick’ university (i.e. universities established in late 
19th Century to late 1950s) as an undergraduate or postgraduate.  Zero otherwise. 
London = 1 if attended a London University College as an undergraduate or postgraduate. 
Zero otherwise. 
1960s = 1 if attended a university created in 1960s or a former College of Advanced 
Technology as an undergraduate or postgraduate.  Zero otherwise. 
Polytechnic = 1 if attended an ex-polytechnic (post-1992 university) as an undergraduate or 
postgraduate. Zero otherwise. 
Overseas = 1 if attended a foreign university as an undergraduate or postgraduate.  Zero 
otherwise. 
Other = 1 if attended another HE institution including: art college, teacher training 
institution, specialist PG institutions, etc. This classification also includes the 
Open University. Zero otherwise 
Oxford/Cambridge = 1 if educated at an Oxford/Cambridge College (postgraduate or    
    undergraduate) Zero otherwise. 
Academic Specialism Categorical variables 
Engineering = 1 if engineer (or related disciplines e.g. urban planner or computer technologist). 
Zero otherwise. 
Social Science = 1 if social scientist (historian, philosopher, sociologist, economist (or from 
business/finance), lawyer, educationalist). Zero otherwise. 
Arts = 1 if fine/modern artist, musician, dramatist, linguist, language scholar.  Zero 
otherwise. 
Natural Science = 1 if biologist, chemist, physicist, geologist, mathematician/statistician or with 
background in medical/ veterinary related disciplines. Zero otherwise. 
Doctoral Degree 
 
= 1 if a PhD or equivalent (e.g. MD, DSci) is held in year of observation. Zero 
otherwise. 
Academic and Public Esteem  
Professor = 1 professorship awarded in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Honorary degree = 1 if honorary degree awarded in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
FRS = 1 granted fellowship of Royal Society in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Knighthood = 1 if granted Knighthood year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
Career History and Training  
Previous work experience Categorical variables indicating VCs’ recent employment history (ten years prior to 
the incumbents current appointment) by employment type. 
Civil Service = 1 if previously employed in civil service, excluding Dept. of Education. Zero 
otherwise. 
Education = 1 if previously employed by official public education bodies e.g. DfES, HEFC, 
QCA etc.  Zero otherwise. 
Industry  = 1 if previously employed in the private sector with managerial and/or research 
responsibility. Zero otherwise. 
Academia = 1 if previously employed in the HE sector as lecturer, senior lecturer, or professor. 
Zero otherwise. 
Training  
Ex VC = 1 if previously appointed as a  Vice Chancellor, Principal, Rector; Director, 
Provosts or equivalent in another HE institution. Zero otherwise. 
Pro VC = 1 if previously appointed as a Pro Vice Chancellor, Assistant Principal, Deputy 
Director or equivalent. Zero otherwise. 
Current Employment  
New Appointment = 1 if appointed in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
External Appointment = 1 if externally appointed to current post in year of observation.  Zero otherwise. 
Tenure (years) Years in current post (year of observation minus year of appointment) 
Tenure expired (years) = 1 if contract expired in year of observation. Zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B6 
 
VC Gender, Age, and Age at Appointment 1994/95-2008/09 by Institution Type (including Heads of Colleges of the Arts) 
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables are reported in parentheses. The number of observations is reported in italics. 
 ALL VCs (i) VCs of Pre-1992 (ii) VCs of Post-1992 (iii) VCs of Post-2003 (iv) Heads of Arts colleges (v) 
Year 
 
n Male 
(%) 
Age 
(App) 
Age 
(years) 
n Male 
(%) 
Age  
(App) 
Age 
(years) 
n Male 
(%) 
Age 
(App) 
Age 
(years) 
n Male 
(%) 
Age  
(App) 
Age 
(years) 
n Male 
(%) 
Age  
(App) 
Age 
(years) 
1994/95 
 
117 
 
94 
 
50.75 
(5.17) 
56.35 
(5.47) 
55 
 
98 
 
52.93 
(4.12) 
57.56 
(4.76) 
39 
 
90 
 
48.51 
(5.08) 
54.74 
(5.07) 
23 
 
91 
 
49.34 
(5.69) 
56.17 
(7.02) 
19 
 
95 
 
47.79 
(5.39) 
53.16 
(6.88) 
1995/96 
 
117 
 
93 
 
50.62 
(4.99) 
56.32 
(5.11) 
55 
 
96 
 
52.78 
(4.10) 
57.47 
(4.55) 
39 
 
90 
 
48.21 
(4.45) 
55.03 
(4.53) 
23 
 
91 
 
49.56 
(5.73) 
55.73 
(6.69) 
19 
 
95 
 
48.00 
(5.49) 
53.68 
(6.78) 
1996/97 
 
117 
 
91 
 
50.67 
(4.94) 
56.14 
(5.04) 
55 
 
96 
 
52.76 
(4.09) 
57.73 
(4.20) 
39 
 
90 
 
48.28 
(4.48) 
55.51 
(4.47) 
23 
 
83 
 
49.69 
(5.55) 
55.35 
(6.14) 
19 
 
95 
 
48.95 
(5.92) 
53.79 
(5.86) 
1997/98 
 
117 
 
91 
 
50.79 
(4.67) 
56.16 
(5.87) 
55 
 
98 
 
52.65 
(4.54) 
57.67 
(4.65) 
39 
 
87 
 
49.00 
(4.52) 
55.41 
(3.96) 
23 
 
83 
 
49.39 
(5.26) 
53.64 
(5.73) 
19 
 
95 
 
48.94 
(5.72) 
54.10 
(5.76) 
1998/99 
 
117 
 
91 
 
51.49 
(4.83) 
56.72 
(4.58) 
55 
 
98 
 
53.00 
(4.05) 
57.89 
(4.06) 
39 
 
87 
 
50.46 
(5.12) 
56.49 
(4.35) 
23 
 
83 
 
49.61 
(5.09) 
54.30 
(5.29) 
19 
 
95 
 
48.94 
(5.72) 
54.10 
(5.76) 
1999/00 
 
117 
 
90 
 
51.38 
(4.72) 
57.05 
(4.53) 
55 
 
98 
 
52.91 
(4.09) 
58.25 
(4.26) 
39 
 
87 
 
50.26 
(4.76) 
56.97 
(4.00) 
23 
 
74 
 
49.61 
(5.10) 
54.48 
(5.07) 
19 
 
95 
 
48.94 
(5.72) 
54.10 
(5.76) 
2000/01 
 
117 
 
89 
 
51.57 
(4.82) 
57.31 
(4.54) 
55 
 
98 
 
53.22 
(4.32) 
58.42 
(4.09) 
39 
 
87 
 
50.59 
(4.91) 
57.41 
(4.52) 
23 
 
70 
 
49.30 
(4.62) 
54.47 
(4.57) 
19 
 
89 
 
49.05 
(4.75) 
55.21 
(4.55) 
2001/02 
 
117 
 
87 
 
51.99 
(4.80) 
57.49 
(4.67) 
55 
 
96 
 
53.91 
(4.03) 
58.36 
(3.98) 
39 
 
87 
 
50.82 
(4.87) 
57.72 
(4.27) 
23 
 
65 
 
49.39 
(4.69) 
55.04 
(4.18) 
19 
 
89 
 
49.21 
(4.28) 
55.05 
(3.37) 
2002/03 
 
117 
 
87 
 
52.01 
(5.15) 
57.63 
(4.66) 
55 
 
95 
 
53.65 
(4.80) 
58.15 
(5.00) 
39 
 
85 
 
51.03 
(5.10) 
58.31 
(4.14) 
23 
 
74 
 
49.74 
(4.95) 
55.26 
(4.00) 
19 
 
89 
 
49.21 
(4.28) 
55.05 
(3.37) 
2003/04 
 
117 
 
85 
 
51.95 
(4.53) 
57.28 
(4.21) 
55 
 
91 
 
53.00 
(4.06) 
57.33 
(4.53) 
39 
 
85 
 
51.51 
(5.00) 
57.95 
(3.85) 
23 
 
74 
 
50.17 
(4.23) 
56.04 
(3.84) 
19 
 
89 
 
49.21 
(4.28) 
57.05 
(3.37) 
2004/05 
 
117 
 
85 
 
52.18 
(4.56) 
57.69 
(4.07) 
55 
 
91 
 
53.25 
(4.15) 
57.67 
(4.35) 
39 
 
82 
 
51.82 
(4.99) 
58.21 
(3.64) 
23 
 
78 
 
50.26 
(4.19) 
56.86 
(4.11) 
19 
 
89 
 
49.47 
(3.89) 
57.74 
(4.08) 
2005/06 
 
117 
 
84 
 
52.53 
(4.38) 
57.82 
(4.09) 
55 
 
91 
 
53.56 
(3.98) 
58.33 
(4.14) 
39 
 
82 
 
52.67 
(4.44) 
58.00 
(3.76) 
23 
 
69 
 
49.82 
(4.18) 
56.30 
(4.32) 
19 
 
95 
 
49.68 
(4.13) 
58.31 
(3.80) 
2006/07 
 
117 
 
83 
 
52.69 
(4.08) 
58.28 
(4.07) 
55 
 
89 
 
53.51 
(3.68) 
58.64 
(4.26) 
39 
 
82 
 
52.69 
(4.43) 
58.72 
(3.65) 
23 
 
70 
 
50.74 
(3.91) 
56.70 
(4.06) 
14 
 
93 
 
51.29 
(5.18) 
58.50 
(4.07) 
2007/08 
 
117 
 
82 
 
52.64 
(3.85) 
57.94 
(4.20) 
55 
 
87 
 
53.36 
(3.60) 
58.45 
(4.20) 
39 
 
82 
 
52.67 
(3.90) 
57.95 
(4.35) 
23 
 
70 
 
50.87 
(3.97) 
56.74 
(3.88) 
14 
 
93 
 
51.29 
(5.18) 
59.50 
(4.07) 
2008/09 
 
117 
 
82 
 
52.82 
(4.11) 
58.63 
(4.36) 
55 
 
87 
 
53.98 
(4.00) 
59.20 
(4.39) 
39 
 
82 
 
52.36 
(3.86) 
58.36 
(4.57) 
23 
 
70 
 
50.83 
(4.00) 
57.74 
(3.88) 
12 
 
92 
 
51.41 
(5.45) 
58.83 
(5.25) 
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Appendix B7 
 
VC Academic Background 1994/95 to 2008/09 (% of All VCs ex heads of colleges of the ‘Arts’) 
Notes : See appendix B2 for definitions of categories. 
Year N 
(i) University Attended as Undergraduate (UG) and Postgraduate (PG)  (ii) Academic Specialism  
Oxbridge Ancient/ Civic London 
 
1960s 
(Plateglass/ 
CAT) 
Polytechnic Overseas Other 
Na
tu
ra
l 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
En
gi
ne
er
 
So
ci
al
 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
Ar
ts
 
Ph
D
 
UG PG UG PG UG PG UG PG UG PG UG PG UG PG 
1994/95 117 27.3 22.2 47.0 42.7 15.4 17.9 3.4 8.5 0.8 1.7 2.5 6.8 0.8 0.0 36.7 13.7 45.3 4.3 68.4 
1995/96 117 27.3 23.1 46.1 42.7 15.4 16.2 3.4 9.4 0.8 1.7 3.5 6.8 0.8 0.0 36.7 14.5 43.7 5.1 68.4 
1996/97 117 27.3 23.1 46.1 41.9 14.5 16.2 3.4 9.4 2.5 1.7 3.4 6.8 0.8 0.0 35.1 14.5 45.3 5.1 67.5 
1997/98 117 29.9 27.3 41.9 41.9 12.0 12.8 5.1 11.1 2.5 1.7 5.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 32.5 12.0 50.4 5.1 67.5 
1998/99 117 29.0 25.6 41.0 40.2 13.7 16.2 5.1 11.1 2.5 1.7 4.3 5.1 0.8 0.0 35.0 10.3 50.4 4.3 69.2 
1999/00 117 26.5 24.7 42.7 39.3 13.7 17.1 6.0 11.9 2.5 1.7 4.3 5.1 1.7 0.0 35.0 10.3 49.6 5.1 70.1 
2000/01 117 24.8 25.6 41.9 38.5 12.8 17.1 6.0 11.1 4.3 3.4 6.0 4.3 1.7 0.0 32.6 11.1 50.4 5.9 72.6 
2001/02 117 22.2 23.1 43.6 41.0 13.7 17.9 5.1 10.2 4.2 3.4 6.8 4.3 1.7 0.0 29.9 13.7 49.6 6.8 74.4 
2002/03 117 22.2 23.9 41.9 38.5 13.7 17.1 6.0 12.8 5.1 3.4 6.8 4.3 1.7 0.0 30.8 12.0 50.4 6.8 77.8 
2003/04 117 22.2 20.5 41.0 37.6 16.2 21.4 6.0 11.1 5.1 4.2 5.1 5.1 1.7 0.0 30.8 12.9 50.4 5.9 76.1 
2004/05 117 21.4 20.5 39.3 40.1 15.4 17.9 6.8 12.8 5.1 3.4 7.7 5.1 1.7 0.0 30.8 12.9 51.2 5.1 76.1 
2005/06 117 20.5 17.9 40.2 40.1 13.6 17.9 8.5 16.2 6.0 5.1 6.0 2.5 1.7 0.0 31.6 12.0 52.1 4.3 79.5 
2006/07 117 21.4 17.9 41.8 39.3 14.5 17.1 8.0 17.1 6.0 6.0 5.1 2.5 0.8 0.0 31.6 10.3 53.8 4.3 80.3 
2007/08 117 19.6 17.1 44.4 48.4 11.9 17.9 6.0 17.9 8.5 6.0 5.1 2.5 0.8 0.0 31.6 9.4 51.3 7.7 82.0 
2008/09 117 19.6 15.4 41.8 37.6 11.9 18.8 7.7 19.7 9.4 6.0 5.1 2.5 0.8 0.0 32.5 8.5 51.3 7.7 83.8 
% 
change n/a -28.2 -30.6 -11.1 -11.9 -22.7 5.0 126.5 131.8 1075 252.9 104.0 -63.2 0.00 0.00 -11.4 -37.9 13.2 79.0 22.5 
N / 
Mean  1755 24.1 22.0 44.7 40.2 13.9 17.3 6.7 12.7 4.2 3.5 5.1 4.3 1.3 0.00 32.9 11.8 49.7 5.6 74.2 
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Appendix B8 
 
Esteem, Work Experience, Training and Tenure All VCs (ex. Heads of Colleges of the Arts) 1994/95 - 2008/09 
  (i) Esteem and Public Honours (%) (ii) Work Experience (%) (iii) Training and Tenure  
Year N 
pr
of
es
so
r 
H
on
or
ar
y 
 
D
eg
re
e 
Fe
llo
w
 o
f t
he
 
R
oy
al
 S
oc
ie
ty
 
K
ni
gh
te
d 
C
iv
il 
Se
rv
an
t 
D
ep
t. 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
 
In
du
st
ry
 
 
A
ca
de
m
ia
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t (
%
) 
Fo
rm
er
 V
ic
e 
C
ha
nc
el
lo
r  
(%
) 
Fo
rm
er
   
   
 P
ro
-
V
ic
e 
C
ha
nc
el
lo
r 
(%
)  
Te
nu
re
 in
 y
ea
rs
 
(s
.d
) 
A
pp
oi
nt
m
en
t 
ex
pi
re
d 
(%
) 
1994/95 117 82.9 50.4 11.1 13.7 7.7 1.7 4.3 86.3 69.8 7.35 31.6 8.5 (5.33) 10.2 
1995/96 117 87.2 50.4 11.9 13.7 8.5 1.7 4.3 85.5 69.8 6.62 33.3 10.56 (6.94) 7.6 
1996/97 117 87.2 50.4 11.9 14.5   10.2 2.5 2.5 84.8 60.7 5.88 34.2 8.38 (5.03) 17.9 
1997/98 117 88.9 52.9 10.2 11.9 8.6 1.7 2.5 87.2 64.1 6.62 38.4 9.69 (4.66) 11.1 
1998/99 117 88.0 49.6 10.2 13.7 9.4 1.7 1.7 87.2 69.2 5.89 41.0 7.50 (4.69) 6.8 
1999/00 117 88.0 49.6 10.2 14.5 9.4 1.7 2.5 86.4 68.4 6.62 42.7 7.64 (3.43) 11.9 
2000/01 117 86.3 51.3 8.5 16.2 8.5 1.7 3.4 86.4 72.6 7.35 47.9 8.50 (3.95) 13.6 
2001/02 117 86.3 52.1 6.8 14.5 7.6 1.7 4.3 86.4 75.2 11.0 48.7 7.43 (3.10) 11.9 
2002/03 117 87.2 52.9 6.8 11.9 6.8 1.7 5.1 86.4 73.5 11.0 50.4 8.11 (4.30) 15.4 
2003/04 117 85.5 47.0 4.3 12.8 7.7 0.8 5.1 86.4 74.4 9.56 53.0 9.50 (4.48) 8.5 
2004/05 117 86.3 42.7 4.3   9.4 7.7 0.8 5.1 86.4 78.7 11.0 53.0 8.37 (4.74) 13.6 
2005/06 117 87.2 39.3 4.3 7.7 7.7 1.7 5.9 84.7 80.3 10.3 53.8 10.00 (5.83) 5.9 
2006/07 117 88.0 35.9 5.1 8.5 7.7 1.7 5.1 85.5 82.9 11.5 53.0 8.28 (4.58) 15.3 
2007/08 117 88.0 29.0 5.1 6.8 6.0 0.8 5.1 88.1 83.8 13.0 54.7 7.00 (5.58) 6.8 
2008/09 117 88.9 29.0 5.1 7.7 6.0 0.8 4.3 88.9 82.0 15.4 55.6 6.41 (3.53) 14.5 
% change n/a 7.7 -42.5 -54.1 -43.8 -22.1 -52.9 0.0 3.0 17.5 
109.
5 75.9  n/a 
N / Mean 1755 87.0 45.5 7.7 11.8 8.0 1.5 4.1 86.4 72.3 9.4 52.0 8.3 (4.57) 11.4 
Notes :  See appendix B2 for definitions of categories. Figures for Tenure are for those VCs who completed their term in office 
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Appendix C1 
 
UK Student Loans and Grants 1962 to 2010 
1962/63 Mandatory maintenance grants are introduced for students to cover tuition fees and 
living costs, following the publication of the Robbins report  
1980 Student grants are increased from £380 to £1,430.  
1984 The then Conservative Education Secretary Keith Joseph abandons plans for parents 
to be made to contribute to tuition fees.  
1989/91 The Government freeze grants and introduce student loans, following the publication 
of the 1990 Higher Education Act. Grants of up to £2,265 remain available for poorer 
students, while loans of up to £420 are on offer to all applicants.  
1996 John Major, the then Conservative prime minister, commissions Lord Dearing to 
make recommendations on higher education funding.  
1997 Labour is elected on a manifesto which includes a commitment to ensure that "the 
costs of student maintenance should be repaid by graduates on an income-related 
basis ..."  
 
The Dearing report is published. It recommends that students should pay 
approximately 25 per cent of the cost of tuition but that government grants should 
remain in place.  
 
David Blunkett, the then Labour Education Secretary, announces the introduction of 
£1,000 tuition fees to be paid by every student in each year of study, beginning in 
September 1998. The student grant of £1,710 is abolished to be replaced by means-
tested student loans.  
1998 The Teaching and Higher Education Act is passed into law – setting an annual tuition 
fee for England of £1,000. Means testing means a third of students will not pay 
anything.  
1999 A committee led by Lord Cubie begins a comprehensive review of higher education 
funding in Scotland. The Cubie report recommends in December that tuition fees in 
Scotland should be scrapped and the Scottish executive should fund higher education 
in full. Students would be required to pay £3,000 of it back when their earnings 
reached £25,000 a year.  
2000 The Scottish executive accepts Lord Cubie’s proposals, with one adjustment. 
Students in Scotland must now pay back £2,000, not £3,000, but repayments start 
once earnings reach just £10,000 – way below the £25,000 recommended.  
2001 Labour is re-elected with a manifesto pledge that it "will not introduce top-up fees 
and has legislated against them".  
2002 More than 80 Labour backbenchers support calls to scrap tuition fees.  
2003 Less than two years after pledging not to introduce top-up fees, the Labour 
government publishes a white paper setting out proposals to allow universities to set 
their own tuition fees up to a cap of £3,000 a year. The fees were to be repaid once 
graduates earn above £15,000 and will be accompanied by a means-tested package of 
support. 
 
Tony Blair faces his biggest backbench rebellion as prime minister in a vote on top-
up fees, with 72 Labour MPs voting against the motion. He wins by five votes. The 
government announces a full-scale independent review of the top-up fees system 
after three years in a bid to head off the rebels.  
 
Iain Duncan Smith, the Conservative leader, pledges that all university tuition fees 
would be abolished under a future Tory government and condemning the fees as "a 
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tax on learning".  
2004 Charles Clarke, the Labour Education Secretary, stands by his plans to introduce 
variable tuition fees but presents a series of concessions to Labour rebels in a bid to 
avoid defeat in the Commons vote on January 27.  
 
Amendments to the bill include an increase in the maintenance grant for the poorest 
30 per cent of students from £1,000 to £1,500. There will be an independent review 
of the £3,000 fee cap after three years. Student loans will be increased to meet the 
real cost of living, and all student debt will be written off after 25 years.  
2005 Almost all universities set fees at the maximum level of £3,000 per year, while 
about eight out of 10 offer bursaries to students from low-income families.  
2006 Students starting university in the autumn become the first to be charged the 
higher £3,000 fees. Universities say they still need £1.3bn in extra funding. 
Conservative leader, David Cameron, says tuition fees are unavoidable. "The 
money's got to come from somewhere."  
2008 The National Union of Students drops its opposition to tuition fees.  
2010 Lord Browne recommends that students should pay at least £21,000 for a 
three-year-degree in the most radical shake-up of higher education funding for 
50 years.  
2012 Maximum tuition fee set at £9,000 per annum. 
Source: The Telegraph 10/11/10 
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Appendix C2 
 
Brown’s et al. Model of Expected Debt 
 
Brown et al. (2005a) propose a theoretical model to examine the relationship between expected future 
income and debt which can be easily applied to student indebtedness. The author’s assume two time 
periods (t=1,2) where consumers can borrow (or save) freely between each period at an interest rate factor 
of  R (where R = 1 + r, with 0 < r >1). Their time preference is defined as R-1. They further assume that 
consumers have a twice differentiable utility function that is strictly concave in consumption, i.e. U′(C), 
U′′(C) < 0. With price normalised to 1 the individual’s utility function can be expressed: 
 
U(Ct)       [C2.1] 
 
where Ct is consumption in period t. Lenders are assumed risk neutral and earn zero profits on their 
lending denoted by D. Borrowers are assumed to have a certain first period income y1 > 0 but second 
period income y2 > 0 may be high (y2H)  or low (y2L) . The high income state in the second period occurs 
with exogenous probability p where 0<p<1, and the low income state with probability 1-p. It is assumed 
that borrows can always pay back their debt i.e. D < y2L/R, thus there is consumption smoothing. 
 
In the first period consumers maximise the utility function: 
  
U(y1 + D) + (pU[y2H – RD] + (1-p)U[y2L –RD])/R.     [C2.2]
   
The first order condition is expressed: 
 
U′(y1 + D) =  pU′ [y2H – RD] + (1-p)U′ [y2L –RD])     [C2.3] 
 
Partially differentiating this last expression in the optimum loan size D with respect to p gives: 
 
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
= 𝑈′[𝑦2𝐻−𝑅𝜕]−𝑈′[𝑦2𝐿−𝑅𝜕 ]
𝑈′′[𝑦1+𝜕]+𝑅[𝜕𝑈′′(𝑦2𝐻− 𝑅𝜕)+(1−𝜕)𝑈′′(𝑦2𝐿−𝑅𝜕)] > 0   [C2.4] 
 
Given that both the numerator and denominator are negative by concavity the above expression is 
positive. Debt incurred in period one is positively correlated with optimistic expectations in the second 
period. Thus some form of consumption smoothing over the time period explains this positive effect. The 
authors extend the model to situation where individuals face repayment difficulties in the second period 
and a situation in which borrowers have unlimited liability and lenders can appropriate the money lent. In 
both cases optimistic second period financial expectations is positively associated with debt.  
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Appendix C3 
 
Details of the Student Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was administered by myself with no other staff involved during 
January/February 2009 in seminars and lectures to full-time business and finance 
students who were registered on three-year business degree programmes at the 
university of Brighton. The students were given instructions on how to fill in the 
questionnaire and informed that the questionnaire had two sections. They were told that 
the first section related to questions concerning their personal characteristics (questions 
1- 7); family characteristics (questions 8 – 11); personal financial situation (questions 
12-14); and future financial expectations (questions 15-20). Students were given 10 
minutes to fill in the first part and were assured that all information would be strictly 
confidential and not to enter any identifying information (e.g. name or student number) 
other than the general information requested on the questionnaire. Students were also 
told that the exercise was voluntary and they had the right to refuse to partake, but only a 
few refused. Once all students had completed section one they were given instructions 
on how to fill in the second section. They were informed that the questions related to 
their subjective risk attitudes, risk taking behaviour, and time preference. In particular 
questions 2-4 in this section were described in detail to the students before they 
answered the questions. Students were given an extra five minutes to fill in this part of 
the questionnaire once instructed on how to do so. In total the questionnaire took 
between 20-25 minutes to administer and collect in. It was felt that this would be enough 
for students on any one sitting and it was not possible to have longer as the 
seminar/lecture only lasted for 50 minutes which meant that there were only 20 minutes 
left for teaching. This was the most that colleagues were willing to give up. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to do any follow-up questions (e.g. questions relating to 
the span of control) due to the practicalities of finding a suitable time. More importantly 
this meant that students had to be ‘identified’ which is against the university’s policy on 
research ethics. A copy of the questionnaire is provided below. 
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Questionnaire for Students                       
 
Section 1: Basic Details  
 
1. Age: …………..                                          2. Are you:  Male □  Female □ 
 
3.   What do you consider to be your race or cultural origin? Please tick one of the 
following 
 
□ White British     □ Black Other  □ Black British □ White Irish  
□ Indian        □ Other     □ White Other  □ Pakistani  
□ Black African □ Bangladeshi  □ Black Caribbean □ Chinese  
 
4.    Please tick all the qualifications that you have: 
 
□ No formal qualifications   □ GCSE/O-Level/Scottish O grade  
□ NVQ/City and Guilds   □ A-Level/Scottish Higher  
□ GNVQ     □ Degree 
□ HNC/HND/SHNC/SHND   □ Other     
 
5.     Subject of your degree:………………………..Year of Your Degree   _______ 
 
6.    Are you married or living with someone as ‘married’? □ Yes  □ No  
                              
7.    Do you think you will ever become self-employed in your career? 
 
□ Yes  □ No  □ Possibly □ Don’t Know  □ Have 
Already 
 
8.  Do either/both of your parents have a university degree? 
  
Mother   □ Yes □ No  Father   □ Yes □ No 
 
9.  What are your parents occupation(s): 
  
Mother _________________ Father __________________  
 
10.  Do your parents own their own house?     □ Yes □ No 
 
11.  Can you estimate your family's gross annual income.   £_____________ 
 
12.  Are you in receipt of a grant/scholarship or other financial support?   
 
□ Yes □ No 
 
13.  Are your parents contributing towards your subsistence?    □ Yes □ No 
 
 If so how much approximately per month?    £___________ 
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14.  Do you work during term-time?  □ Yes  □ No 
 
15.  In your first job after graduation what do you expect to earn (gross per year)?    
 
£……………………………… 
 
16.  By the age of 30, how much do you expect to be earning gross per year? 
  
□ As self-employed £………….. □ As Employed       £………………. 
 
 
17. By the age of 30, if you had not done a degree how much do you expect to be 
earning gross per year?  
 
□ As self-employed £………….. □As Employed       £……………….. 
 
 
18. What is your best estimate of the average expected (gross annual) earnings, at 
age 30, of someone on your course.  
 
£………………………………   
 
 
19. What will your estimated debt be at the end of the current academic year? 
(Exclude mortgage debt. If you will not be in debt, please answer zero).                     
 
£……………………………… 
 
 
20. What will your estimated debt be at the end of your course? (Exclude mortgage 
debt. If you will not be in debt, please answer zero). 
 
£……………………………… 
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Section 2: Risk Attitude Related Questions 
 
1. Please tick Yes or No                Yes       No  
 
a) Do you have a personal accident/illness or medical insurance policy? □ □ 
b) Do you smoke?  □ □ 
c) Do you usually take out travel insurance when you travel abroad?  □ □ 
d) Have you incurred interest charges on credit cards in the last year?  □ □ 
e) Do you regularly play the football pools or the lottery? □ □ 
f) Do you have a personal savings account?  □ □ 
g) Have you used a slot/fruit machine in the last week? □ □ 
h) Do you walk out of your way to cross roads at pedestrian crossings?  □ □ 
i) Have you ever participated in any of the following sports? □ □ 
 Hand gliding, parascending, parachuting, bungee-jumping, climbing,  
 flying or motor racing?           
 
2. Please tick the boxes best describing your attitude to the statements.  
 
                                                                                   Strongly  Slightly     Slightly     Strongly  
                                                                                    Agree  Agree  Neither   Disagree   Disagree  
a) I would not feel comfortable speaking to a     □      □       □           □               □ 
    bank manager about getting a business loan.  
b) I enjoy the risk of situations that many consider       □      □       □           □               □ 
    challenging.  
c) I am not scared of being in debt.     □      □       □           □               □ 
d) I do not handle uncertainty well.     □      □       □           □               □ 
 
3. Someone offers you a bet. You will win a net amount of £1,000 with probability 0.5 or end up 
losing the initial bet and your stake with probability 0.5. Please tick the maximum amount you are 
prepared to pay for this gamble.  
 
□ Will not participate      □ £200     □ £800  
□ £50        □ £400     □ £1,000  
□ £100       □ £600     □ £1,100  
 
4. If you are given £1,000 in Dec 2008 and five of your friends (A, B, C, D and E) are given the 
following amounts in Dec 2009. How would you consider your situation compared to theirs? Are 
you better off, worse off or the same?  
 
  Better  Worse  Same  
A £1,050  □     □      □ 
B £1,100  □     □      □ 
C £1,000  □     □      □ 
D £1,200  □     □      □ 
E £ 950 □     □      □ 
 
5. How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do 
you try to avoid taking risks? Please check a box on the scale where the value 0 means: "not 
prepared to take risks" and the value 10 means: "fully prepared to take risks." You can use the 
values in between to make your estimate. 
 
Not prepared to take risks    Fully prepared to take 
risks 
 
□0     □1 □ 2  □3 □ 4 □5 □6  □7 □8  □9    □10 
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Appendix C4 
 
Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Index Function 
 Specification  1 Specification  2 Specification  3 Specification  4 Specification  5 
Gender (male) 2778.829** 
(1135.057) 
2698.596** 
(1126.108) 
1945.72* 
(1145.521) 
2200.331* 
(1164.468) 
1716.42 
(1153.611)      
white non-British  -2707.252 
(1703.659) 
-2849.808* 
(1691.023) 
-2480.673 
(1680.933) 
-2509.062 
(1677.272) 
-2397.787 
(1675.025)     
other ethnic group -4451.135*** 
(1338.231)    
-4731.201*** 
(1334.493) 
-3783.644*** 
(1358.557) 
-3763.769 *** 
(1355.364) 
-3578.558*** 
(1360.942) 
white British  ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
age (years) -105.485 
(185.223) 
-85.95528 
(183.083) 
-68.06565 
(181.5533) 
-62.74967 
(181.5119) 
-64.66597 
(180.8673) 
grant/scholarship 1374.403 
(1242.840) 
1136.778 
(1237.174) 
814.1341 
(1228.101) 
919.3138 
(1228.78) 
726.4714 
(1224.727) 
has part-time job -9329.065*** 
(1314.503) 
-9250.845*** 
(1303.963) 
-9126.963*** 
(1290.228) 
-9138.506*** 
(1287.42) 
-9300.18*** 
(1291.812) 
monthly 
contribution (£) 
-12.71511*** 
(2.785663)      
-12.60206*** 
(2.772099) 
-12.87514*** 
(2.754683)      
-12.99704*** 
(2.751435) 
-13.05032*** 
(2.747557) 
first year student 1185.199 
(1598.316)    
1579.376 
(1595.03) 
1692.697 
(1577.31)      1614.65 (1574.97) 
1784.475 
(1572.276) 
second year student 4624.307** 
(1865.06) 
4613.493** 
(1850.392) 
4789.544*** 
(1831.436) 
4805.839*** 
(1826.018) 
4865.126*** 
(1824.783) 
third year student ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
family home owners -3364.937** 
(1542.454) 
-3425.212** 
(1529.731) 
-3113.935 ** 
(1515.613) 
-3181.503** 
(1513.154) 
-3330.741** 
(1517.94) 
Mother and father 
university educated 
-3563.146** 
(1502.076) 
-3633.47**   
(1488.673)    
-3756.185** 
(1475.511) 
-3737.955** 
(1472.095) 
-3786.544** 
(1469.363) 
Expected earnings 
>£30,000 after 
graduation 
4398.127** 
(1718.200) 
 4306.177** 
(1703.67)     
2777.089*  
(1663.05) 
2997.096* 
(1773.093) 
2832.511* 
(1760.28) 
Expected earnings 
>£50,000 at 30 
2975.695*** 
(1112.742) 
 2975.397*** 
(1103.299)     
2800.379*** 
(1092.935) 
2850.978*** 
(1091.354)     
2929.138*** 
(1093.169) 
discount rate § 15388.66** (7053.512) 
15023.42** 
(6973.531) 
14726.24** 
(6961.176)      
14736.54** 
(6948.69) 
risk attitude § §  811.2701*** (291.0654) 
 862.2457*** 
(293.8944) 
764.4649*** 
(291.6456) 
debt aversion § § § 494.1774 (432.7096) 
§ 
uncertainty aversion § § § § 686.6526 (509.2374) 
σ 9113.382 
(425.2541) 
9034.38 
(421.4977) 
8923.831 
(493.4554) 
8901.029 
(490.5441) 
8888.974 
(492.6188) 
Goodness of fit 
stats: 
     
R2 - ANOVA 0.263 0.275 0.277 0.281 0.277 
R2 - Decomposition 0.272       0.284 0.287 0.291 0.290        
Log-Likelihood -2686.349 -2683.987 -2680.104 -2679.454 -2679.199 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test - 2kχ  
138.95 [0.000] 143.68 [0.000] 151.44 [0.000] 152.75 [0.000] 153.25 [0.000] 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
Notes to table:  
(a) All estimations reported were undertaken using NLOGIT 3.0 (2003). 
(b) Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(c) * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(d)  f  denotes base category in estimation  
(e) § denotes variable not used in estimation  
(f) R2- ANOVA = variance in predicted conditional mean over variance in dependent variable 
(g) R2 – Decomposition = variance in predicted mean over variance in predicted mean plus model residual variation 
(h) The likelihood ratio test is defined: -2×(Log-likelihood value (constant only) - Log-likelihood value (full model). The test 
statistic is a chi-squared statistic with the degrees of freedom determined by the number of independent variables (k) in the 
relevant specification. The null tests the joint restriction that all the estimated coefficients from a specific specification are 
simultaneously equal to zero.  
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Appendix C5 
 
Tobit Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Index Function Debt at End of Academic 
Year 
 Specification  1 Specification  2 Specification  3 Specification  4 Specification  5 
Gender (male) 1382.324** (642.875) 
1341.854 ** 
 (639.805) 
 954.818 
(652.865) 
973.838 
(665.001) 829.095 (658.165)      
white non-British  -2298.497** (969.591) 
-2367.636** 
(965.426) 
-2183.509 ** 
(962.621) 
-2186.919** 
(962.967) 
-2134.721** 
(959.995)     
other ethnic group -2893.911*** (758.950)    
-3022.941*** 
(758.896) 
-2539.793*** 
(774.482) 
-2538.935*** 
(774.526) 
-2434.801*** 
(776.078) 
white British  ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
age (years)  -78.633 (104.145) 
-87.565  
(103.339) 
-96.520  
(102.798) 
-96.931  
(102.862) 
-98.390  
(102.500) 
grant/scholarship 565.501 (703.883) 
462.736  
(702.509) 
309.979  
(699.122) 
317.971  
(701.167) 
264.344  
(697.633) 
has part-time job -4282.681*** (745.148) 
-4237.705*** 
(741.373) 
-4184.527*** 
(735.909) 
-4186.052*** 
(736.022) 
-4286.087*** 
(738.115) 
monthly 
contribution (£) 
-6.848*** 
(1.590)      
-6.7914*** 
(1.585) 
-6.936*** 
 (1.580)      
-6.947*** 
(1.581) 
-7.047*** 
(1.579) 
first year student -7768.769*** (892.242)    
-7594.654*** 
(892.212) 
-7540.187 *** 
(885.089)      
-7545.894 *** 
(885.943) 
-7487.205*** 
(883.178) 
second year student -3876.944*** (1040.466) 
-3893.02*** 
(1034.963) 
-3796.898 *** 
(1027.518) 
-3794.812*** 
(1027.551) 
-3747.941*** 
(1024.977) 
third year student ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ 
family home 
owners 
-1635.141* 
(876.014) 
-1657.87* 
(871.572) 
-1497.808* 
(866.271) 
-1503.426* 
(867.073) 
-1613.016* 
(868.035) 
Mother and father 
university educated 
-2203.927** 
(856.041) 
-2232.516 *** 
(850.893)    
-2312.594 *** 
(846.739) 
-2312.164*** 
(846.792) 
-2323.25*** 
(843.664) 
Expected earnings 
>£30,000 after 
graduation 
2262.548** 
(971.933) 
 2217.806** 
(966.880)     
1435.436  
(1004.593) 
1452.516  
(1011.012) 
1468.641 
(1001.924) 
Expected earnings 
>£50,000 at 30 
1381.648** 
(631.672) 
 1381.485** 
(628.190)     
1286.742** 
(624.393) 
1291.072** 
(625.086)     
1356.243** 
(625.049) 
discount rate § 7136.448* (4005.636) 
6970.494* 
(3972.902) 
6950.364* 
(3975.198)      
6850.687 * 
(3961.041) 
risk attitude § §  422.2024** (167.206) 
 426.0842** 
(169.197) 
395.7183** 
(167.697) 
debt aversion § § § 37.14454 (246.581) 
§ 
uncertainty 
aversion § § § § 
374.250 (290.117) 
σ 5125.616 
(241.171) 
5097.048 
(239.800) 
5049.157 
(237.249) 
5049.087 
(237.244) 
5033.051 
(236.471) 
Goodness of fit 
stats: 
     
R2 - ANOVA 0.316 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.326 
R2 - Decomposition 0.340      0.248 0.346 0.346 0.347        
Log-Likelihood -2493.985 -2492.405 -2489.206 -2489.195 -2488.376 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test -χ
𝑘
2
  
166.89 [0.000] 170.05 [0.000] 176.45 [0.000] 176.47 [0.000] 178.11 [0.000] 
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 
Note to tables:  
(a) Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(c) * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(d)  f  denotes base category in estimation and § denotes variable not used in estimation 
(f) R2- ANOVA = variance in predicted conditional mean over variance in dependent variable 
(g) R2 – Decomposition = variance in predicted mean over variance in predicted mean plus model residual variation 
(h) The likelihood ratio test is defined: -2×(Log-likelihood value (constant only) - Log-likelihood value (full model). The test 
statistic is a chi-squared statistic with the degrees of freedom determined by the number of independent variables (k) in the relevant 
specification. The null tests the joint restriction that all the estimated coefficients from a specific specification are simultaneously 
equal to zero.  
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Appendix D1 
 
Table 1 Proposed UK GPA Classification Scheme 
 
Grade Standard Grade Point UK current descriptor 
A+ Excellent 4.25 Top 1st 
A Excellent 4.00 Good 1st 
A- Excellent 3.75 Low 1st 
B+ Good 3.50 High 2-1 
B Good 3.25 Mid 2-1 
B- Good/Satisfactory 3.00 Low 2-1 
C+ Satisfactory 2.75 High 2-2 
C Satisfactory 2.50 Mid 2-2 
C- Satisfactory 2.25 Low 2-2 
D+ Adequate 2.00 3rd 
D Pass 1.00 Low 3rd or pass 
D- Marginal Fail 0.50 Marginal Fail 
F Fail 0.00 Fail 
 Source:  Higher Education Academy (2013) 
 
 
Table 2 US  GPA Classification Scheme 
 
Grade Percentage Grade Grade Point 
A+ 97-100 4.25 
A 93-96 4.00 
A- 90-92 3.75 
B+ 87-89 3.50 
B 83-86 3.25 
B- 80-82 3.00 
C+ 77-79 2.75 
C 73-76 2.50 
C- 70-72 2.25 
D+ 67-69 2.00 
D 65-66 1.00 
E/F Below 65 0.00 
Source: College Board: http://www.collegeboard.com/html/academicTracker-howtoconvert.html 
US universities and colleges are free to determine their own degree classification 
systems, but in general, most universities and colleges award degrees according to a 
five-point letter scale: A+ (the highest qualification) and E/F (the lowest classification). 
These grades are determined by a student’s grade point average (GPA) that typically 
ranges from 0 for an E/F-grade to 4 for an A-grade.  Students are required to attain a 
minimum GPA to continue with their studies within a university. A student’s GPA is 
determined by the numerical value of the letter grade awarded in each course taken 
during a semester weighted by the credits each course attracts determined by the hours 
timetabled for each course. Some universities use a 100-point grading system.  Similar, 
grading systems are used in American high schools, but the number of classes and the 
thresholds delineating classes can differ between states. 
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Appendix D2 
 
 
Variable Definitions for Primary Empirical Analysis 
 
Variable Definition Source 
% good 
degrees 
Percentage  of 1st Class and upper second (2:1) 
awarded in year of observation (leaving year) 
Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) 
% Female 
Graduates 
Percentage of FTE HE Female students graduating 
in year of observation 
HESA Students in HE 
% Science 
Graduates 
Percentage of FTE students on science related 
undergraduate programmes excluding medically 
related subjects relative to Arts undergraduate 
programmes 
Science subjects include: Biological sciences; Veterinary science; Agriculture and related 
sciences; Physical sciences; Mathematical sciences; Computer science; Engineering and 
technology. 
Arts Subjects include:  Social studies; Law; Business and administrative studies; Mass 
communications and documentation; Languages; Historical and philosophical studies; Creative 
arts and design; Education. 
 
% UK 
Domiciled 
Students 
Proportion of FTE undergraduate students 
domiciled in the UK to all undergraduates. 
HESA Students in HE: FTE undergraduate (UG) students. 
UK domiciled students are those whose normal residence is in the UK (inc.  Guernsey, Jersey 
and the Isle of Man) 
European Union (EU) students are those whose normal residence is in countries which were 
European Union (EU) members as at 1 December of the reporting period. 
Non-European Union students are those whose normal residence prior to commencing their 
programme of study in the UK resided outside the EU. 
% Students 
from State 
Schools 
Percentage of young full-time undergraduate 
entrants from state schools or colleges 
Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) 
Performance Indicators: Table T1b - Participation of under-represented groups in higher 
education: Young full-time undergraduate entrants. Available at:  www.hesa.ac.uk/pis/urg  
Pre-entry 
points 
Median entry tariff points of students on 
admission to specific university 
The data are compiled as part of the National Student Survey (NSS) and available on the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE) website: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/lt/publicinfo/nationalstudentsurvey/nationalstudentsurveydata/ 
NSS student 
satisfaction 
score 
The average value of overall student satisfaction 
with their programme of study measured on a 
scale of 0-100. The higher the rating the better is 
students’ overall satisfaction with the teaching and 
overall learning experience. 
The data can be found on the HEFCE website: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/lt/publicinfo/nationalstudentsurvey/nationalstudentsurveydata/ 
and includes the response to question 22 on the student questionnaire ‘Overall, I am satisfied 
with the quality my course’ that is used in the analysis. It should be noted that these scores were 
registered on a scale from 1-5 in 2005 and 2006 and the results were multiplied by 20 to make 
them comparable to satisfaction ratings from 2007 onwards. 
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Variable Definition Source 
 
ln Expenditure Natural logarithm of  real total expenditure 
(£’000) on academic services (1998=100) 
Expenditures on: Central Libraries and Information Services; Central Computer and Computer 
Networks; and other academic services. Including Staff costs (Academic/Other Academic /Other 
service staff); Other expenses and depreciation of equipment). 
2002/03 Finance Return (£000s) Table 6 Expenditure by Activity: Academic Services 
Staff-Student 
Ratio 
Numerator: Total FTE of students studying at 
higher education institutions.  
Denominator: Total FTE of teaching /teaching and 
research academic staff and atypical teaching 
staff. 
HESA: Students and staff in HE 
 
% FTE 
undergraduate 
students  
Percentage of full-time equivalent undergraduate 
students to all FTE equivalent students 
HESA: Students in HE 
% First Year 
Drop Outs 
Percent of full-time first degree entrants who are 
no longer in HE 
 
Performance Indicators: Table T3a - Non-continuation following year of entry: Full-time first 
degree entrants. Available at: www.hesa.ac.uk/pis/urg 
VC Dummy for change of Vice Chancellor Whos Who (various years) An Annual Biography, London: A and C Black, and university 
websites. 
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Appendix D3 
 
The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service Points System 
 
 
 
 
Source: UCAS tariff tables accessed September 2012 available at: 
http://www.ucas.com/how-it-all-works/explore-your-options/entry-requirements/tariff-
tables 
 
 
The first A-level students to be awarded points based on the new UCAS tariff shown 
above completed their A-levels, Scottish Highers, or Advanced Vocational Certificate in 
Education (AVCE) in 2002. Further information on allocation of points for the AVCE 
and other qualifications can be found on the UCAS website as referenced above. The 
points previously awarded to specific grades in the old points system are shown in 
parenthesis next to the current scores. It should be noted that the A* grade was first 
awarded in 2010 to indentify exceptional A-level performance as concern was raised 
over grade inflation at A-level. It is also important to note that a one-year A/S 
qualification was also introduced at the same time which is typically seen as equivalent 
to half a full A-level and the grades achieves in this qualification attracts half the tariff 
points for the equivalent grades in the ‘full’ two year A-level qualification as shown in 
column three in the table.  It should also be noted that AVCE qualifications can be 
combined with a traditional A-level. 
 
 
 
 
  
Qualification A-level A/S Advanced 
Scottish 
Highers 
Scottish 
Highers 
Grade     
A* 140 N/A N/A N/A 
A 120 (10) 60 (5) 130 80 
B 100  (8) 50 (4) 110 65 
C 80    (6) 40 (3) 90 50 
D 60    (4) 30 (2) 72 36 
E 40    (2) 20 (1) N/A N/A 
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Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables used for the Secondary 
Empirical Analysis 
 
Variable Definition  Proportion  
Good Degree  = 1 if 1st or 2:1 degree class, zero otherwise 0.546 
Individual Characteristics2   
Female  = 1 if female, zero otherwise 0.577 
Age at entry:   
18-20  = 1 if aged 18-20, zero otherwise 0.718 
21-24  = 1 if aged 21-24, zero otherwise 0.183 
25-29  = 1 if aged 25-29, zero otherwise 0.045 
30+  = 1 if aged is 30 or over, zero otherwise 0.054 
2
3χ = 132.54 [p-value =0.000]   
Ethnicity:   
White = 1 if white, zero otherwise 0.821 
Asian = 1 if asian, zero otherwise 0.058 
Black = 1 if black, zero otherwise 0.036 
Mixed Race = 1 if mixed race, zero otherwise 0.032 
Other Ethnic = 1 if other ethnic group, zero otherwise 0.011 
Ethnicity unknown      = 1 if ethnicity is unknown, zero otherwise 0.042 
2
5χ = 22.89[p-value =0.000] 
  
Area of origin:   
UK  = 1 if UK domiciled, zero otherwise 0.921 
EU = 1 if EU domiciled, zero otherwise 0.046 
Overseas = 1 if overseas domiciled, zero otherwise 0.033 
2
2χ = 0.76 [p-value =0.685] 
  
Other characteristics   
Full-time  programme = 1 if full-time student, zero otherwise 0.981 
Disability declared = 1 if disability declared, zero otherwise 0.116 
Clearing = 1 if entered the university through clearing, 
zero otherwise 0.085 
Pre-entry qualifications   
UCAS Points:3   
≤160 = 1 if UCAS entry points ≤160 0.116 
161 - 260 = 1 if UCAS entry points 161 - 260 0.271 
261 - 319 = 1 if UCAS entry points 261 - 319 0.221 
 ≥ 320 = 1 if UCAS entry points ≥ 320 0.161 
Other UK qualification (non A-level)4 = 1 if student holds non-A level qualification 0.055 
HE qualification 5 = 1 if student holds a higher education 
qualification below the level of a honours 
degree, zero otherwise 0.121 
Non-UK qualification = 1 if student holds non-UK qualification, zero 
otherwise 0.047 
No formal qualification = 1 if no formal educational qualification is 
held, zero otherwise 0.008 
2
7χ =188.97 [p-value =0.000]   
Year of exit   
2005/06 = 1 if year of exit is 2006, zero otherwise 0.208 
2006/07   = 1 if year of exit is 2007, zero otherwise 0.226 
2007/08 = 1 if year of exit is 2008, zero otherwise 0.189 
2008/09 = 1 if year of exit is 2009, zero otherwise 0.185 
2009/10 = 1 if year of exit is 2010, zero otherwise 0.192 
2
4χ =6.49 [p-value =0.165]   
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Variable Definition  Proportion  
Head of household’s occupational 
group:6 
  
White collar/professional = 1 if white collar/professional occupation, zero 
otherwise 0.574 
Skilled manual/non-manual = 1 if skilled manual/non-manual  occupation, 
zero otherwise 0.249 
Semi-skilled/unskilled = 1 if semi-skilled/unskilled occupation, zero 
otherwise 0.160 
Unemployed/retired = 1 if unemployed or retired, zero otherwise 0.017 
2
3χ =6.73 [p-value =0.081]   
School of Study   
Architecture and design = 1 if  architecture or design, zero otherwise 0.073 
Art and communication = 1 if  arts or communication studies, zero 
otherwise 0.093 
Historical and critical studies = 1 if historical or critical studies, zero 
otherwise 0.035 
Business and finance = 1 if business or finance, zero otherwise 0.145 
Service management = 1 if service management, zero otherwise 0.057 
Computing, mathematical and 
information services 
= 1 if studying for honours degree in computing, 
mathematics or  information services, zero 
otherwise 0.080 
Sports science = 1 if sports science, zero otherwise 0.101 
Education = 1 if education, zero otherwise 0.089 
Modern Languages = 1 if modern languages, zero otherwise 0.036 
Social science = 1 if social science, zero otherwise 0.082 
Health care = 1 if health care, zero otherwise 0.042 
Engineering = 1 if engineering, zero otherwise 0.031 
Environmental sciences = 1 if environmental sciences, zero otherwise 0.069 
Pharmacy and biological sciences = 1 if pharmacy and biological sciences, zero 
otherwise 0.067 
2
13χ = 1700 [p-value =0.000] 
  
   
Number of  observations  11358 
Notes:  
1 z-scores are used to test differences in sample proportions between females and males. The appropriate 
critical value at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed test is ± 1.96. 
2  Chi-squared values are used to test the assumption of independence in the sets of categorical variables 
and performance. The significance levels of these tests are reported in parenthesis. 
3 The scores reported are those for A-level, AVCE and Scottish Higher or equivalent qualifications. 
4 Other UK qualifications include Access, BTECH and NVQ level 3 qualifications 
5 HE qualifications include HND, HNC and Foundation degrees and other HE qualification lower than 
degree standard. 
6 Occupational groups: 1) White collar and professional occupations include: CEOs/senior managers of 
large public/private sector companies, local government senior officers, bank/financial service managers 
surveyors, officers in the armed forces, university/FE lecturers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, accountants, 
chemists, physicists etc; 2) Skilled manual/non-manual include: librarians, medical and legal secretaries, 
bricklayers, machine operatives, welders, train drivers, HGV drivers etc. 3) Semi-skilled/ unskilled include: 
traffic wardens, assistant teacher/nurses hairdressers, farm labourers sales assistants etc. 
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Appendix D5 
 
True Random Effects Estimates  
(Exponential Distribution for the Efficiency Term) 
 
Variable Name 
 
Coefficient Robust 
Standard error 
Students Characteristics   
Ln (% Female Graduates) 0.062 0.071 
Ln (% Science Graduates) -0.004 0.007 
Ln (% UK Domiciled Students   (lagged 3 years)) 0.148** 0.070 
Ln(% Students from State Schools (lagged 3 years)) -0.244** 0.110 
Ln (Median entry  points (lagged 3 years)) 0.247*** 0.046 
Ln(NSS score (lagged 1 year)) -0.017 0.106 
University Characteristics   
Pre-1992 university 0.050*** 0.019 
Post-2003 university -0.013 0.040 
Post-1992 university f  
Ln (expenditure (in 1998 prices)) 0.002 0.013 
Ln(Staff-student ratio) 0.020 0.027 
Ln(% FTE undergraduate students) -0.122 0.099 
Ln(% First year drop outs (lagged 3 years)) -0.022* 0.012 
Ln(VC tenure (years)) 0.001 0.004 
Year Dummies   
Year dummy 2012 0.089*** 0.012 
Year dummy 2011 0.046*** 0.010 
Year dummy 2010 0.025*** 0.009 
Year dummy 2009 0.003 0.008 
Year dummy 2008 -0.001 0.007 
Year dummy 2007 -0.0004 0.006 
Year dummy 2006 f  
𝜎𝑢
2
 0.048*** 0.005 
𝜎𝑣
2 0.031*** 0.004 
𝜎𝑣
2/𝜎𝑢2 1.568 0.007 
F-statistic§ / Wald test 𝜒202  
746.21 
[0.000] 
Simulated- likelihood 934.1582 
Observations 700 
Number of universities 100 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by university.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c)  f  denotes base category in estimation.  
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Appendix D6 
 
Maximum Likelihood Probit (index) Estimates for ‘Good’ Degree Classification 
 
 Probit index function 
 Coefficient Robust  
Standard error 
Constant -0.882***  0.171 
Female 0.239***  0.055 
Age at entry  
21-24 0.232***  0.044 
25-29 0.255***  0.083 
30+ 0.330***  0.134 
18-20 f    
Ethnicity  
Asian/British Asian -0.418***  0.088 
Black/British Black -0.472***  0.055 
Mixed race -0.198***  0.074 
Other ethnic -0.395***  0.083 
Ethnicity unknown or refused  0.116  0.091 
White f   
Occupational group of H/H head  
Professional/managerial 0.251***  0.038 
Semi-skilled/unskilled -0.044  0.039 
Unemployed/retired -0.382***  0.077 
Skilled manual/non-manual f    
Domicile  
UK 0.320 ***  0.119 
Overseas -0.205  0.129 
EU f   
Pre entry qualifications  
161<UCAS points< 260 0.076  0.052 
261<UCAS points< 320 0.660***  0.062 
UCAS points > 320 0.844***  0.080 
Other UK qualification  0.051  0.092 
HE Qualification 0.213***  0.071 
Non UK qualification 0.487***  0.164 
No formal qualification -0.021  0.118 
UCAS points < 160 f   
Other Characteristics  
Full time =1 0.168*  0.098 
Disability declared -0.062  0.050 
Clearing =1 -0.087  0.069 
School of Study  
Architecture and Design -0.301***  0.025 
Arts and Communication 0.100***  0.032 
Historical and Critical Studies -0.063**  0.027 
Service Management -0.222***  0.037 
Computing, Mathematical and Information Sciences -0.396***  0.026 
Sport science -0.402***  0.017 
Education -0.451***  0.034 
Languages -0.011  0.024 
Applied Social Science -0.368***  0.028 
Health Professions -0.096**  0.043 
Engineering -0.036  0.023 
Environment 0.114***  0.008 
Pharmacy and Biomolecular Sciences 0.027  0.021 
Business and finance f   
Year of Exit  
2009/10 0.202***  0.080 
2008/09 0.104*  0.061 
2007/08 0.103  0.070 
2006/07 0.066  0.073 
2005/06 f   
Psuedo_R2   0.093 
Log-likelihood -7098.884 
Observations   11358 
Notes to table:  
(a) Robust standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering by academic units.   
(b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(c) f  denotes base category in estimation. 
